allocution

the common-law right of allocution. As early as 1689, it was recognized that the court's failure to ask the defendant if he had anything to say before sentence was imposed required reversal. ... the drafters of Rule 32(a) intended that the defendant be personally afforded the opportunity to speak before imposition of sentence.

Defined by the Supreme Court in - Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301 (1961).

The formal address of the judge to the prisoner, asking him if he has anything to say why sentence should not be pronounced against him. In case of conviction of an offence not capital the omission is not fatal and the judgment will not be reversed therefor; State v. Ball, 27 Mo. 324. In England it was held error, "for it is a necessary question, because he may have a pardon to plead, or may move in arrest of judgment," and for that reason the attainder was reversed; 3 Salk. 35S; 2 id. 630. But in this country it is not material "whether a pardon was produced before or after judgment, as no attainder or other such consequences result from a capital conviction here, which a pardon may not remove"; State v. Ball, 27 Mo. 324. Form of entry was: "And thereupon it is forthwith demanded of the said J. S., if he hath or knoweth anything to say why the said justices here ought not upon the premises and verdict aforesaid to proceed to judgment against him; who nothing further saith, unless as he had before said. Whereupon," etc. Arch. Cr. PI. & Pr. (23d ed.) 226.