Perjitrt

2 When a lawful-oath is administered, in some judicial proceeding, to a person who swears willfully, absolutely, and falsely, in a matter material to the issue or point in question. ^ The willful giving, under oath, in a judicial proceeding or course pf justice, of false testimony material to the issue or point of inquiry.* The taking of a willful false oath by one who, being lawfully required to depose the truth in any judicial proceeding, swears absolutely in a matter inaterial to the point in questibn.s Taking a false oath in a judicial proceeding.'' An offense against public justice. Must be corrupt (committed malo animo)^ willful, positive, absolute; on a point material to the question in dispute; and the oath be administered by a court or ofi Olcer having jurisdiction or authority over the subject-matter, and in a proceeding relative to a civil suit or a criminal prosecution. The breach of an extra-judicial oath is merely ground for damages for the private injury."^ The false statement must have been made " willfully." « The officer must have had legal authority to administer the oath.' The matter charged to have been falsely stated must have been material to the issue. The words used in Eev. St. are "material matter." These words were adopted from the common lav/; and they must be given a signification broad enough at least to cover cases of perjury at common law. • ' The section referred to provides that " If any person in any case, matter, bearing, or oth^r proceeding, when an oath or affirmation shall be required to be taken or administered under or by any law or laws of the United States, shall, upoh the taking of such oath or affirmation, knowingly and willingly swear or affirm falsely, every person s6 of- ' Middleton v. New Jersey West Line E. Co., 26 N. J. E. 869 (1875). ^L., perjurare^ to forswear; per, through, over, beyond; jurare, to bind by oath: jus, right, law, 3 Coke, 3 Inst. 164: 4 31. Com. 137; 86 Ohio St. 88. « 2 Bish. Cr. L., 5 ed., § 1015. = Commonwealth v. Smith, 11 Allen, 253 (1865), Hoar, Judge. « The Queen v. Castro (" Tichborne "), L. E., 9 Q. B. 367 (1874), Blackburn, J. ' 4 Bl. Com. 137; Whart. Cr. Ev. § 1257. » Schmidt v. Witherick, 89 Minn., 156 (1S88). » United States v. Curtis, 107 U. S. 672 (1888). •■1 United States v. Shinn, 8 Saw. 410-11 (1882), Deady, fending shall be deemed guilty of perjury, and shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine, not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment and confinement to hard labor, not exceeding five years, according to the aggravation of the offense." * One who swears willfully.to a matter which he rashly believes, which is false, and which he had no probable cause for believing, may be convicted of the crime." The truth must be shown.' ' Parol testimony is admissible.* The testimony of one witness, unsupported, may not be enough to convict; for there may then be merely oath against oath.^ Subornation, of perjury. Procuring another to take such a false oath as constitutes perjury in the principal.* " If any person or persons shall knowingly or willingly procure any such pei-jury [see above] to be committed, every person so offending shall be deemed giuilty of subornation of perjury, and shall, on conviction thereof, be punished " by fine, and by imprisonment at hard labor, as in cases of perjury,' q. v.; and thereafter be incapable of giving testimony in any court of the United States until the judgment is reversed.^ Subornation of peigury is in its essence but a form of perjury itself. An indictment miist aver that the accused knew that the testimony was false, and that in giving it the witness would commit perjury.' The person solicited is not an accomplice in the crime of subornation; and the fact that he committed perjury does not prevent the jury from convicting the suborner of the solicitation on his testimony. i" Solicitation to commit perjury, though unsuccessful, is a misdemeanor at common law. " See Suborn. See CttiMES, Falsi; Infamy; SwEARrao, False. PERMAIfENT. Does not always embrace the idea of absolute perpetuity.'^ Thus, " permanent residence^" does.not involve the Idea that a change thereafter may not be made; " it implies that there is no present intention to make a change.'* " Permanently establish a county seat " does not > E. S. § 6392: Act 3 March, 1825, J 13. ' See United States v. Moore, 2 Low. 235-38 (1873), cases; Baldw. 370; 1 Sprague, 558; 4 Mc Lean, 113. s 1 Whart. Ev. § 387.

Cr. L. § 1381; 27 Gratt. 127. *3 Greenl. Ev. §§ 188-202; 105 Mass. 582; 107 id. 227. •4 Bl. Com. 358. On corroboration, see 25 Cent. Law J. 534 (1885), cases. •4B1. Com. 137. ' B. S. S 5392. e E. S. § 5.393. See also § 5397. 9 United States ti. Dennee, 3 Woods, 41 (1877); Commonwealth V. Douglass, 5 Mete, Mass., 244 (1842). '"United States v. Thompson, 31 F. E. 331 (1887), Deady, J. "See 2 East, 5; 6 id. 464. n Hascall v. Madison University, 8 Barb. 185 (1850). " Newton v. Commissioners.

100 U. S. 562 (1879). mean to keep the county seat at a place perpetually, or for all time;' the legislature may at pleasure remove a county seat "permanently located."" See Forever. An institution of learning is " permanently located " when the trustees by resolution locate the buildings with intention that the place shall be the permanent place for conducting the busiuess of the corporation.' A sidewalk need not be made of stone or brick to be " permanent " rather than " temporary." * Compare Establish; Perpetual.

See Alimony.