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Civil Rights

Bouvier's Law Dictionary and Concise Encyclopedia · John Bouvier; revised by Francis Rawle · 1914

Bouvier's Law Dictionary and Concise Encyclopedia

A term applied to certain rights secured to citizens of the United States by the 13th and llth Amendments to the constitution, and by various acts of congress made in pursuance thereof.

The act of April 9.

1866 ("ordinarily called the 'Civil Rights Bill';" Bradley, J., in U. S. v. Stanley, 109 U. S. 3, 16, 3 Sup. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835), provided that all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are citizens of the United Slates; that sueh citizens of every race and color shall have the same right in every state and territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, etc., and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and be subject to like punishment, etc., and none other, This act was said by Swayne, J., to be not a penal statute but a remedial one to be construed liberally; U. S. v. Rhodes, 1 Abb. U. S. 28, Fed. Cas. No. 16,151. This legislation was substantially replaced by the 14th Amendment which was broader in its scope, manifestly intended to vindicate those rights against individual aggression; Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 3S7, 50 L. Ed. 633, 5 Ann. Cas. 692. This amendment was finally promulgated as adopted in July, 1868 (see Fourteenth Amendment) and thereafter Congress enacted several laws intended to enforce its provisions. The first was the act of May 31, 1S70. known as the Enforcement Act (supplemented by an amending act of February 28, 1871). The purpose was to protect negro voters by requiring in sections 1 and 2 that all citizens should be accorded equal facilities without distinction of race or color; in sections 3, 4 and 5 for the punishment through federal courts of persons who violated the act; and in section 6 for punishment in like manner of conspiracies to defeat the elective franchise. There was also provided an elaborate scheme of supervision of all elections, which included members of Congress, through the federal courts, which became R. S. §§ 2011, 2012, 2016, 2017, 2021, 2022, 5515 and 5522. The power of Congress to impose this system of supervision was upheld in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 25 L. Ed. 717; U. S. v. Gale, 109 U. S. 65, 3 Sup. Ct. 1, 27 L. Ed. 857; and sections 3 and 4 of the Enforcement Act were held unconstitutional; U. S. v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 23 L. Ed. 503: while section 6 was, in effect, held unenforceable, as not providing for the punishment of any act punishable under the constitution and laws of the United States; U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 5S8. The next act in the series was that of criminal liability for the action of individuals against individuals; and re authority to the President I the army and navy in cases of d within a state and to suspend \-. ind disqualified for jury ice all persons Involved, it also conti remarkable section (<») making liable who could, by reasonable have prevented any oth- Driving individuals of the i pial pro! of the laws, and failed to d i bo. 'I i was practically rendered ineffective by the construction given by the Supreme C to the power of I to enforce the 14th Amendment by legislation. Cases in which various provisions of it were held to be unenforceable in the cases in which it was resorted to are: U. S. v. Harris.

029, 1 Sup. Ct. 001, 27 L. Ed. 290; Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 317, 5 Sup. Ct. 928, 962, 29 L. Ed. 201'; Bowman v. Ry. Co., 115 0. B. 611, 6 Sup. Ct 192, 29 L. Ed. 502; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 078, 7 Sup. Ct. 65€ 30 L. Ed. 760; Holt v. Mfg. Co., 170 D. 8. 68, 20 Sup. Ct. 272, 44 L. Ed. 374; Qi Harris, 1S9 U. S. 475, 23 Sup. Ct. 039, 47 L. Ed. 909.

The last act of the series was that of March 1, 1S75, which was pre-eminently known as the "Civil Ri. and consisted of five sections. Section 1 provided that all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States should be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, etc., of inns, public conveyam land or water, theatres, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all citizens of whatever race or color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude. Section 2 provided for the punishment of any person who should violate the foregoing section, both criminally and by a suit for a penalty. Section 3 gave jurisdiction to the federal courts exclusively of all offenses against the act, and of suits for a penalty. Section 4 provided that no person should be excluded from service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United States or any state, on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude. Section 5 gave to th< preme Court a right of review of all cases arising under the act. Section 4 was declared constitutional in Ex parte Virginia, 100 D. S. 339, 25 1..

Ed. 076.

Sections 1 and 'J were held unconstitutional and void in the Civil Bights I 109 U. S. 3, 3 Sup. Ct. IS, 27 L. Ed. 835, as not being authorized by either the 13th or 14th Amendments. And having been so declared unconstitutional, they were not separable as to their operation in such places as are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the national government and the statute was 230 U. S. 126, 33 Sup. Ct 964, 57 L. Ed. 1422; The Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 25 L. Ed. 550. The 13th Amendment denounces a status or condition irrespective of the manner or authority hy which it is created. The prohibitions of the 14th and 15th Amendments are largely upon the acts of the states; but the 13th Amendment names no party or authority, but simply forbids slavery and involuntary servitude and grants to Congress power to enforce this prohibition by appropriate legislation; Clj^att v. U. S., 197 U. S. 207, 25 Sup. Ct. 429, 49 L. Ed. 726. Such legislation may be primary and direct in its character; id. In the Civil Rights Cases the court held that although the constitution and statutes of a state may not be repugnant to the 13th Amendment, Congress, by legislation of a direct and primary character, may, in order to enforce the amendment, reach and punish individuals whose acts are in hostility to rights and privileges derived from and secured by or dependent upon that amendment; Clyatt v. U. S., 197 U. S. 207, 25 Sup. Ct. 429, 49 L. Ed. 726. The power, duty and responsibility to enforce the rights of citizens under any of the constitutional amendments rests with the state and not with the United States government; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 26 L. Ed. 567. But in Hodges v. U. S., 203 U. S. 1, 27 Sup. Ct 6, 51 L. Ed. 65, the 13th Amendment was held not to empower Congress to protect against individual interference (where a conspiracy was alleged to exclude negroes from making contracts to labor). Prohibiting intermarriage between white persons and negroes is not interference with civil rights; State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 10 Am. Rep. 42; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 16 Sup. Ct. 113S, 41 L. Ed. 256; nor requiring separate schools; State v. Mc Cann, 21 Ohio St. 210; Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 17 Am. Rep. 405; People v. Gallagher, 93 N. T. 438, 45 Am. Rep. 232; nor requiring separate accommodations on railroad trains within the state; Louisville, N. O. & T. Ry. Co. v. State, 66 Miss. 662, 6 South. 203, 5