Bisdictiox

him under the statutes of descent and distribution; Carpenter’s Estate, 170 Pa. 208, 32 Atl. 637, 29 L. R. A. 145, 60 Am. St. Rep. 765; Owens v. 6wens, 100 N. 0. 240, 6 S. E. 794; Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 69 N. W. 935, 25 L. R. A. 664 (reversing 31 Neb. 61, 47 N. W. 700, 10 L. R. A. 810, 28 Am. St. Rep. 500); Mc Allister v. Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 84 Pac. 112, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 726, 115 Am. St. Rep. 233, 7 Ann. Cas. 973 (where it was held that the court could pot engraft an exception upon a plain provision of the statute of descent). In Iowa, however, there are statutory prohibitions against a murderer’s inheriting from his victim either by descent or devise; In re Kuhn’s Estate, 125 la. 449, 101 N. W. 161, 2 Ann. Cas. 657 (where however a widow was held entitled to her distributive share as a matter of contract and right even though she killed her husband); Gollnlk v. Mengel, 112 Minn. 349^ 128 N. W. 292; to the same effect [1892] 1 Q. B. 147 (an Insurance case in which the insured [Maybiick] was killed by his wife, the beneficiary). It has oeen held that a murderer could not take the property of his ancestor by devise; Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188, 5 L, R. A. 340, 12 Am. St. Rep. 819; 24 Ont Rep. 132, 24 Can. S. O. 650; or by descent; Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S. W. 1042, 64 L, R. A. 458; it passes to the estate of the deceased; Ellerson v. Westcott, 148 N. Y. 149, 42 N. E. 540. The proceeds of a policy were held to pass to the distributees of the decedent as though the murderer had never been in existence; Box V. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S. W. 1042, 64 L. R. A. 458. See Mc Allister v. Pair, 72 Kan. 533, 84 Pac. 112, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 726, 115 Am. St. Rep. 233, 7 Ann. Cas. 973. In cases where the beneficiary in a policy of life insurance causes the death of the insured, it Is usually held that the murderer cannot take the fruits of his crime, such a result being, it is said, equivalent to permitting recovery of insurance money on a building which the beneficiary in the policy had wilfully burned; Mut L. Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 D. S. 591, 6 Sup. Ct. 877, 29 U Ed. 997; [1892] 1 Q. B. 147; Schreiner v. Order of Forresters, 35 111. App. 576; Schmidt v. Life Ass’n, 112 la. 41, 83 N. W. 800, 61 L. R. A. 141, 84 Am. St. Rep. 323; 26 Beav. 606. But the killing of an insured person by an insane beneficiary does not forfeit his rights under the policy; Holdom v. A. O. U. W., 159 111. 619, 43 N. B. 772, 81 L. R. A. 67, 60 Am. St. Rep. 183; nor is there a forfeiture if the killing was accidental; Schreiner v. Order of Forresters, 36 111. App. 576. Prof. James Barr Ames (Lectures, 310; Am. L. Reg. & Rev. April, 1897) considers that at common law the murderer would take, but that equity should compel the crimbraska. North Carolina, Ohio and Pennsylvania did not apply the sound principle of equity that a murderer or other wrongdoer shall not enrich himself by his Iniquity at the expense of an innocent person. In Pleading. In an indictment for murder, it must be charged that the prisoner ’’did kill and murder” the deceased; and unless the word murder be Introduced into the charge, the^ indictment will be taken to charge manslaughter only; Bish. Cr. Prac. §,648; Fost Cr. Law 424;,Yelv. 205; 1 Chltty, Cr. Law *243, and the authorities and cases there cited.