Identity

Sameness.

Identity of persons is a phrase applied especially to those cases In which the issue before the jury is, whether a man be the same person with one previously convicted or attainted.

4 Bla. Com. 396; 4 Steph. Com. 468.

In cases of larceny the question of the identity of property is for the jury and a verdict will be set aside where the court said In the charge that one of the stolen “bills was positively identified;” Hill v. State, 17 Wis. 675, 86 Am. Dec. 736. The question of identity of a prisoner as well as of property may arise. In a case of larceny of a hog the question of Identity both of prisoner and hog was submitted to the jury; Kelly v. State, 1 Tex. App. 628; and evidence of a confession given by a fellow-prisoner of the accused (who had conversed with him through soil pipes in the gaol) that he recognized him by his voice was allowed to go to the jury on the question of identity; Brown v. Com., 76 Pa. 319. Generally a witness may be permitted to identify an accused solely from having heard his voice; Com. v. Kelly, 186 Mass. 403, 71 N. E. 807; Deal v. State, 140 Ind. 354, 39 N. E. 930; State v. Herbert, 63 Kan. 516, 66 Pac. 235; Mack v. State, 54 Fla. 55, 44 South. 706, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 373, 14 Ann. Cas. 78. As to the modes of identifying different kinds Of personal property, see Harris, Identification, Ch. XIII. And as to the different kinds of evidence resorted to for proving the identity of a prisoner, see id. Ch. IV. As to the identity between an alien immigrant and the accu.sed, descriptive matter in the report of the captain of the ship to the immigration officers, corresponding closely with other evidence relating to him, was allowed to go to the jury; Mcluemey v. U. S., 143 Fed. 729, 74 C. C. A. 655. In cases of larceny, trover, and replevin, the things in question must be identified; 4 Bla. Com. 396. So, too, the identity of articles taken or injured must be proved in all indictments where^ taking property is the gist of the offence, and in actions of tort for damage to specific property.

See State v. Vines, 34 La. Ann. 1082.

Many other cases occur in which identity must be proved in mortgages, In which this Identification need be such only as would enable identification by a third person aided by Inquiry, and not such as would enable a stranger to select it; Jones, Chat. Mortg. § 54; Smith v. Mc Lean, 24 la.

323; Tindall v. Wasson, 74 Ind. 495; Connally v. Spragins, 06 Ala. 258; Lawrence V. Evarts, 7 Ohio St 194; Gouldiug v. Swett, 13 Gray (Mass.) 617.

The question is sometimes one of great practical difficulty, as in case of the death of strangers, reappearance after a long abseuce, and the like.

See Ryan, Med. Jur. 301; 1 Beck, Med. Jur. 509; 6 0. & P. G77; Clark v. Pearson, 53 Ga. 490; 1 Hagg. Cons. 180; Shelf. Marr. & D. 226; Best, Pres. App. Case 4; Clark v. Robinson, 88 111. 498; Wills, Circ. Ev. 143: 4 Bla. Com. 396; 4 Steph. Com. 468; Harris, Identif.

Identity of the name of a. grantor or grantee is prima facie evidence of identity of the person; Rupert v. I'cnner, 35 Neb. 687, 53 N. W. 598, 17 L. R. A. 824; and a conveyance by a grantee of the same name as the holder of the title Is presumably sufficient; Gilman v. Sheets, 78 la. 499, 43 N. W. 299; even where the names are not identical in spelling, as Savery and Savory; Smith v. Gillum, 80 Tex. 120, 15 S. W. 794; Fink v. Ry. Co., 8 N. Y. Supp. 327. See Idem Sonans. These cases apply a general principle, that a presumption of identity of persons arises from identity of name, and the former is recognized as prima fade evidence of the latter in a great variety of cases; Stebbins v. Duncan, 108 U. S. 47, 2 Sup. Ct. 313, 27 L. J3d.

641; Long v. Mc Dow, 87 Mo. 197; State v. Mc Guire, id. 042; 4 Q. B. 020; Hatcher v. Rocheleau, 18 N. Y. 86; Ward v. Dougherty, 75 Cal. 249, 17 Pac. 193, 7 Am. St. Rep'. 151; Campbell v. Wallace, 46 Mich. 320, 9 N. W. 432; Grindle v. Stone, 78 Me. 176, 3 Atl. 183; ■ Bogue V. Bigelow, 29 Vt. 179; Wilson v. Holt, 83 Ala. 528, 3 South. 321, 3 Am. St. Rep. 708; Robertson v. Du Bose, 76 “J^ex. 1, 13 S. W. SOjO; contra, 9 M. &.W. 75; Robards v. Wolfe, 1 Dana (Ky.) 156; Kinney v. Flynn, 2 R. I. 319; Ellsworth v. Moore, 5 la. 486; Mooers V. Bunker, 29 N. H. 420.

But it has been held that it is a question for the jury to determine the Identity of a grantor with the former grantee: Carleton v. Townsend, 28 Cal. 221; or whether a person pleading former conviction is the same party; State v. Robinson, 89 Me. 154; or a person bearing the name of a deceased is one of his heirs; Freeman v. Loftis, 51 N. C. 528. The identity of a family name and initials raises no presumption of identity; Bennett v. Libhart, 27 Mich. 489. As between father and son of the same name it is presumed that the former Is intended if there is no distinguishing mark; Padgett v. Lawrence, 10 Paige (N. Y.) 170, 40 Am. Dec. 232; Graves v. Colwell, 90 111.

612; 1 Stark. 106; State v. Vlttum, 9