acknowledgment

If there be no express promise, but a promise is to be raised by implication of law from the acknowledgment of the party, such acknowledgment ought to contain an unqualified and direct admission of a previous, subsisting debt, which the party is liable and willing to pay. If there be accompanying circumstances, which repel the presumption of a promise or intention to pay; if the expressions be equivocal, vague, and indeterminate, leading to no certain conclusion, but at best to probable inference, which may affect different minds in different ways; we think they ought not to go to a jury as evidence of a new promise to revive the cause of action.

The act of one who has executed a deed, in going before some competent officer or court, and declaring it to be his act or deed. The acknowledgment is certified by the officer or court; and the term "acknowledgment" is sometimes used to designate the certificate. Sometimes loosely used for "admission" (q. V.)

The act of one who has executed a deed, in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. The acknowledgment is certified by the officer The function of an acknowledgment Is two-fold: to authorize the deed to be given in evidence without further proof of its execution, and to entitle it to be recorded. The same purposes may be accomplished by a subscribing witness going before the officer or court and making oath to the fact of the execution, which is certified in the same manner; but in some states this is only permitted in case of the death, absence, or refusal of the grantor. In. the states a deed is void except as between the parties and their privies, unless acknowledged or proved. Nature of. In some states the act is held to be a judicial or quasi-judu-ial one; Wasson v. Connor, 54 Mis. 351; Harmon t. Magee, 57 Miss. 410; Grider v. Mortgage Co., 99 Ala. 281, 12 South. 775, 42 Am. St. Rep. 5S (changing the rule of earlier cases); Thompson v. Mortgage Security Co., 110 Ala. 400, 18 South. 315, 55 Am. St. Rep. 29; Heilman v. Kroh, 155 Pa. 1, 25 Atl. 751; Murrell v. Diggs, 84 Va. 900, 6 S. E. 461, 10 Am. St Rep. 893; while in others it is held to be a ministerial act; Lynch v. Livingston, 6 N. Y. 422; Loree v. Abner, 57 Fed. 159, 6 C. C. A. 302; Ford v. Osborne, 45 Ohio St 1, 12 N. E. 526; Learned v. Riley, 14 Allen (Mass.) 109. Who may take. An officer related to the parties; Lynch v. Livingston, 6 N. Y. 422; Remington Paper Co. v. O'Dougherty, SI N. Y. 474. The presumption is that the officer took it within his jurisdiction; Morrison v. White, 16 La. Ann. 100; Rackleff v. Norton, 19 Me. 274; Bradley v. West, 60 Mo and that it was duly executed; Albany County Savings Bank v. Mc Carty, 71 Hun 227, 24 N. Y. Supp. 991. In some states a notary cannot take acknowledgment in another county than the one within which he was appointed and resides; Utica & Black River R. Co. v. Stewart, 33 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 312; Rehkoph v. Miller, 59 111. App. 662; nor the attorney of record; Gilmore v. Hempstead, 4 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 153; Thurman v. Cameron, 24 Wend. (X. Y.) 91; Hucrhes v. Wilkinson's Lessee. 37 Miss. 482; Hedger v. Ward, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 106; nor if his term has expired; Gilbraith v. Gallivan, 78 Mo. 452; Carlisle v. Carlisle, 78 Ala. 542. In Pennsylvania, by statute, a notary may act anywhere within the state; Acts, 1893, p. 323. Taking an acknowledgment is not public business such as may not be transacted on a legal holiday: Slater v. Schack, 41 Minn. 2G9. 43 N. W. 7. One cannot take an acknowledgment of a deed in which he has any interest; Beamau v. Whitney, 20 Mo. 413; Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329; Wasson v. Connor, 54 Miss. 351; Brown v. Moore, 38 Tex. 645; Withers v. Baird, 7 Watts (Pa.) 227, 32 Am. Dec. 754. Contra, Davis v. Beazley, 75 Va. 491: Dail v. Moore, 51 Mo. 589; West v. Krebaum, SS 111. 263; Green v. Abraham, 43 Ark. 420. of acknowledgment and the lueniity of the parties are the essential parts, and must be stated; Bryan v. Ramirez, 8 OaL 461, 68 Am. Dec. 340; Morse v. Clayton, 13 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 373; Alexander v Merry, <J Mo, 514. The general rule applied in cases of grammatical or clerical 'errors is that the courts will disregard obvious mistakes, and read into the acknowledgment the proper won1. If such word can he easily ascertained; Merritt v. Yates, 71 111. 636, 23 Am. Rep. 128; Cairo & St. L. K. Co. v. Parrott, 02 111. 194; Durst v. Daugherty, 81 Tex. 650, 17 s. w. 388; Mc- Oardla v. Hillings, 10 N. D. 373, 87 N. W. 1008, 88 Am. St. Rep. 720; Frostburg Mut. Bldg. Ass'n v. Brace, 51 Md. 50S; Hug! Wright, 100 Tex. 511, 101 S. W. 789, 11 L. R. A. (X. S.) 643, 123 Am. St. Rep. 827; but it is held that important words omitted cannot be supplied by intendment; Jackway v. Gault, 20 Ark. 190, 73 Am. Dec. 494; Hayden v. Westcott, 11 Conn. 129; Newman v. Samuels, 17 la. 52S; Wetmore v. Laird, 5 Biss. 160, Fed. Cas. No. 17,467. In the following cases it was held that the statute must be strictly complied with; Buell v. Irwin, 24 Mich. 145; Rogers v. Adams, 66 Ala. GOO; Myers v. Boyd, 96 Pa. 427; Wetmore v. Laird, 5 Biss. 160, Fed. Cas. No. 17,467; Tully v. Davis, 30 111. 103, 83 Am. Dec. 170: Ridgely v. Howard, 3 H. & McK. (Md.) 321. Where a notary takes the acknowledgment and attaches his seal, but fails to sign his name, it is not sufficient; Clark v. Wilson, 127 111. 420, 19 N. E. 800. 11 Am. St. Hop. ! 13. Effect of. Only purchasers for value can take advantage of defects; Mastin v. Halley, 61 Mo. 196. An acknowledged deed is evidence of seizin in the grantee, and authorizes recording it; Kellogg v. Loomis, 16 Gray (Mass.) 48. An unacknowledged deed is good between the parties and subsequent purchasers with actual notice; Gray v. Ulrich, 8 Kan. 112; Kellogg v. Loomis, 16 Gray (Mass.) 48; Stevens v. Hampton, 40 Mo. 404; Bishop v. Schneider, 46 Mo. 472, 2 Am. Rep. 533; Ryan v. Carr. 40 Mo. 483. The certificate will prevail over the unsupported denial of the grantor; Lickmon v. Harding, 65 111. 505. Identification of Grantor. An introduction by a common friend is sufficient to justify officer in making certificate; Carpenter v. Dexter, S Wall. (U. S.) 513, 19 L. Ed. 126. Contra, Jones v. Bach, 48 Barb. (N. Y.) 568T Nippel v. Hammond, 4 Col. 211. See Acquainted. A notary imposed upon by a personation is liable only for clear negligence. It is a legal presumption that he acted on reasonable information, and his absence of memory as to details of what occurred does not destroy that presumption; Com. v. Haines, The certificate is not invalidated by wau* of recollection of the officer; looker v. Sloan, 30 N. J. Eq. 394; nor by □ or omission of, the date; Huxley v. Har 62 Mo. 510; Kelly v. I k, 45 Md We Wb v. Buff, 'W Tex. C77; Yorty v. Paine. 01' Wis. 15!, 22 N. W. 137. It is always permissible to show thai party never appeared before the officer acknowledged the deed; Donahue v. Mills, 41 Ark. 421; Pickens v. Knisely, 29 A'.' 1, 11 s. E. 932, 8 Am. St Rep. 622; but if he appeared, the rtiflcate of acknowledgment can only be 6 for fraud or imposition, with knowledge bro home to the grantee: Bouvier-Iaeger Land Co. v. Sypher, 180 Fed. I Correction. Where a notary fails to set forth the necessary facts, he may correct his certificate, and may be compelled by mandamus, but equity has no jurisdiction to correct it; Wannall v. Kem, 51 Mo. 150; Hutchinson v. Ains Worth, 63 Cal. 286; Merritt v. Yates, 71 111. 636, 23 Am. Rep. 1- See paper by Judge Cooley, 4 Amer. Bar Assoc. 1SS1.

In conveyancing. The act by which a party who has executed an instrument of conveyance as grantor goes before a competent officer or court, and declares or acknowledges the same as his genuine and voluntary act and deed. The certificate of the officer on such instrument that it has been so acknowledged. Rogers v. Pell, 154 N. Y. 518, 49 N. E. 75; Strong v. United States (D. C.) 34 Fed. 17; Burbank v. Ellis, 7 Neb. 156. The term is also used of the act of a person who avows or admits the truth of certain facts which, if established, will entail a civil liability upon him. Thus, the debtor's acknowledgment of the creditor's demand or right of action will toll the statute of limitations. Ft. Scott v. Hickman, 112 U. S. 150, 163, 5 Sup. Ct. 56, 28 L Ed. 636. Admission is also used in this sense. Roanes v. Archer, 4 Leigh (Va.) 550. To denote an avowal of criminal acts, or the concession of the truth of a criminal charge, the word "confession" seems more appropriate. Of a child. An avowal or admission that the child is one's own;' recognition of a parental relation, either by a written agreement, verbal declarations or statements, by the life, acts, and conduct of the parties, or any other satisfactory evidence that the relation was recognized and admitted. In re Spencer (Sur.) 4 N. Y. Supp. 395; In re Hunt's Estate, 86 Hun, 232, 33 N. Y. Supp. 256; Blythe . Ayres, 96 Cal. 532, 31 Pan. 915, 19 In R. A. 40; Balley v. Boyd, 59 Ind. 292.

— Acknowledgment money. A sum paid in some parts of England by copyhold tenants on the death of their lords, as a recognition of their new lords, in like manner as money is usually paid on the attornment of tenants. Cowell.

— Separate acknowledgment. An acknowledgment of a deed or other instrument, made by a married woman, on her examination by the officer separate and apart from her husband.

In conveyancing. The act by which a party who has executed an-instrument of conveyance as grantor goes before a competent officer or court, and declares or acknowledges the same as his genuine and voluntary act and deed. The certiticate of the officer on such instrument that it has been so acknowledged. facts which, if established, will entail a civil liability upon him. Thus, the debtor’s aeknowledgment of the creditor’s demand or right of action will toll the statute of limitations. Admission is also used in this seuse. To denote an avowal of criminal acts, or the concession of (he truth of a criminal charge, the word “confession” seems more appropriate.

Owning to; avowal, admission. 1. A statement by a debtor that a claim, barred by the statute of limitations, is still a valid obligation. Takes the case out of the statute, and revives the original cause of action. An acknowledgment which will revive the original cause of action must be unqualified and unconditional. It must show positively that the debt is due in whole or in part. If connected with circumstances which affect the claim, or if conditional, it may amount to a new assumpsit for which the old debt is a sufficient consideration; or if it be construed to revive the original debt, that revival is conditional, and the performance of the condition, or a readiness to perform it, must be shown." A new promise, as a new cause of action, ought to be proved in a clear and explicit manner, and be in its terms unequivocal and determinate; and, if any conditions are annexed, they ought to be shown to be performed. If there be no express promise, but a promise to be raised by implication of law from the acknowledgment of the party, such acknowledgment ought to contain an unqualified and direct admission of a subsisting debt, which the party is liable and willing to pay. If there be accompanying circumstances which repel the presumption of a promise or intent Jon to pay; if the expressions be equivocal, vague, and Indeterminate, leading to no certain conclusion, but at best to probable inferences, which may affect different minus 'People V. Braman, 30 Mich. 468-70 (1874), cases. Graves, C. J. See also Commonwealth v. Andrer<!8, 133 Mass. 204 (1882). ' Ferriss v. Knowles, 41 Conn. 308 (1874). in different ways, thsy ought not to go to a jury aa evidence of a new promise to revive the cause of action. Any other course wox Ud open up all the mischiefs against which the statute was intended to guard innocent persons, and expose them to the dangers of heing entrapped in careless conversations, and betrayed by prejudices. It may be that in this manner an honest debt may sometimes be lost, but many mifounded recoveries will be prevented. 1 No case has gone the length of saying that there must be an express promise to pay in terms. A clear, distinct, imequivocal acknowledgment of a debt as an existing obligation, identifying it so that there can be no mistake as to what it refers to, made to a creditor or his agent, takes a case out of the statute.* " I will pay the debt as soon as possible," constitutes a new and sufficient acknowledgment.' Acknowledgment does not necessarily imply words.-* See further Promise, New. 2. The act of a grantor in going before a competent officer and declaring that tlae instrument he produces is his act and deed.' Also, the official certificate that such declaration was made., The acknowledgment or the proof which may authorize the admission of a deed to record, and the recording thereof, are provisions for the security of creditors and purchasei-s. They are essential to the va Udity of the deed as to those persons, not as to the grantor. An acknowledgment, regular on its face, makes the instrument evidence, without further proof, and fits it for being recorded. The exact words of the statute need not be followed: it is sufficient if the meaning be clearly and fully expressed.' In the case of a wife, the certificate must show that she was examined separate and apart from her husband; that she was of full age; that the contents of the deed were first made knovra to her; and that she acted of her own free will. Otherwise, although recorded, her acknowledgment constitutes neither a record nor notice.' 1 Bell V. Morrison, 1 Pet. 368 (1828), Story, J. See also Moore o. Bank of Columbia, 6 id. 91-94 (1832); Fort Scott V. Hickman, 118 U. S. 163 (1884); Green v. Coos Bay Wagon Co., 23 F. R. 67 (1885), cases; Curtis V. Sacramento, TO Cal. 414-16 (1886); Chidsey u. Powell, 91 Mo. 686(1887). 2 Jones V. Lantz, 63 Pa. 326 (1869), Sharswood, J.; Wolf ensbiu-ger i;. Young, 47 id. 517(1864); Shaeter v. Hoffman, 113 id. 5 (1886), cases; 114 id. 358; 23 Alb. Law J. 104-5 (1881), cases. 'Norton v. Shepard, 48 Conn. 141 (1880), cases. * Bailey v. Boyd, 59 Ind. 298 (1877). e [Short v. Coulee, 28 111. 228 (1862), Breese, J. Lessee of Sioard v. Davis, 6 Pet. 136 (1832). ' Wiekersham v. Eeeves, 1 Iowa, 417 (1855); Owen v. Norris, 5 Blackf. 481(1840); Becker v. Anderson, 11 Neb. 497 (1881); Spitznagle v. Vanhessch, 13 id. 338 8 See Paxton v. MarshaU, 18 F. R. 361, 364-68 Conveyance of the estates of married women by deed, with separate examination and acknowledgment, has taken the place of the alienation of such estates by " line " in a court of record under the law of England. For fraud in levying a fine, the court of chancery would grant relief, as in the case of any other conveyance. And so now, her deed of conveyance does not bind her if her acknowledgment was obtained by fraud or duress, or if, by reason of infancy or insanity, she was not competent to make the contract. Statute of 18 Edw. L (1890) enacted that if a feme covert should be a party to a fine, she was first to be examined by certain justices; and if she dissented, the fine was not to be levied. This was held to mean that the fine ought not to be received without her examination and consent; but that if it was received, neither she nor her heirs could be permitted to deny that she was examined and freely consented; for this would be contradicting the record, and tend to weaken the assurances of real property. The object of statutes requiring the separate examination of the wife to be taken by an officer, to be certffied by him in a particular form, and to be recorded in the public registry, is not only to protect her by making it the duty of such officer to ascertain and to certify that she has not executed the deed by compiilsion or in ignorance of its contents, but to faci Utate the conveyance of the estates of married women, and to secure and perpetuate evidence, upon which transferees may rely, that the requirements of the law have been complied with. The duty of the officer involves the exercise of judgment and disoretiotf, and so is a judicial or quasi judicial act. The conclusion is that, except in case of fraud, his certificate, made and recorded as the statute requires, is the sole and conclusive evidence of the separate examination and acknowledgment, and that, except where fraud in procuring her execution is alleged, extrinsic evidence of the manner in which the examination was conducted is inadmissible.! Whenever substance is found in a certificate, obvious clerical errors and all technical defects will be disregarded, and, in order to uphold it, the certfficate will be read in connection with the instrument and in the light of surrounding circumstances.' See Examination, 5; Notice, 1. 3. Admission of a fact; confession of guilt. See Confession, 2. 7 Michael, id. 571-73 (1883), cases; Langton v. Marshall, 59 Tex. 898 (1883); Schley v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 120 U. S. 675 (1887), citing m. cases; 1 Bl. Com. 444. 1 Hitz V. Jenks, 123 U. S. 301-3 (1887), cases. Gray, J. In this case a notary had taken the acknowledgment in the statutory form, and the wife admitted that the signature was hers, but did not recollect executing the deed, and denied that it was explained to her. Held, there being no proof of fraud or duress, evidence to impeach the certificate was properly rejected. See also Davey v. Turner, 1 Dallas, *13 (1765); Lloyd v. Taylor, ib. *17 (1768); Cox v. GiU, 83 Ky. 669 (1886); Davis V. Agnew, 67 Tex. 310 (1886); Cover v. Manaway, ACQir ArN"TED. Implies a mutual acquaintance; as where one, swears that he is "well acquainted" with an applicant for naturalization.! Having a substantial knowledge of the subject-matter; as of the paper to which a certificate is afiixed.2

In conveyancing. The act by which a party who has executed an instrument, declares or ac» knowledges it before a competent officer, to be his, or her act and deed.