Principal

Leading; chief; more important. This word has several njeanings. It is used in opposition to accessary, to show the degree of crime committed by two persons. Thus, we say, the principal is more guilty than the accessary after the fact. In estates, principal is used as opposed to incident or accessary: as in the following rule: “The incident shall pass by the grant of the principal; but not the principal by the grant of the incident: accessorium non ducit sed sequitur suum principal ” Co. Litt. 152a. It is used in opposition to agent, and in this sense it signifies that the principal is the prime mover. See Principal and Agent. It is used in opposition to interest: as, the principal being secured, the interest will follow. See Interest. The corpus or capital of the estate in contradistinction to the income. Money bearing interest; a capital sum lent on interest. It is used also in opposition to surety: thus, we say, the principal is answerable before the surety. See Suretyship; Guaranty. Principal is used also to denote the more important: as, the principal person. In the English law, the chief person in some of the inns of chancery is called principal of the house. Principal is also used to designate the best of many things: as, the principal bed, the principal table, and the like. In Criminal Law. The actor in the commission of a crime. All who are present, either actually or constructively, at the place of a crime, and are either aiding, abetting, assisting, or advising its commission, or are present for such purpose, are principals in the crime; U. S. v. Boyd, 45 Fed. 851.

See Fernandez v. State, 25 Tex. App. 538, 8 S. W. G67.

Principals are of two kinds, namely, principals in the first degree, and principals in the second degree. A principal in the first degree is one who is the actual perpetrator of the act.

1 Hale, PI. Cr. 233, G15; Hately v. State, 15 Ga. 346.

But to constitute him such it is not necessary that he should be actually present when the offence is consummated; People v. Adams, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 190, 45 Am. Dec. 468; Smith v. State, 21 Tex. App. 107, 17 S. W. 552. For if one lay poison purposely for another, who takes it and is killed, the offender, though absent when it was taken, is a principal in the first degree; Clark, Cr. L. 83; 4 Bla. Com. 34; 1 Chitty, Cr. L. 257. And the offence may be committed in his absence, through the medium of an innocent agent: as, if a person incites a child under the age of discretion, or any other innorance of the fact, or other cause, to the commission of crime, the inciter, though absent when the act was committed, is ex necessitate liable for the act of his agent and a principal In the first degree; 1 Hale, PI.

Or. 514; 2 Leach 978.

But if the instrument be aware of the consequences of his act, he is a principal in the first degree; the employer, in such case, if present when the fact is committed, is a principal in the second degree, and, if absent, an accessary before the fact; 1 C. & K. 589; 1 Archb. Cr. L. 58. Principals in the second degree are those who are present aiding and abetting the commission of the act.

Rasnick v. Com., 2 Va. Cas. 350.

They are generally termed aiders and abettors, and sometimes, improperly, accomplices; for the latter term includes all the particeps criminis, whether principals in the first or second degree or mere accessaries. A person to be a principal in the second degree need not be actually present, an ear or eyewitness of the transaction. The presence may be constructive. He is, in construction of law, present aiding and abetting if, with the intention of giving assistance, he be near enough to afford it should the occasion arise. If, for instance, he be outside the house watching to prevent surprise or the like, whilst his companions are in the house committing a felony, such constructive presence is sufficient to make a principal in the second degree; Clark, Cr. L. 85; Com. v. Knapp, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 49G, 20 Am. Dec. 491; 9 C. & P. 437; Brennan v. People, 15 111.

511.

There must, however, be a participation in the act; for although a person be present when a felony is committed, yet if he does not consent to the felonious purpose or contribute to its execution, he will not be a principal in the second degree merely because he does not endeavor to prevent the felony or apprehend the felon; 1 Russ. Cr. 27; 1 Hale, PI.

Cr. 439; State v. Hildreth, 31 N. C. 440, 51 Am. Dec. 359; Connaughty v. State, 1 Wis. 159, GO Am. Dec. 370.

The law recognizes no difference between the offence of principals in the first and principals in the second degree. And so immaterial is the distinction considered in practice that, if a man be indicted as principal in the first degree, proof that he was present aiding and abetting another in committing the offence, although his was not the hand which actually did it, will support the indictment; and if he be indicted as principal in the second degree, proof that he was not only present, but committed the offence with his own hand, will support the indictment. So, when an offence is punishable by a statute which makes no mention of principals in the second degree, such principals are within the meaning of the statute as much as the parties who actually commit In treason, and in offences below felony, and in all felonies in which the punishment of principals in the first degree and of principals in the second degree is the same, the indictment may charge all who are present and abet the fact as principals in the first degree, provided the offence permits of a participation, or specially, as aiders and abettors; Archb. Cr. PI.

7; Com. v. Chapman, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 422; 1 C. & M. 187.

But where by particular statutes the punishment is different, then principals in the second degree must be indicted specially as aiders and abettors; Archb. Cr. PI.

7.

If indicted as aiders and abettors, an indictment charging that A gave the mortal blow, and that B, C, and D were present aiding and abetting, will be sustained by evidence that B gave the blow, and that A, C, and D were present aiding and abetting; and even if it appears that the act was committed by a person not named in the indictment, the aiders and abettors may, nevertheless, be convicted; Dougl. 207; 1 East, PI.

Cr. 350.

And the same though the jury say that they are not satisfied which gave the blow, if they are satisfied that one of them did, and that the others were present aiding and abetting; 1 Den. Cr. Cas. 52; 2 C. & K. 382. See Access ary; Accomplice; Principal and Agent.