Estoppel

^ 1.

A stop; obstruction, bar; hindrance, preclusion.

2.

That which concludes, and "shuts a man's mouth from speaking the truth." « 1 2 Bl. Com. Ch. Vn-XH; 1 Ld. Cas. R. P. ix; 2 id. ix. »Avery v. Durfrees, 9 Ohio, 147 (1839;; 5 Wall. 281; 16 id. 229; 23 id. 125; 96 U. S. 312. "Van Buskirk ti. Clark, 37 Hun, 203 (1886). * Lawson v. Floyd, 124 U. S. 108 (1888), Miller, J. °F. estoper, to impede, stop. A man shall always be estopped by his own deed, and not permitted to aver or prove anything in contradiction to what he has once solemnly and deliberately avowed. 1, A special plea in bar — when a man has done some act or executed some deed which estops or precludes him from averring anything to the contrary.2 Estoppel by deed. By some matter contained in a valid sealed instrument. Estoppel by record. By adjudication of a competent court of record. Viewed as an admission or determination under circumstances of such solemnity that the law will not allow the fact so admitted or established to be afterward drawn in question between the same parties or their privies. To litigate the fact again would be to impeach the correctness of the former decision. The conclusion being indisputable, so are the premises." Collateral estoppel. The collateral determination of a question by a court having general jurisdiction over the matter.* See Adjudication; Record. Equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais. An estoppel by virtue of some act or action not under seal nor of record in a court. " Equitable " is the modem epithet,— derived from the courts of equity. The doctrine that "what I induce my neighbor to regard as true is the truth as between us, if he has been mislead by my asseveration." 5 Proceeds upon the ground that he who has been silent as to his alleged right when he ought in good faith to have spoken, shall not be heard to speak when he ought to be silent.* Presupposes error upon one side and fault or fraud upon the other, and some defect of which it would be inequitable for the party against whom the doctrine is asserted to take advantage.' The vital principle is, that he who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not 1 [a Bl. Com. 295. 3 3 Bl. Com. 308. 3 Burden v. Shannon, 99 Mass. 203 (1868), cases; Sawyer V. Woodbury, 7 Gray, 602 (1856). * Small V. -Haskins, 26 Vt. 223 (1854), Redfleld, C. J. " Kirk V Hamilton, 102 U. S. 70 (1880), Harlan, J. "Morgan v. Chicago & Alton R. Co., 96 U. S. 720 (1870, Swayne, J.; Bank of United States v. Lee, 13 Pet. 119 (1839).,. V ^, 'Morgan v. Chicago, &c. R. Co., mpra; Merchants Nat Bankr. State Nat. Bank, 10 Wall. 645 (1870), cases; Leather Manuf. Bank v. Morgan, 117 U. S. 108-9 (1886), Continental Nat.

Bank v

Bank of Commonotherwise have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing- the expectations, upon which he acted... A change of position would involve fraud and falsehood. This remedy is available only for protection, and cannot be used as a weapon of assault. It accomplishes that which ought to be done between man and man, and is not permitted to go beyond this limit, i The primary ground of the doctrine is, that it would be a fraud to assert what one's previous conduct had denied, when on the faith of that denial others have acted.' In application there must be some intended deception in conduct or declarations, or such gross negligence as amounts to constructive fraud. But conduct foimded on ignorance of one's rights seldom works such result." 6ne should be estopped from asserting a right of property, upon which he has, by his conduct, misled another, who supposed himself to be the owner, to make expenditures. It is often applied where one owning an estate stands by and sees another erect improvements on it in the belief that he has the title or an interest in it, and does not interfere to prevent the V work or inform the party of his own title. There is in such conduct a manifest intention to deceive, or such gross negligence as to amount to constructive fraud. The owner, therefore, in such a case, will not be permitted afterward to assert his title and recover the property, at least without making compensation for the improvements. But this salutary principle cannot be invoked by one who, at the time the improvements were made, was acquainted with the true character of his own title, or with the fact^that he had none.* It never takes place where one party did not intend to mislead, and the other party is not aetua Uy misled.^ An estoppel by conduct involves: a misrepresentartion or a concealment of a material fact, made with knowledge of the facts, to one who is ignorant of the truth, made with intention that he should act upon it, and leading him to act upon it.* Tlje representation must be credited as true, and the thing of value be parted with, the credit be given, or the liability be incurred, in consequence thereof.'

1 Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U. S. 580 (1879), Swayne, J.; Baker v. Humphrey, 101 id. 499 (18T9), cases. a Hill V, Epley, 31 Pa. 334 (1858), Strong, J.; Gregg v. Von Phul, 1 Wall. 281 (1863), cases; Dair v. United States, 16 id. 4 (1873). 3 Henshaw v. Bissell, 18 Wall. 271 (1873), cases, Field, J.; Fowler v. Parsons, 143 Mass. 406 (1887). 4 Steel V. Smelting Co., 106 U, r^'MQ (1883), Field, J. See Wendell v. Van Eensselaer, 1 Johns. Ch. *354 (1815), Kent, Ch. 5 Brown v. Bowen, 30 N. T. 541 (1864); Jewett v. Miller, iO id. 406 (1852); Catlin v. Grote, 4E.iK Sra. 304 (1855). ■ 6 Stevens v. Dennett, 51 N. H. 333 (1873), Foster, J.^ Denver Fire Ins. Co. i>. Mc Clelland, 9 Col. 24(1885); Griffith V. Wright, 6 id. 249 (1883); 41 N. H. 385; 43 id, 285; Hid. 31; 30N.Y.541. 'Jones V. Mc Phillips, 82 Ala. 116 (1886), cases, Stone, Chief Justice.

Where a party gives a reason for his conduct and decision touching a thing involved in controversy, he Is estopped, after litigation has begun, from changing the ground and putting his conduct upon another and different consideration. ^ The only case in which a representation as to the future can be held to operate as an estoppel is when it relates to an intended abandonment of an existing right, and is made to influence others, and by which they have been induced to act. An estoppel cannot arise from a promise as to future action with respect to a right to be acquired upon an agreement not yet made. 2 Binds parties and privies,^ but not, one not sui juris, as, an infant,* nor a married woman.* Tlie principle is a means of repose; it promotes fair dealing. It cannot be made an instrument of wrong or oppression, and it often secures justice where nothing else could.* It is meant to prevent fraud; is invoked to hold one to facts as he alleged them, although false, and not to prove them different from the allegation.' The meaning is not that equitable estoppels are cognizable only in courts of equity, for they are commonly enforced in actions at law. But it does not follow, because equitable estoppels may originate legal as distinguished from equitable rights, that it may not be necessary in particular cases to resort to a court of equity to make them available. All that can properly be said is, that to justify a resort to a court of equity, it is necessary to show some ground of equity other than the estoppel itself, whereby the party entitled to the benefit of it is prevented from making it available in a court of law. In other words, the case shown must be one where the forms of law are used to defeat that which, in equity, constitutes the right.s Is not applicable to the government in a criminal prosecution.^ See Disparage, 3; Fraud; Grant, 2; Laches; Lease; Ratification,!; Sale, Conditional; Standby.

1 Ohio & Mississippi R. Co. v. Mc Carthy, 96 XT. G. 267 (1877), cases, Swayne, J. 2 Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mowry, 96 U. S. 547-48 (1877), cases. Field, J. 8 Deery v. Cray, 5 Wall. 805 (1866); Ketchum v. Duncan, 96 U. S. 666 (isrr). * Sims V. Everhardt, 102 U. S. 313 (1880). ^Jackson v. Yanderheyden, 17 Johns. 167 (1819); Keen v. Coleman, 39 Pa. 399 (1861); Bigelow, Estop. 376; 37 Am. Law Reg. 50-^2 (1888), cases. 6 Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 420 (1880). 'Pendleton v. Richey, 33 Pa. 63 (1858); Keating v. Orne, 77 id. 93 (1874). B Drexel v. Bemey, 133 U. S. 253 (1887), Matthews, J. See also, generally, 17 BMtch. 14; 18 id. 33; BBiss. 373; 11 id. 209; 2 Flip, 699; 13 F. R. 208; 16 id. 479; 71 Ala. 247; 3 Col. 535; 50 Conn. 86; 2 Dak. 185; 1 Idaho, 469; 105 111. 333; 13 Bradw. 99; 72 Ind. 480; 76 id. 390; 30- ^an. 640; 39 Minn. 473; 74 Mo. 67; 42 N. Y. 447; 75 id.^-, lOOPa. 263, 558; 13R.L265; 76 Va. 314; 10"Wis. 453; 1 Sna. L. C. 651, note; 2 Pomeroy, Eq. §§ 801-21; Herman, tZ^gtoppel; 3 Whart. Ev., Index. » Justice D. C&i{imonwealth, 81 Ya. 317 (1885), cases.