Argumentative
A Dictionary of Law · Henry Campbell Black · 1891
A Dictionary of Law
In pleading. Indirect; inferential.
Steph. Pl. 179.
A pleading is so called in which the statement on which the pleader relies is implied instead of being expressed, or where it contains, in addition to proper statements of facts, reasoning or arguments upon those facts and their relation to the matier in dispute, such as should be reserved for presentation at the trial. Argumentum a communiter accidentibus in jure frequens est. An argument drawn from things commonly happening is frequent in law.
Broom, Max. 44.
Argumentum a divisione est fortissimum in jure. An argument from division [of the subject] is of the greatest force in law.
Co. Litt. 2138; 6 Coke, 60.
Argumentum @ majori ad minus neg-" ative non valet; valet e converso. An argunent from the greater to the less is of no force negatively; aflirmatively itis.
Jenk. Cent. 281.
Argumoentum a simili valet in lege. Argumentum ab auctoritate est fortissimum in lege. An argument from authority is the strongest in the law. “The book cases are the best proof of what the law is.”
Co. Litt. 254a.
Argumentum ab impossibili valet in lege. An argument drawn from an impossibility is forcible in law.
Co. Litt. 92a.
Argumentum ab inconvenienti est validum in lege; quia lex non permittit aliquod inconveniens. An argument drawn from what is inconvenient is good in law, because the law will not permit any inconvenience.
Co. Litt. 66a, 258.
Argumentum ab inconvenienti plurimum valet [est validum] in lege. An argument drawn from inconvenience is of the greatest weight [is forcible] in law.
Co. Litt. 66a, 97a, 1526, 2586; Broom, Max. 184.
If there be in any deed or instrument equivocal expressions, and great inconvenience must necessarily follow from one construction, it is strong to show that such “i construction is not according to the true intention of the grantor; but where there is no equivocal expression in the instrument, and the words used admit only of one meaning, arguments of inconvenience prove only want a of foresight in the grantor.
3 Madd. 540; 7 Taunt. 496.