Replevin

^ 1. When a person distrained upon applies to the sheriff, and has the distress returned into his own possession, upon giving security to try the right of taking it in a suit at law, and, if that be determined against him, to return the goods once more to the distrainor < — or, where the goods ai'e of a perishable nature, to return a' pecuniary equivalent.' In modern practice, a remedy for any unlawful detention of personalty, the same being delivered to the claimant upon security given either to make out the injustice of the detention or to return the property.* Replevy. To obtain ppssession of personalty by an action of replevin. Repleviatole; replevisable. Obtainable by replevin. Opposed, irrepleviable; irreplevisable. Replevisor. The plaintiff in replevin. There must be a tortious taking or detention of the property; not a mere breach of a contract. ' Eeplevin lies wherever trespass lies for taking the plaintili's goods ^ with this difference: trespass will lie upon possession alone, while replevin' requires property in the plaintiff. All that is necessary to support the action is property in the plaintiff, either general or special, and a wrongful taking from his possession, actual or constructive. The idea_ suggested by Blackst6ne that replevin lies only for goods taken by *' distress " has no foundation. The complaint is, that the defendant took and unjustly detains the plaintiff's goods, not that he took them for any.particular pui^ pose."* ' Exp. Crow Dog, 109 U. S. 561 (1883), eases. See also, generally. State v. StoU, 17 Wall. 431 (1873), cases; Kingi;. Cornell, 106 U. S. 396 (1882); Bed Eock V. Henry, ib. 601 (1882); Cook County Nat. Bank v. United States, 107 id. 451 (1882); Bowlus v. Brier, 87 Ind. 396 (1882); Hogabooh v. Highgate, 55 Vt. 414 (1883). 2 Bynum v. Miller, 89 N, C. 395 (1883), Ashe, J. "F, re, again, plevir, to be surety,

— Skeat. L. L. replegiare, to take back the pledge, — 3 Bl. Com. 13. < [3B1. Com. 13. » [3 Bl, Com. 9, 146. ' See Taylor v. The Royal Saxon, 1 Wall. Jr. 326-29 (1859). ' Mead v. Johnson, 54 Conn, 319 (1886). The action is a special one, entirely regulated by statute, its whole object being to place the plaintiff in possession of personal property, -which he claims to be his either by a general or special title, with a right of immediate possession. The requirements of the statute must,- therefore, be strictly complied with before the plaintiff can avail himself of its aid.^ The better doctrine is that before an action can be brought, a demand of possession of the property must be made when necessary to terminate the defendant's right of possession or to confer that right on the plaintiff; but when both parties claim the ownership and the right of possession as an incident, no demand is necessary.'' The security which the plaintiff furnishes, as a substitute for the property, is called a replevin bond, claim-preperty bond, property bond, or, simply, the claimant's bond. No one account of the course of proceedings, every- -where applicable, can be given. The term is unknown to equity and admiralty jurisprudence, and under codes of reformed procedure the action has been replaced by " claim and delivery,'' a provisional remedy ancillary to a civil action to try the title to goods; ' the word " replevin " being used as if interchangeable -with such action.^ See Avowry; Capeee, Cepit; Detaimek; Distress; Eloign; Retornum. 2. A writ formerly used for liberating a man from prison or private custody, upon security given that he -n'ould be forthcoming to answer the charges. Otherwise known as the writ de homine replegiando, for replevying a man.* See Habere, Habeas corpus.