Contribution

Payment by one or more persons who are liable, in company with others, of a proportionate part of the whole liability or loss, to one or more of the parties so liable upon whom the whole loss has fallen or who has been compelled to discharge the whole liability; Dupuy v. Johnson, 1 Bibb (Ky.) 562; Lawrence v. Cornell, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 545; Pars. Part. 198. "The principle is that parties having a common interest in a subject-matter shall bear equally any burden affecting it Qui sentit commodum senlire debet et onus. Equality is equity. One shall not bear a common burden in ease of the rest. Hence, if, (as often may be done), a lien, charge, or burden of any kind, affecting several, is enforced at law against one only, he should receive from the rest what he has paid or discharged on their behalf. This is the doctrine of equitable contribution, resting on as simple a principle of natural justice as can be put."

Per Bates, Ch., in Eliason v. Eliason, 3 Del. Ch. 260; 3 Co. 11 6; 1 Cox, C. C. 318; 1 B. & P. 270; 1 Sto. Eq. 477; 1 Wh. & Tud. L. Cas. in Eq. 66.

Though its most common application is to sureties and owners of several parcels of land subject to a lien, the application of the principle is said to be universal by Lord Redesdale in 3 Bligh 59; and it applies equally to dower as to other incumbrances; Eliason v. Eliason, 3 Del. Ch. 260; Bank of United States v. Delorac's Ex'rs, Wright (Ohio) 285. A right to contribution exists in the case of debtors who owe a debt jointly which has been collected from one of them; Davis v. Burnett, 49 N. C. 71, 67 Am. Dec. 263; Haupt v. Mills, 4 Ga. 545; Mills v. Hyde, 19 Vt. 59, 46 Am. Dec. 177; Norton v. Coons, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 130; Fletcher v. Brown, 7 Humphr. (Tenn.) 385.

See Russell v. Failor, 1 Ohio St. 327, 59 Am. Dec. 631.

It also exists where land charged with a legacy, or the portion of a posthumous child, descends or is devised to several persons, when the share of each is held liable for a proportionate part; Armistead v. Dangerfield, 3 Munf. (Va.) 20, 5 Am. Dec, 501; Stevens v. Cooper, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 425, 7 Am. Dec. 499; Blaney v. Blaney, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 107; Taylor v. Taylor, 8 B. Monr. (Ky.) 419, 48 Am. Dec. 400. As to contribution under the maritime law, see General Average. Originally this right was not enforced at law, but courts of common law in modern times have assumed a jurisdiction to compel contribution among sureties in the absence of any positive contract, on the ground of an implied assumpsit, and each of the sureties may be sued for his respective quota or proportion; Wh. & Tud. Lead. Cas. 66; Carroll v. Bowie, 7 Gill (Md.) 34; Ellicott v. Nichols, 7 Gill (Md.) 85, 48 Am. Dec. 546; Lindell v. Brant, 17 Mo. 150.

The remedy in Kenna v. George, 2 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 35; Bisp. Eq. § 329.

For example, a surety who pays an entire debt can, in equity, compel the solvent sureties to contribute towards the payment of the entire debt; 1 Ch. Cas. 346; Finch 15, 203; while at law he can recover no more than an aliquot part of the whole, regard being had to the number of co-sureties; 2 B. & P. 2G8; 6 B. & C. G97; Towers v. Gowen,.".2 Me. 381.

See Subrogation.

See, as to co-sureties, 1 Lead. Cas. ESq. 100.

There is no contribution, as a general rule, between joint tort-feasors; 8T.R. 180; Nichols v. Nowling, 82 Ind. 4S8; Percy v. Clary, 32 Md. 245; Miller v. Fenton, 11 Paige (N. Y.) 18; Jacobs v. Tollard, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 287, 57 Am. Dee. 105; Acheson v. Miller, 2 Ohio St. 203, 59 Am. Dec. 663; but this rule does not apply when the person seeking redress did not in fact know that the act was unlawful, and is not chargeable with knowledge of that fact; 4 Bing. 72; Moore v. Appleton, 26 Ala. 633; Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455; Armstrong County v. Clarion County, 66 Pa. 218, 5 Am. Rep. 36S. It is not the admiralty rule; Erie R. Co. v. Transp.

Co., 204 U. S. 225, 27 Sup. Ct. 246, 51 L. Ed. 450.

The rule against contribution between wrongdoers is not universal. If the parties are not equally at fault, the principal delinquent may be responsible to the others for damages incurred by their joint offence. With respect to offences in which is involved any moral delinquency, all parties are equally guilty, and the courts will not inquire into their relative guilt. But where the offence is merely malum prohibitum and in no sense immoral, the court will inquire into their relative delinquency and administer justice between them; Lowell v. R. Co., 23 Pick. (Mass.) 32, 34 Am. Dec. 33, cited in Washington Gas Co. v. Dist. of Columbia, 161 U. S. 316, 327, 16 Sup. Ct. 564, 40 L. Ed. 712, where it is said that the cases are too numerous for citation; they are collected in Whart. Nog. 246; 2 Thomp. Neg. 789, 1061; 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 1035. The rule stated also fails when the injury grows out of a duty resting primarily upon one of the parties, and but for his negligence there would have been no cause of action against the other. A servant is consequently liable to his master for the damages recovered against the latter in consequence of the negligence of the servant; Merryweather v. Nizan, 2 Sm. Lead. Cas. 483. Where a recovery is had against a municipal corporation for an injury resulting from an obstruction to the highway, or other nuisance, occasioned by the act or default of its servant, or even of a citizen, the municipality has a right of action against the wrongdoer for indemnity; Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black creditors of an insolvent debtor divide among themselves the proceeds of his property proportionably to the amount of their respective credits. La. Code, art.

2522, n. 10.

It is a division pro rata.

Merlin, 7?-,