Notice

The information given of some act done, or the interpellation by which some act is required to be done.

Knowledge.

A statutory notice is not binding unless given as the law directs or allows; Allen v. Strickland, 100 N. C. 225, 6 S. E. 780; O’Fallon v. It. Co., 45 111.

App. 572.

Act ml notice exists when knowledge Is actually brought home to the party to be affected by it. This statement is criticised, as being too narrow, in Wade, Notice 4. This writer divides actual knowledge into two classes, express and implied; the former includes all knowledge of a degree above that which depends upon collateral inference, or which imposes upon the party the further duty of inquiry; the latter imputes knowledge to the party because he is shown to be conscious of having the means of knowledge, though he docs not use them, choosing to remain ignorant of the fact, or is grossly negligent in not following up the inquiry which the known facts suggest; Wade, Notice 5. In Appeal of Craft, 42 Conn. 146, there is a division into “particular or explicit*’ and “general or implied” notice. Information which a prudent man believes to be true, and which if followed by inquiry must lead to knowledge, is equivalent to knowledge; Tucker v. Constable, 16 Or. 407, 19 Pac. 13. Where the direct issue of fraud is involved, knowledge may be imputed to one wilfully closing his eyes to information within his reach; Wecker v. Enameling Co., 204 U. S. 176, 27 Sup. Ct 184, 51 L. Ed. 430, 9 Ann. Cas. 757. Notice of any fact which is sufficient to put a purchaser of land on inquiry, is adequate notice; Rorer Iron Co. v. Trout, 83 Ya. 397, 2 S. H. 713, 5 Am. St. Rep. 285; and of everything to which such inquiry may lead; Shauer v. Alterton, 151 U. S. 607, 14 Sup. Ct. 442, 38 L. Ed. 286. Constructive notice exists when the party, by any circumstance whatever, is put upon inquiry (which is the same as implied notice, supra), or when certain acts have been done which the party interested is presumed to have knowledge of on grounds of 397, 17 Am. Dec. 431; Scott v. Gallagher, 14 S. & R. (Pa.) 333, 16 Am. Dec. 508. The recording a deed; Wise v. Wimer, 23 Mo. 237; Magoffin v. Mandaville, 28 Miss. 354; 4 Kent 182, n.; an advertisement in a newspaper, when authorized by statute as a part of the process, public acts of government, and lis pendens (but see Lis Pendens), constitute constructive notice. Judge Story defines the term as “knowledge” imputed by the court on presumption, too strong to be rebutted, that the information must have been communicated; Story, Eq. Jur. § 399. “Constructive notice is a legal inference of notice, of so high a nature, as to be conclusive, unless disproved, and is in most cases insusceptible of explanation or rebuttal by evidence that the purchaser had no actual notice, and believed the vendor’s title to be good 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 77. Constructive notice is sometimes called notice in law; Sterry v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 261. Proof of notoriety of the fact in the neighborhood of the party to be affected is competent to prove notice; Wright v. Stewart, 130 Fed., 905. To establish notice by telephone, the party relying upon such notice has the burden of proving the identity of the person receiving the communication and that it reached the party sought to be charged; Second Pool Coal Co. v. Coal Co., 188 Fed. 892, 110 C. C. A. 52G. Proof that an envelope was mailed and received is not conclusive evidence that the notice was enclosed, and if its receipt is denied, it is for the jury; Empire State Surety Co. v. Lumber Co., 200 Fed. 224, 118 C. C. A. 410. The constructive notice given by the record of a deed is sometimes called record notice. Where an instrument affecting the title to real estate is properly recorded, the record thereof is notice to subsequent purchasers, etc., from the same grantor; Wade, Notice, 2d ed. § 97; Vaughan v. Greer, 38 Tex. 530; Mayo v. Cartwright, 30 Ark. 407; Randolph v..K.

Co., 28 N. J. Eq. 49.

The possession of land is notice to all the world of the possessor’s rights thereunder; Li pj) v. Land Syndicate, 24 Neb. 692, 40 N. W. 129; Buck v. Holt, 74 la.

294, 37 N. W. 377; Brooke v. Bordner, 125 Pa. 470, 17 Atl. 467; Daniel v. Hester, 29 S. C. 147, 7 S, E. 65; Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran, 142 U. S. 417, 12 Sup. Ct. 239, 35 L. Ed. 1063.

Notice to an agent in the same transaction is, in general, notice to the principal; Farmers & C. Bk. v. Payne, 25 Conn. 444, 68 Am. Dec. 362; Pritchett v. Sessions, 10 Rich (S. C.) 293; Baker v. Bliss, 39 N. Y. 70; Armstrong v. Abbott, 11 Colo. 223, 17 Pac. 517. A principal imposing confidence in an agent, and therefore neglecting some source of knowledge which he might have sought, is not chargeable with what he might suspicion; Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 U. S. 505, 9 Sup. Ct. 594, 32 L. Ed. 1005. Notice to the trustees is notice to the beneficiaries in a deed of trust; Peters v. Bain, 133 U. S. 670, 10 Sup. Ct. 354, 33 L. Ed. 696; Cruralish v. R. Co., 32 W. Va. 244, 9 S. E. 180. A principal is not bound by his agent’s knowledge where it is not the duty of the agent to communicate it; Hummel v. Bank, 75 Ta. 689, 37 N. W. 954. Notice to an agent.must be on the very business on hand; Alger v. Keith, 105 Fed. 105, 44 C. C. A. 371. So of knowledge incidentally acquired by a corporate officer when not acting in his official capacity; Caffee v. Berkley, 141 la.

344, 118 N. W. 267.

If the agent is acting adversely to the principal his knowledge is not imputed to the principal; Central C. & C. Co. v. Good & Co., 120 Fed. 793, 57 C. C. A. 1G1; Gunster v. Power Co., 181 Pa. 327, 37 Atl. 550, 59 Am. St. Rep. 650. Where it is in the private interest of the officer of a bank to conceal knowledge from his bank, the law does not, by a fiction, charge the bank with such knowledge; American N. Bk. v. Miller, 229 U. S. 517, 33 Sup. Ct. 883, 57 L. Ed. 1310. Notice to the president and some directors of a corporation is sufficient to bind it; Paul S. S. Co. v. Paul, 129 Fed. 757; but where the president, acting in his private capacity, acquires knowledge of a particular fact, it does not affect the corporation in a later transaction unless he participated therein; Smith v. Carmack (Tenn.) 64 S. W. 372; Teagarden v. Lumber Co., 105 Tex. 61(5, 154 S. W. 973. Notice to one who acts as local representative, advisor, secretary and treasurer, is notice to his association; Dennis v. Loan Ass’n, 136 Fed. 539, 69 C. C. A. 315; but where one is secretary of two companies, it must be shown that when notice was given to him, it was his duty to communicate it to the proper company, even though he was acting at the time for the other company; [1902] 1 Ch. 507. The giving notice in certain cases is in the nature of a condition precedent to the right to call on the other party for the performance of his engagement, whether his contract were express or implied. Thus, in the familiar instance of bills of exchange and promissory notes, the implied contract of an indorser is that he will pay the bill or note, provided it be not paid, on presentment at maturity, by the acceptor or maker (being the party primarily liable), and provided that he (the Indorser) has due notice of the dishonor, and without which he is discharged from all liability: consequently, it is essential for the holder to be prepared to prove affirmatively that such notice was given, or some facts dispensing with such notice; 1 Chitty, Pr. 496; 1 Pars. Notes & B. Whenever the defendant’s liability to perform an act depends on another occurrence which is best known to the plaintiff, and of which the defendant is not legally bound to take notice, the plaintiff must prove that due nolice was in fact given. So, in cases of insurances on ships, a notice of abandonment is frequently necessary to enable the assured plaintiff to proceed as for a total loss v hen something remains to be saved, in relation to which, upon notice, the insurers might themselves take their own measures. Notice may be written or oral, in many cases, at the option of the party required to give it; but written notice is generally preferable, both as avoiding doubt and ambiguity in its terms, and as admitting more easy and exact proof of delivery; 2 Dan. Neg. Inst. 972. Immediate notice of a fire means reasonable notice; Solomon v. Ins. Co., 100 N. Y. 595, 55 N. E. 279, 40 L. R. A. 682, 73 Am. St. Rep. 707. Acknowledging service of notice does not preclude showing it was too late; Shenrouse v. Morgan, 111 Ga. 858, 36 S. E. 927. Personal service does not include sendee at the last known residence; Dalton v. It. Co., 113 Mo. App. 71, 87 8. W. 010. See Knowledge; Record.