Collusion

An agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of his rights by the forms of law, or to obtain an object forbidden by law. Collusion and fraud of every kind vitiate all acts which are infected with them, and render them void.

See 3 Hagg. Eccl. 130, 133; Mc Kay v. Williams, 67 Mich. 547, 35 N. W. 159, 11 Am. St. Rep. 597; Winter v. Truax, 87 Mich. 324, 49 N. W. 604, 24 Am. St. Rep. 160; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 51; Bousquet, Diet. Abordage.

In Divorce Law. An agreement between a husband and wife that one of them will commit or appear to commit a breach of matrimonial duties in order that the other may obtain a remedy at law as for a real injury.

2 Wait, Act. & Def. 591; 2 Lev. & Tr. 302; L. R. 1 P. & M. 121. See Reed v. Reed, 86 Mich. 600, 49 N. W. 587; Belz v. Belz, 33 111. App. 105.

Such an agreement is a fraud upon the court where the remedy is sought; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 39 Wis. 167; and will bar a divorce; L. R. 1 P. & M. 121; 2 Bish. Mar. Div. & Sep. 251. "The authorities are uniform in holding that any contract between the parties,.having for its object the dissolution of the marriage contract, or facilitating that result, such as an agreement by the defendant in the pending action for divorce to withdraw his or her opposition and to make no defense, is void as contra bonos mores, and any note given in consideration thereof is void."

Adams v. Adams, 25 Minn. 72; Weeks v. Hill, 38 N. H. 199.

This was quoted by Sulzberger, J., in Pietz v. Pietz, 20 Dist R. (Pa.) 311. The fact that defendant voluntarily appears, without service, and makes no defense, is not of itself collusion, but the court will, in such case, narrowly examine the evidence; Lyon v. Lyon, 13 Dist. Rep. (Pa.) 623. A mere mutual desire to be divorced will not defeat the granting of the decree when there is no collusion between the parties for the purpose of making evidence; Taylor v. Taylor, 35 Pa. Co. Ct. 385. In Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340, 23 Sup. Ct. 757, 47 L. Ed. 1084, while the husband and wife were living apart, the husband told the wife that if she would not contest divorce proceedings he would make provision for her support. The court, in holding that a bond for such provision was not discharged in bankruptcy, said that it might be considered as in the nature of an ordinary alimony decree.