Fee-Simple

An estate of inheritance.

Co. LitL lb; 2 Bla. Com. 106.

The word simple adds no meaning to the word fee standing by itself. But it excludes all qualification or restriction as to the persons who may Inherit it as heirs, thus distinguishing it from a fee-tall, as well as from an estate which, though inheritable, is subject to conditions or collateral determination.

1 Washb. R. P. 61; Wright, Ten. 146; 1 PresL Est. 420; Littleton § 1.

It is the largest possible estate which a man can have, being an absolute estate. It is where lands are given to a man and to his heirs absolutely, without any end or limitation put to the estate.

Plowd. 557; 2 Bla. Com. 106; Chal. R. P. 191. See Brackett v. Ridlon, 54 Me. 426; Haynes v. Bourn, 42 Vt 686.

Where the granting clause of a deed conveys an estate In fee-simple, a subsequent proviso that the grantee shall not convey without the consent of the grantor is void as a restriction or alienation, general as to time and person, and therefore repugnant to the estate created; Murray v. Green, 64 Cal. 303, 28 Pac. 118; Wilkins v. Norman, 139 N. C. 40, 51 S. E. 797, 111 Am. St. Rep. 767. In modern estates the terms fee, fee-simple, and fee-simple absolute are substantially synonymous; Jecko v. Taussig, 45 Mo. 170. The word “heirs” is necessary, in a conveyance, to the creation of a fee-simple, and no expression of intention, in substituted terms, will have an equivalent effect; Sisson v. Donnelly, 36 N. J. L. 434; Edwardsv Ule R. Co. N. H. 290; Cromwell v. Winchester, 2 Head (Tenn.) 389; but it is otherwise in a will; Hill V. Hill, 74 Pa. 173, 15 Am. Rep. 645; Arnold V. Brown, 7 E. I. 188. In the absence of statute, a conveyance of property to a trustee, with power to sell and convey the fee, vests in such trustee an estate in fee-simple, without the use of the word “heirs Ewing v. Shannaban, 113 Mo. 188, 20 S. W, 1065. The common-law rule that a fee-simple cannot be conveyed without the word “heirs” does not apply to an exception, or an easement appurtenant to other land of the grantor or of the right to take profit in the soil; Engel v. Ayer, 85 Me. 448, 27 Atl. 352. FEE-TAIL (Fr. tailler, to shorten). An inheritable estate which can descend to certain classes of heirs only. It is necessary that they should be heirs “of the body” of the ancestor, and these are proper words of limitation. It corresponds with the feudum talliatuin of the feudal law. The estate itself is said to have been derived from the Roman system of restricting estates.

1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 21; 1 Washb. R. P. 66; 2 Bla. Com, 112, n.

See, also, Co. 2d Inst, 333; Tudor, Lead. Cas. 607; 4 Kent 14; Chal. R. P. 259; and It is said to exist by virtue of the statute de donis; Crabb, R. P. 5 971.

See, generally, Wight v. Thayer, 1 Gray (Mass.) 286; Jewell V. Warner, 35 N. H. 176; Bone v. Tyrrell, 113 Mo. 175, 20 S. W. 796; Durant v. Muller, 88 Ga. 251, 14 S. E. 612; Brown v. Addison Gilbert Hospital, 155 Mass..323, 29 N. E. 625; Ray V. Alexander, 146 Pa. 242, 23 Atl. 383.

An estate-tail may be general, i. e. limited to the heirs of the body merely; or special, i, e. limited to a special class of such heirs, e. g. heirs male or heirs female, or those begotten of a certain wife named; Newton v. Griffith, 1 H. & G. (Md.) 111. In the last case specified, if the wife died without issue, the husband was called tenant in tall after possibility of issue extinct. The restrictions against alienation could be evaded at common law by levying a fine, suffering a recovery. In this country, an entail can generally be barred by deed. In Pennsylvania, by statute, words which, at common law, would create a fee tall, are to be taken to create a fee simple.