Privileged Communications

Communications made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although It contain matter which without this privilege would be defamatory and actionable. Duty, In this canon, cannot be confined to legal duties, which may be enforced by Indictment, action, or mandamus, but must include moral and social duties of imperfect obligation; 5 E. & B. 347. The proper meaning of a privileged communication, said Baron Parke, is only this: that the occasion on which the communication was made rebuts the inference prima facie arising from a statement prejudicial to the character of the plaintiff, and puts it upon hijn to prove that there was malice in fact, — that the defendant was actuated by motives of personal spite or ill-will, independent of the occasion on which the communication was Vender, 40 Minn. 475, 42 N. W. 542; Chaffin v. Lynch, 83 Va. 106, 1 S. E. 803; White v. Nicholls, 3 How. (U. S.) 287, 11 L. Ed. 591; [1891] App. Cas. 78; Brown v. Vannaman, 85 Wis. 451, 55 N. W. 183, 39 Am. St. Rep. 860. The law recognizes two classes of cases in which the occasion either supplies an absolute defence, or a defence subject to the condition that the party acted bona fide without malice. The distinction turns entirely on the question of malice. The communications last mentioned lose their privilege on proof of express malice; Erber v. Dun, 12 Fed. 526. The former depend in no respect for their protection upon the bona fides of the defendant. The occasion is an absolute privilege, and the only questions are whether the occasion existed, and whether the matter complained of was pertinent to the occasion; Heard, Lib. & S. § 89.

See Webb, Pollock, Torts 335; Odg. SI. & L. 184; Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N. C. 270, 13 S. E. 775.

As to communications which are thus absolutely privileged, no person is liable, either civilly or criminally, in respect of anything published by him as a member of a legislative body, in the course of his legislative duty, or in resnect of anything published by him in th^ course of his duty in any judicial proceeding. This privilege extends not only to parties counsel witnesses, jurors, and judges in r judicial proceeding, but also to proceedings in legislative bodies, and to all who, in the discharge of public duty or the honest pursuit of private right, are compelled to take part in the administration of justice, or in legislation. Allegations In pleadings imputing criminal or fraudulent acts to the opposite party, if pertinent, are absolutely privileged and cannot be made the ground of an action for libel; Mc Gehee v. Ins. Co., 112 Fed. 853, 50