Revive

To bring again to life, to reanimate, to renew; to bring into action after a suspension.

Lindsey v. Lyman, 37 la. 207., REVOCATION.

The recall of a power or authority conferred, or the vacating of an instrument previously made. An act of the mind demonstrated by some outward and visible sign.

Graham v. Burch, 47 Minn. 171, 49 N. W. 697, 28 Am. St. Rep. 339.

Revocation of grants. Grants may be revoked by virtue of a power expressly reserved in the deed, or where the grant Is without consideration or in the nature of a testamentary disposition; 3 Co. 25. Yoluntai'y conveyances, being without pecuniary or legal consideration, may be superseded or revoked, in effect, by a subsequent conveyance of the same subject-matter to another for valuable consideration. And it will make no difference that the first conveyance was meritorious, being a voluntary settlement for the support of one’s self or family, and made when the grantor was not indebted, or had ample means besides for the payment of his debts. And the English cases hold that knowledge of the former deed will not affect the rights of a subsequent purchaser; 9 East 59; 4 B. & P. 332; 18 Ves. 84. See, also, the exhaustive review of the American cases, in note to Sexton v. Wheaton, 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 36. It is generally held that a voluntary conveyance which is also fraudulent, is void as to subsequent bona fide purchasers for value with notice; but if not fraudulent in fact, it is only void as to those purchasing without notice.

See Bisp. Eq. 257; Elliott v. Horn, 10 Ala. 348, 352, 44 Am.' Dec. 4S8; Verplank v. Sterry, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 536, 557, 7 Am. Dec. 348; Hudnal v. Wilder, 4 Mc Cord (S. C.) 295, 17 Am. Dec. 744; Fraudulent Conveyance.

The fact that the voluntary grantor subsequently conveys to another, is regarded as prima facie evidence that the former deed was fraudulent as to subsequent purchasers without notice, or it would not have been revoked; Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 265, 8 L. Ed. 120; Bank of Alexandria v. Patton, 1 Rob. (Va.) 500, 544. In some of the states, notice of the voluntary deed will defeat the subsequent purchaser; Lancaster v. Dolan, 1 Rawle (Pa.) 231, 18 Am. Dec. 625; Baltimore v. Williams, 6 Md. 242; Hudnal v. Wilder, 4 Mc Cord (S. English rule prevails; Doyle v. Sleeper, 1 Dana (Ky.) 531; Freeman v. Eatman, 38 N. C. 81, 40 Am. Dec. 444. If one bail money or other valuables to another, to be delivered to a third person on the day of marriage, he may countermand it at any time before delivery over; 1 Dy. 49. But if such delivery be made in payment or security of a debt, or for other valuable consideration, it is not revocable; 1 Stra. 105. And although the gift be not made known to the donee, being for his benefit, his assent will be presumed until he expressly dissents; 3 Co. 26 6; 2 Salk. 618.' Powers of appointment to uses are revocable if so expressed in the deed of settlement. But it is not indispensable, it is said, that this power of revocation should be repeated in each successive deed of appointment, provided it exist in the original deed creating the settlement; 4 Kent 336; 1 Co. 110 b; 2 Bla. Com. 339. It has been said that the power of revocation does not include the appointment of new uses; 2 Freem. 61; Pr. in Ch. 474. A voluntary deed of trust, without power of revocation, made with a nominal consideration, and without legal advice as to its effect, when there was evidence that its effect was misunderstood by the grantor, will be set aside in equity; Garnsey v. Mumly, 24 N. J. Eq. 243; s. c. 13 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 345, and note by Mr. Bispbam. In a similar case it was held that the mere omission of counsel to advise the insertion of a power of revocation is not a ground to set aside the deed; but that this omission and the absence of the power are circumstances tending to show that the act was not done with a deliberate intent. Tbe deliberate intent of a party to tie his hands should clearly appear. In the absence of such an intent the omission of a power to revoke is prima facie evidence of mistake. The mistake being one of fact mixed with legal effects, equity will relieve; Appeal of Russell, 75 Pa. 269; the earlier English cases seem to have insisted upon the presence of a power of revocation in voluntary settlements; L. R. 8 Eq. 558; 14 id. 365; but in a later case it was held that the absence of such a power was merely a circumstance of more or less weight, according to the other circumstances of each case; L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 430. A reserved right of revocation is not inconsistent with the creation of a valid trust; Mize v. Nat Bank, CO Mo. App. 358. A quitclaim deed from a trustee to the donor of the trust will not revoke the trust, though made solely for that purpose, since a completed trust, without reservation of power to revoke, can only be revoked by the consent of all the beneficiaries; Ewing v. Sliannahan, 113 Mo. 188, 20 S. W. 1065. See Hellman v. Mc Williams, 70 Cal. 449, 11 Pac. 659. Powers of sale and 6f substitution of trusvoked by the death of the grantor, although the mortgage or deed of trust is a mere right to resort to the thing for the payment of the debt, and the mortgagee or trustee has no estate, legal or equitable, in the thing conveyed; Frank v. Mortgage Co., 86 Miss. 103, 38 South. 340, 4 Ann. Cas. 54, 70 L. R. A. 135, with full note on the revocation by death of power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust. A power of sale of an ancestor’s land, for the purpose of an amicable division among tbe heirs, is revoked by the death of one of the parties, although it contains a provision that it shall not be revoked by deatn, and authorizes the payment of the salary and expenses of the agent out of the proceeds of the property; Weaver v. Richards, 144 Mich. 395, 108 N. W. 3S2, 6 h R. A. (N. S.) 855, and note. That case is put squarely upon the doctrine that the interest which will protect a power after the death of the person creating it, must be an interest in the thing itself. And a contract placing one’s property in another’s hands to manage and sell, which is to continue after the death of the donor, is nevertheless terminated by the death of the donor; Mills v. Smith, 193 Mass. 11, 78 N. E. 765, 6