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Presume

A Dictionary of Law · William C. Anderson · 1889

A Dictionary of Law

To' take or assume a matter beforehand, without proof; to take for granted. Infer is stronger than presume. The law does not.presume, much less infer, fraud."

See Infer.

Presumption

Next to positive is circumstantial evidence, or the doctrine of presumptions. When a fact cannot itself be demonstrated, that which comes nearest to 1 R. S, § 1642; Acts 28 Feb. 1795, 3 March, 1807.

2 Constitution, Art. II, sec.

2, cl, 2. " Had the consent of the Senate been made necessary to displace &s well as to appoint, the Executive would have suffered degradation; and the relative importance of the House of Representatives a grave diminution."

2 Bancroft, Const. 191. 3 Constitution, Art. II, sec. 2, cl. 3. * Constitution, Ai*t.

H, sec.

3. ^ Ibid., sec. 4.

Seegenerally 2 Bancroft, Const. 166-94; proof of it is proof of the circumstances necessarily, or usually, attending it: this proof creates a presumption, which is relied upon till the contrary is established.! Presumptive evidence proceeds upon the theory that the jiuy can infer the existence o£ a fact from another fact that is proved, and which most usually accompanies it.'* Presumption of law. A rule which, in certain cases, either forbids or dispenses with any ulterior inquiry.' A judicial postulate that a particular predicate is universally assignable to a particular subject.^ It is founded upon the first principles of justice, a law 01" laws of nature, or the experienced course of human conduct and affairs, and the connection usually found to exist between certain things.^ Derives its force from jurisprudence. Probability is not necessary to it. It relieves from producing evidence. Its conditions are fixed and uniform. It is irrebuttable or absolute, and rebuttable or provisional.* Conclusive, imperative, or absolute presumptions of law. Rules determining the quantity of evidence requisite to support any particular averment, which may not be overcome by proof that the fact is otherwise.' Cases in which the long experienced connection between things has been found so uniform as to make it expedient for the common good that this cormectiou be taken as inseparable and universal,^ and indisputable. Disputable or rebuttable presumptions of law. These are such presumptions as may be overcome by opposing proof: that facts, usually together, were so in a given case.* The law infers one fact from the proved existence of its common companion; directs how much shall be proved to make a prima facie case, and that that may be overcome by counter-proof.* Presumption of fact. A mere argument upon the facts in a case; a natural presumption derived wholly and directly from the circumstances of the particular case, by means of the common experience of mankind, without the aid or control of rules of law.* ' [.3 Bl. Com. 371.] ' Home Ins. Co. v. Weide, 11 Wall. 440 (1870), Davis, J. See also 26 Ala. 30; 66 Ind. 438; 11 Me. 146; 34 N. H. 365; 27 N. J. L. ISO, 153; 6 Wend. 181; 7 id. 66; 97 Pa. 34; 16 Vt. 71; 12 Wis. 257. ' [1 Greerd. Ev. § 14; Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 449 (1871). 1 1 Whart. Ev. ch. XTV. » 1 qireenl. Ev. §33; 39 Minn. 15. A logical argument from a fact to a fact; an argument which infers a fact otherwise doubtful from a fact already proved.! An inference of the existence of a certain fact arising from its necessary and usual connectiort with other facts which are known.2 Derives its force from logic. To it probability is necessary. It requires evidence. Its conditions fluctuate. ^ There are certain departments of scientific knowledge where an entire series of facts or forms may always be inferred from the existence of any one, according to the maxim ex pede Herculem. The conclusion in such cases is deduced from the observed uniformity of physical nature, which by a necessity of our own minds we believe to be invariable. But this mode of reasoning has but a very limited application in the law of evidence as judicially applied to ascertain the facts and motives of human conduct. It is the foundation of the doctrine of presumptions to the extent to which they are admitted. ^ Psychological presumptions. These are of knowledge of law; of ^ fact from a known fact; of innocence; of love of life; of good faith; of sanity; of prudence; against danger; as to supremacy of husband; of intent as to probable consequences; of malice; against a spoliator.* Physical presumptions. Of incompetency through infancy; of identity; of death; of survivorship in a common catastrophe; of loss of a ship from lapse of time.* Presumptions of uniformity and continuance. As to residence, occupancy, habit, coverture, solvency, value; that foreign law is like our law; as to constancy of nature — of physical sequence, animal habits, conduct of men in masses.* Presumptions of regularity. As to marriage, and legitimacy; negotiation of paper; judicial proceedings; dates; formalities of documents; appointments of officers and agents; acts of public officers, of business and professional men; of the due delivery of letters.* Presumptions of title. In favor of possession of realty — not tortious, and independent; and of personalty— as to vessels, and papers; that the proprietor adjacent to a road owns the soil thereof; as to ownership of hedges, land covered by water, alluvion, trees, and minerals. Missing links are proven from long possession, and grants from lapse of time. Applied, also, to licenses from use.* Presumption as to payment. This arises after the lapse of twenty years.' " Facts presumed are as effectually established as facts proved, where no presumption is allowed." * 1 1 Whart. Ev. ch. XIV. 2 Roberts u People, 9 Col. 474 (1886), Beck, C. J. * Sabariego v. Maverick, 124 U. S. 395 1(1888), Matthews, J. « 2 Whart. Ev. §§ 1240-69. >2Whart. Ev. §§1270-S3. « 2 Whart. Ev. §§ 1331-S9. If the evidence offered conduces in a Hy reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in controversy, it should go to the jury.^ Inferences from Inferences are not permitted: only immediate inferences from facts proved. If the presumed fact has no immediate connection with or re- ^ lation to the established fact from which it is inferred, it is regarded as too remote. Thus, the presumption that a public officer has done his duty does not supply proof of independent and substantial facts.^ In a case where the ultimate fact was whether a renewal premium had been paid to the defendant, it was held that the jury could not infer (1) that the policy did not lapse but was renewed; (2) that the renewals were paid to the plaintiff's sub-agent; and (3) paid over by the agent to the defendant. ^ A judge, in deciding that evidence of a particular circumstance is not receivable, impliedly decides that no presumption can be drawn from it which ought to have effect with the jury. A presumption which the jury is to draw is not a circumstance in proof, and it is not, therefore, a legitimate foundation for a presumption. There is no " open and visible connection " between the facts out of which the two presumptions arise.* An inference from an inference, if allowed at all, has little probative force.* See PRiESUMPTio; Evidence.