Manslaughter

The unlawful killing of another without malice either express or imp Ued. 4 Bla. Com. 190; 1 Hale, PI.

Cr. 460.

Any unlawful and wilful killing of a' human being, w’ithout malice. Is manslaughter, and thus defined, it includes a negligent killing which is also wilful; U. S. v. Meagher, 37 Fed. 876.

See 2 Bish. N. Cr. L. § 737.

The distinction between manslaughter and murder consists in the following. In the former, though the act which occasions the death be unlawful, or likely to be attended with bodily mischief, yet the malice, either express or implied, which is the very essence of murder, is presumed to be wanting in manslaughter; 1 East, PI.

Cr. 218; Poster 290; Com, v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 304, b2 Am. Dec. 711.

To constitute the offense, It is necessary that the circumstances should take away every evidence of cool depravity of heart or wanton cruelty; Com. V. Paese, 220 Pa. 371, 69 Atl. 891, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 795, 123 Am. St. Rep. 699, 13 Ann. ^ Cas. 1081. It also differs from murder in this, that there can be no accessaries before the fact, there having been no time for premeditation; 1 Hale, PI. Cr. 437; 1 Russ. Cr. 485; but see 1 Blsh. N. Cr. L. 678. Cases of manslaughter have been divided into three classes: (1) Where there was an intent to take life and the killing would be murder but for mitigating circumstances. (2) Where death results from unintentionally doing an unlawful act. (3) Where it results from the negligent doing or omission of an act which, though not itself wrongful, was attended by circumstances which endangered life; 1 Mc Clain, Cr. L. § 335. There is a not uncommon division of manslaughter into two degrees, voluntary and involuntary; and these degrees are distinctly recognized by statute in several states; in other states several distinct degrees of the crime are created by statute; in some as many as four. Involuntary manslaughter is such as happens without the intention to inflict the injury. Voluntary manslaughter Is such as happens voluntarily or with an intention to produce the injury. It has been said that the distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter is now obsolete, and unless where the terms are used in statutes defining the crimes, they are not used in indictvoluntary: 1 Wliart.

Cr. L. S 307.

It would seem however that It Is Incorrect to characterize as obsolete what is literally recognized by statute in several Jurisdictions. See supra. It is more accurate to say that the division is purely statutory in its origin, not entering into the common-law definitions. Homicide may become manslaughter in consequence of provocation; mutual combat; in case of resistance to public officers, etc.; killing in the prosecution of an unlawful or wanton act; or killing in the prosecution of a lawful act Improperly performed, or performed without lawful authority. The provocation which reduces the killing from murder to manslaughter is an answer to the presumption of malice, which the law raises in every case of homicide: it is, therefore, no answer when express malice is proved; 1 Russ. Cr. 440; Foster 132; 1 East, PI.

Cr. 239.

— And to be available the provocation must have been reasonable and recent;

— for no words or slight provocation will be sufficient, and if the party has had time to cool, malice will be inferred; Shorter v. People, 2 N. Y. 193, 51 Am. Dec. 286; Preston v. State, 25 Miss. 383; Mc Whirt’s Case, 3 Gratt. (Va.) 694, 46 Am. Dee. 196; Felix v. State, 18 Ala. 720; Ray v. State, 15 Ga. 223; 5 C. & P. 324; 6 How. St. Tr. 769; Norman v. State, 26 Tex. App. 221, 9 S. W. 606; Moore v. State, 26 Tex. App. 322, 9 S. W. 610; Collins v. U. S., 160 U. S. 62, 14 Sup. Ct. 9, 37 L. Ed. 998; Davis V. People, 114 111.

86, 29 N. E. 192; it is on the assumption that passion disturbs the sway of reason and makes one regardless of its admonition; Smith v. State, 83 Ala. 26, 3 South. 551. Words alone, however provoking oj Insulting, will not reduce killing to manslaughter; State v. Elliott, 98 Mo. 150, 11 S. W. 666; Kennedy v. State, 85 Ala. 326, 5 South. 300; Clore v. State, 26 Tex. App. 624, 10 S. W. 242; People v. Murback, 64 Cal. 369, 30 Pac. 608; State v. Sansone, 116 Mo. 1, 22 S. W. 617. Intent to kill cannot be an element of involuntary manslaughter; Jackson v. State, 76 Ga. 473. It does not necessarily follow that homicide was not murder because done in sudden passion; State V. Ashley, 46 La. Ann. 1036, 13 South. 738. In case of mutual combat, it is generally manslaughter only, when one of the parties is killed; State v. Curry, 46 N. C. 280; 2 C. & K. 814. When death ensues from duelling, the rule is different; and such killing is murder. The killing or assaulting of a relative is held a sufficient provocation to reduce the killing of the wrongdoer to manslaughter; Collins V. U. S., 150 U. S. 62, 14 Sup. Ct 9, 37 L. Ed. 998; State v. Horn, 116 N. C. 1037, 21 S. E. 694. The killing of an officer by resistance to him while acting under lawful authority Is murder; Whart. Cr. L. § 413; but see State der a void or Illegal authority, or oilt of his Jurisdiction, the killing will be manslaughter, or excusable homicide, according to the circumstances of the case; 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 80, 132; 1 Hale, PI.

Cr. 458; Creighton V. Com., 84 Ky. 103, 4 Am. St. Rep. 193; Jones V. State, 26 Tex. App. 1, 9 S. W. 53, 8 Am. St. Rep. 454.

Killing a person while doing an act of mere wantonness is manslaughter: as, if a person throws down stones in a coal-pit, by which a man is killed, although the offender was only a trespasser; Lew. Cr. Cas. 179; Mai:.a Pbohibita; or where a person in another’s charge, too feeble to take care of herself, dies from lack of proper food, nursing, and medical attention, the latter is guilty of manslaughter; [1893] 1 Q. B. 450. When death ensues from the performance of a lawful act, it may, in consequence of the negligence of the offender, amount to manslaughter. For Instance, if the.death had been occasioned by negligent driving; 1 East, PI.

Cr. 263; 1 C. & P. 320; 6 id.

129; or by negligently running an engine and thereby causing a collision by which a pas-.senger is killed; State v. Dorsey, 118 Ind. 167, 20 N. E. 777, 10 Am. St. Rep. 111. Again, when death ensues from the gross negligence of a medical or a surgical practitioner, it is manslaughter. It is no crime for any one to administer medicine; but It is a crime to administer it so rashly and carelessly, or with such criminal Inattehtion, as to produce death; Whart. Cr. L. § 346; and in this respect there Is no difference between the regular practitioner and the quack; 4 C. & P. 440; 1 B. & H. Lead. Cr. Cas. 46; State v. Gile, 8 Wash. 12, 35 Pac. 417. Voluntary manslaughter is an offence involving moral turpitude within the meaning of a code specifying as a ground for divorce the conviction of either party of an offence involving moral turpitude; Holloway v. Holloway, 126 Ga. 459, 66 S. E. 191, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 272, 115 Am. St. Rep. 102, 7 Ann. Cas. 1164. For a definition of “moral turpitude” see Depobtation.