Judgment In Rem

A judgment in vem is an adjudication, pronounced upen the status of some particular subject-matter, ee personam, in this: that the latter judgment. is in form, as well as substance, between the parties claiming the right; and that it is so inter partes appears by the record itself. 1b is binding only upon the parties appearing to be such by the record, and those claiming by them. A judgment tn'rem is founded on & proceeding instituted, not against the person, a8 such, but against or upon the thing or subject-matter itself, whose state or condition is to be determined, It is a proceedue ing todetermine the state or condition of the thing itself; and the judgment is a solemn declaration upon the siatus of the thing, and it ipso facto renders it what it declares it to be.

2 Vt. 73.

Various definitions have been given of a judg ment in rem, Dut all are criticised as either in complete or coimprehending too much. Itis gen erally said to be uw judgment declaratory of the siatus of some subject-matter, whether this bea person or a thing. Thus, the probate of a will fixes the status of the document asa will, Tho personal rights and interests which follow ara mere incidental results of the status or character of the paper, and do not appear on the face of the judginent. So, a decree establishing or dissolving a marriage is a judgmeut in rem, because it fixes the stutusof the peraon. Ajudgment of forfeiture, by the proper tribunal, against specific articles or goods, for a violation of the revenue laws, is a judgmentinvem. But it is objected that the customary definition does not fit such a case, because there is no fixing of the status of anything, the whole effect being a seizure, whatever the thing may be. In the foregoing instances, and many others, the judgment is conclusive agaiust all the world, without reference to actual presence or participation in the proceedings. If the exprossion “strictly in rem” may be applied to any class of cases, it should be confined tosuch as these. “A very able writer suys: ‘The distinguishing characteristic of judgments i rem is that, wherever their obligation is recognized and enforced as against any person, it is equally recognized and enforced as wil against persons.’ Itseemsto us that Leone thetrue definition ofa ‘judgment tire’ is ‘an adjudication’ against some person or thing, or upon the statws of some subject-matter; which, wherever anji whenever binding upon any person, is equally binding upon @il persons.”

10 Mo. App. 738.