Comity

A term designating the practice by which one court follows the decision of another court on a like question, though not hound by the law of precedents to do so. The question most frequently arises among the federal courts of different circuits. The importance of securing uniformity in the law as administered in t';1 circuits in patent cases is so great that a decision of a court of co-ordinate Jurisdiction should be followed by this court in every case where the question as present d fairly be regarded as doubtful; Gormley A; Jeffery Fire Co. v. U. S. Agency. 177 Fed. G91, 101 C. C. A. 4T9; Pratt v. Wright, 65 Fed. D9: Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. 1 Fed. 5 A decision of the circuit court and the circuit court of appeals, derived from th( cial reports upon the point in issue (profits in a patent case) would be of controlling weight in another circuit court of appeals both on the ground of county and alse as adjudications entitled to the greatest respect; Taft, C. J., In National 1 & Paper Co. v. Novelty Co., 95 Fed. 9 A circuit court should, in the orderly administration of the law, follow the ruling of a circuit court of appeals in another circuit; Coxe, J., in Hale v. Ililliker. 109 Fed. J7:;: but the courts of one circuit are not controlled by the views of a patent taken by the courts of another circuit, nor absolved from involved; Archbald, J., in Ciiniotti Unhairing Co. v. Fur Refining Co., 120 Fed. 672; the district court may decline to follow the weignt of authority in the lower federal courts; Mc Pherson, X, in U. S. v. Exp. Co., 119 Fed. 240. The circuit court of appeals will follow the decision of another circuit court of appeals unless under especially exceptional circumstances; Pittsburgh Rys. Co. v. Sullivan, 166 Fed. 750, 92 C. C. A. 429; U. S. v. F. A. Marsily & Co., 1G5 Fed. 186, 91 C. C. A. 220; In re Baird, 154 Fed. 215; Gill v. Austin, 157 Fed. 234, 84 C. C. A. 677. "Comity is not a rule of law, but one of practice, convenience and expediency. It is something more than mere courtesy, which implies only deference to the opinion of others, since it has a substantial value in securing uniformity of decision, and discouraging repeated litigation of the same question. But its obligation is not imperative.... Comity persuades; but it does not command. It declares not how a case shall be decided, but how it may with propriety be decided. It recognizes the fact that the primary duty of every court is to dispose of cases according to the law and the facts; in a word, to decfde them right. In doing so the judge is bound to determine them according to his own convictions.... It is only in cases where, in his own mind, there may be a doubt as to the soundness of his views that comity comes in play and suggests a uniformity of ruling to avoid confusion, until a higher court has settled the law." Mast, Foos & Co. v. Mfg. Co., 177 U. S. 485, 488, 20 Sup. Ct. 708, 44 L. Ed. 856. Where questions on an important patent had been decided in two circuits, the Supreme Court felt itself "bound to defer somewhat to this unanimity of opinion on the part of so many learned and distinguished judges"; Hobbs v. Beach, 180 U. S. 389, 21 Sup. Ct 409, 45 L. Ed. 5S6. In the seventh circuit decisions in patent cases in other circuits will not be followed, but each case will stand on its own merits; Welsbach Light Co. v. Gaslight Co., 100 Fed. 648. There is no statute or common law rule by which one court is bound to abide by the decisions of another court of equal rank. It does so simply for what may be called comity among judges. There is no common law or statutory rule to oblige a court to bow to its own decisions; it does so on the ground of judicial comity; (18S4) 9 P. D. 98, per Brett, M. R. The doctrine has no application to foreign corporations. It "was not established for the purpose of giving to any state an unlimited power to dispose of the franchise of acting in a corporate capacity in other states. To obtain a charter for the purpose of evadthe state granting the charter; and to attempt to act under such charter in a foreign state would be a fraud upon the latter;" National Lead Co. v. Paint Store Co., 80 Mo. App. 247, 271. It would seem that the use of the term "comity" in connection with cases where a court of one state under the rule of the conflict of laws adjudicates a case upon the law of another state is not correct. When a case involves a transaction in another jurisdiction and is properly decided upon the law of that other jurisdiction, under well settled rules of the conflict of laws, the law of that other jurisdiction is applied as a matter of right, and not upon the ground of comity. Of this use of the term Mr. Dicey says: "The term 'comity,' as already pointed out, is open to the charge of implying that the judge, when he applies foreign law to a particular case, does so as a matter of caprice or favor." Cases such as the following may perhaps illustrate another class not included in either of the above classes: "A court of equity in one state may enjoin parties from proceeding in a court of law in another state; but on principles of courtesy, and perhaps of policy, this power should not be exercised where the court of law has a concurrent jurisdiction, which was- first assumed and exercised over the subject matter, unless there should exist some peculiar equitable ground for so doing." Bank of Bellows Falls v. R. Co., 28 Vt 470.