ambiguity

Awkwardness is not ambiguity, nor do defined multiple meanings, each of which is satisfied by the allegations of the information, constitute a want of definiteness.

Defined by the Supreme Court in - United States v. Shirey, 359 U.S. 255 (1959).

Duplicity, indistinctness or uncertainty of meaning of an expression used in a written instrument. The word "uncertainty" in a suit refers to the uncertainty defined in pleading and does not include ambiguity; Kraner v. Halsey, 82 Cal. 209, 22 Pac. 1137. Latent is that which arises from some collateral circumstance or extrinsic matter in cases where the instrument itself is sufficiently certain and intelligible. Inhabitants of Jay v. Inhabitants of East Livermore, 50 Me. 107; Tilton v. Bible Society, 60 N. H. 377, 49 Am. Rep. 321; Simpson v. Dix, 131 Mass. 179; Clark v. Woodruff, 83 N. Y. 518. Patent is that which appears on the face of the instrument; that which occurs when the expression of an instrument is so defective that a court which is obliged to place a construction upon it, cannot, placing itself in the situation of the parties, ascertain therefrom the parties' intention. Williams v. Hichborn, 4 Mass. 205; U. S. v. Cantril, 4 Cra. (U. S.) 167, 2 L. Ed. 584; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 292; Ans. Contr. 24S; Peisch v. Dickson, 1 Mas. 9, Fed. Cas. No. 10,911; Chambers v. Ringstaff, 69 Ala. 140; Palmer v. Albee, 50 la. 429; Nashville Life Ins. Co. v. Mathews, 8 Lea (Tenn.) 499. The term does not include mere inaccuracy, or such uncertainty as arises from the use of peculiar words, or of common words in a peculiar sense; Wigr. Wills 174; 3 Sim. 24; 3 M. & G. 452; Brown v. Brown, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 576; Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Day, 13 Vt. 36; see Fish v. Hubbard's Admr's, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 651; 8 Bing. 244; and intends such expressions as would be found of uncertain meaning by persons of competent skill and information; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 298. Latent ambiguities are subjects for the consideration of a jury, and may be explained by parol evidence; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 301; and see Wigr. Wills 48; 5 Ad. & E. 302; 3 B. & Ad. 728: Brown v. Brown, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 576; Astor v. Ins. Co., 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 202; Peisch v. Dickson, 1 Mas. 9, Fed. Cas. No. 10,911. Patent ambiguity cannot be Williams v. Hichborn, 4 Mass. 205; New Jersey v. Wilson. 7 Cra. (U. S.) 167, 3 L. Ed. 303; Jarm. Wills (6th Am. Ed.) *400. See Xeal v. Reams, SS 6a. 298, 14 S. E. 617; Whaley v. Neill, 44 Mo. App. 320; Horner v. Still well, 35 N. J. L. 307; Ilollen v. Davis, 59 la. 444, 13 N. W. 413, 44 Am. Rep. 088; Pickering v. Pickering, 50 N. H. 349; Hyatt v. Pugsley, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 285; Crooks v. Whitford, 47 Mich. 283, 11 N. W. 159; Marshall v. Gridley, 46 111. 247. See Latent Ambiguity; Patent Ambiguity.

Doubtfulness; doubleness of meaning; indistinctness or uncertainty of meaning of an expression used in a written instrument. Nindle v. State Bank, 13 Neb. 245, 13 N. W. 275; Ellmaker v. Ellmaker, 4 Watts (Pa.) 89; Kraner v. Halsey, 82 Cal. 209, 22 Pac. 1137; Ward v. Epsy, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 447. An ambiguity may be either latent or patent. It ls the former, where the language employed is dear and intelligible and suggests but a single meaning, but some extrinsic fact or extrancous evidence creates a necessity' for interpretation or a choice among two or more possible meanings. But a patent ambiguity is that which appears on the face of the instrument, and arises from the defective, obscure, or insensible language used. Carter v. Holman, 60 Mo. 504; Brown v. Guice, 46 Miss. 302; Stokeley v. Gordon, 8 Md. 505; Chambers v. Ringstaff, 69 Ala. 140; Hawkins v. Garland, 76 Vn. 152, 44 Am. Rep. 158; Hand v. Hoffman, 8 N. J. Law, 71; Ives v. Kimball, 1 Mich. 313; Palmer v. Albee, 50 Iowa, 431; Petrie v. Hamilton College, 158 N. Y. 458, 53 N. E. 216. Synonyms. Ambiguity of language is to be distinguished from unintelligibiiity and inaccuracy, for words cannot be said to be ambiguous unless their signification seems doubtful and uncertain to persons of competent skill and knowledge to understand them. Story, Contr 272. The term "ambiguity" does not include mere inaccuracy, or such uncertainty as arises from the use of peculiar words, or of common words in a peculiar sense. Wig. Wills, i74.

— Ambiguity npon the factnm. An ambiguity in relation to the very foundation of the instrument itself, as distinguished from an ambiguity in regard to the construction of its terms. The term is applied, for instance, to a doubt as to whether a testator meant a particular clause to be a part of the will, or whether it was introduced with his knowledge, or whether a codicil was meant to republish a former will, or whether the residuary clause was accidentally omitted. Eatherly v. Eatherly, i Cold. (Tenn.) 461, 465, 78 Am. Den. 499.

^ The eflfeot of words that have either no definite sense or a double sense.^ Ambiguity or duplicity are predlcable' only of language as to which it is needful to make a choice of readings; while "indistinctness," "obscurity," and " uncei'tainty " incliide these, and also cases of language devoid of sense or which does not present any meaning with clearness or precision. The case of a blank left for a name should be deemed an uncertainty." Patent amtaigmty. Such ambiguity as appears upon the face of the writing itself. Latent ambiguity. Where a writing is perfect and intelligible upon its face, but, from some circumstance admitted in proof, sou, J., quoting Campbell, C. J., in Doe v. Catomore, 71 E. C, L. 746 (ISai). I Neft V. Homer, 63 Pa. 330-^1 (1869), cases. See also Batchelder v. White, 80 Va. 108 (1885), cases; Fuller v. Grfeen, 64 Wis. 165 (1885), cases; State v. Churchill, 48 Ark. 437-40 (1880), cases; 3 Daniel, Neg. Inst. K 1373-75, cases; 30 Alb. Law J. 245-49 (1884), cases; Bishop, Contr. §§ 745-76, cases. ^ L. alt&r, other. = [3 Bl. Com. 373, 111. *L. ambiguus, doubtful. ' [Ellmaker v. Bllmaker, 4 Watts, 90 (1835), Gibson, la doubt arises as to the applicability ■of the language to a particular person or thing.i Am Mguitas patens is that which appears to be ambiguous upon the instrument. Am- Mguitas tatens is that which seems certain and without ambiguity for anything that appears upon the instrument, but there is some collateral matter out of the deed that breeds the ambiguity. ^ A " latent ambiguity " is where you show that words apply equally to two different things or subject-matters. 3 Evidence is then admissible to show which thing or subject was intended.^ Difficulty in applying the descriptive portion of a deed to the external object usually arises from a latent ambiguity, which, having its origin in, is to be solved by, parol evidence.* ' A "patent ambiguity" means an inherent ambiguity which cannot be removed either by the ordinary i-ules of legal construction or by the application of extrinsic and explanatory evidence, showing that impressions p Hma /acie unintelligible are yet capable of conveying a certain, definite meaning.^ The court has to do with cases of patent ambiguity; the jury with a case of latent ambiguity. When the intention cannot be ascertained the defect is incurable. Ambiguitas verborum latens verificatione supple-. twr; nam guod ex facto oritur ambiguum verificatione facti tollitur. A latent ambiguity of words is supplied by evidence; for whatever arises ambiguous from a fact [extrinsic] may be removed by evidence of the fact.' Quotles in verbis nulla est ambiguitas, ibi nulla expositio contra verba flenda est. As long as in the words there is no ambiguity, then no interpretation contrary to the words is to be made.' A cardinal canon of interpretation, both of deeds and of statutes. The words, the context, an^ the subjeotmatter, are to be considered equally with the effect and consequences or the spirit and reason. If not before them." 1 Stokeley v. Gordon, 8 Md. 505-9 (1855)..2 [Lord Bacon, Max. Eeg. 28 (26), Law Tracts, 99-100. Approved, Lathrop v. Blake, 23 N. H. 60 (1851); Lycoming Mut. Ins. Co. V. Sailer, 67 Pa. 112 (1870); Deery V. Cray, 10 Wall. 270 (1869); Hawkins v. Garland, 76 Va. 152 (1882). ' See 1 Greeul. Ev. §§ 297-300; 1 Whart Ev. §§ 966-57, 961, 1008. » Smith V. Jeff ryes, 15 M. & W. •662 (1846), Alderson, B.; Webster v. Paul, 10 Ohio St. 534 (1860); 40 Ark. 241.' *Eeed v. Proprietors of Locks, 8 How. 290 (1850)- Moran v. Pi-ather, 23 Wall, 601 (1874). 6 Brown v. Guioe, 46 Miss. 302 (1872), Peyton, C. J. « Bacon, Max. 23; Broom, Max. 608; 2 Kent, 557; 13 Pet. 97; 100 Mass. 60; 8 Johns. 90; 67 Pa. 112. ' Broom, Max. 617; 2 Bl. C(jm. 379; 8 Mass. 201. A latent ambiguity in a will, which may be removed by extrinsic evidence, may arise: (1) When the will names a pereon as the object ot a gift, or a thing as the subject of it, and there are two pei*sons or things that answer such name or description; or (3) when the will contains a misdescription of the object or subject, as where there is no such person or thing in existence; or, if in existence, the peraon is not the one intended, or the thing does not belong to the testator. When a careful study of the testator's language, applied to the circumstances by which he was surrounded, discloses an inadvertency or mistake in a description of a person or thing which can be corrected without adding to his language — thus making a different will, — the correction should be made.i One Gilmer, after making bequests to two Presbyterian churches in Illinois, and other bequests, left the rest of his estate " to be divided equally between the board of foreign missions and the board of home missions." Held, that there was a latent ambiguity respecting the object of the residuary gift, but that the ambiguity could be removed by extrinsic evidence; that the evidence introduced, taken in connection with the bequests to the Presbyterian churches, showed that the testator meant the Board of Foreign Missions and the Board of Home Missions of the Presbyterian Church of the United States ot America, of which he was a member and an of Soer, and not any board of missions controlled by the Baptist, Methodist, Episcopalian, or other denomination.' AMBUIiATOB.T.3 1. Moving about from one place to another; not held in any one place; not stationary. The court of common pleas while it followed the king's household was said to be ambulatory. 3. Not fixed in legal character; not yet settled past alteration; revocable. In this category is a sheriff's return until filed; and a will, to the last moment of testamentary rationality. Voluntas testatoris est ambulatoria usque ad mortem. The will of a testator is ambulatory (alterable, revocable) up to his death.*

[Lat. am Uguitas, q. v.] Doubtfulness, imcertainty or obscurity of meaning. Ambiguity in written instruments is either /xi^en/, (patens,) that is, open or apparent; or latent, (latens,) hidden or concealed. A patent ambiguity is one which appears on the face of the instrument itself, and renders it ambiguous and unintelligible; as if, in a will, there were a blank left for the devisee's name. Broom's Max. 261. Smith on Contracts, 28. Bacon's Max. 90, regula 23. See Amhiguitas. A latent ambiguity is where the instrument itself is, on the face of it, intelligible enough, but a difficulty arises in ascertaining the identity of the subject matter to which it applies; the ambiguity appearing only in the application of it, and bemg mtroduced by evidence of something extrinsic, or by some collateral matter out of the instrument. Thus, if a devise were to J. S,, without further description, the ambiguity would lie kid until evidence had been produced showing that there was a great number of persons corresponding m name with the devisee, and then it would arise; H becoming a matter of doubt which J. S, was meant.* Bxpom's Max, 260. Smith on Contracts, 29. 1 Man. d; Gr.l1,lS, notes. 2 Kent's Com. 556. Marshall, C. J., 4^ Cranch B. 224. A latent ambiguity may be explained by 0 I extrinsic or parol evidence, h Mi 9k patent ambiguity, in general, cannot. Broom's Max. ub. sup. 2 Xent's Com. ub. sup. 1 Steph. Com. 463. See Amhiguitas.