Ship

A vessel employed in navigation. Ben. Ad. § 215; for example, the terms the ship’s papers, the ship’s husband, shipwreck, and the like, are employed whether the vessel referred to be a brig, a schooner, or a sloop, or a three-masted vessel. or river, to which the provisions of revised statutes, title “Merchant Marine,” may be applicable; R. S. § 4612; The St Louis, 48 Fed. 312.

See Cope v. Dry Dock Co., 119 U. S. 629, T Sup. Ct. 336, 30 L. Ed. 501.

See Wood v. Two Barges, 46 Fed. 204, as to what is not a ship. A vessel with three masts, employed in navigation; U. S. v. Kelly, 4 Wash. C. C. 528, Fed. Cas. No. 15,516; the boats and rigging; 2 Marsh. Ins. 727; together with the anchors, masts, cables, and such like objects, are considered as part of the ship; Pardessus, n.

599.

A ship is born when she is launched and lives so long as her identity is preserved; Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U. S. 424, 22 Sup. Ct. 195, 46 L. Ed. 264. Prior to her launching she is an ordinary piece of personal property and subject only to mechanic’s liens created by state law and enforceable in state courts. From the moment her keel touches the water, she is transformed and becomes a subject of admiralty jurisdiction. She acquires a personality of her own and becomes competent to contract, and is individually liable for her obligations, upon which she may sue in the name of her owner and be sued in her own name. Her owner’s agents may not be her agents, and her agents may not be her owner’s agents; Thorp v. Hammond, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 408, 20 L. Ed. 419; Workman v. New York, 179 U. S. 552, 21 Sup. Ct. 212, 45 L. Eld. 314; Homer Ramsdell Transp.

Co. v. La Compagnie G6n6rale Transatlantique, 182 U. S. 406, 21 Sup. Ct. 831, 45 L. Ed. 1155.

She is capable of committing a tort, and is responsible in damages therefor. She may also become a quasi-bankrupt; may be sold for the payment of her debts, and thereby receive a complete discharge from all prior liens, with liberty to begin a new life, contract further obligations, and, perhaps, be subjected to a second sale; Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U. S. 439, 22 Sup. Ct. 195, 46 L. Ed. 264. So sharply is the line drawn between a vessel upon the stocks and one in the water, that the former can never be made liable in admiralty, either in rem against herself or in personam against her owners upon contracts or for torts, while if, in taking the water in the process of launching, she escapes from the control of those about her, shoots across the stream and injures another vessel, she is liable to a suit in rem for damages; 2 W. Rob. 421; L. R. 2 Prob. Div. 231, 235; L. R. 8 Prob. Div. 119; Baker v. Power, 14 Fed. 483. As to what passes by a bill of sale under the general term ship, or ship and her appurtenances, or ship, apparel, and furniture, see 1 Pars. Marit. Law 71, n.

3; Apparel.

The capacity of a ship is ascertained by its tonnage, or the space which may be occupied by its cargo. limited company; [1895] P. 284; admiralty will authorize a majority in value of the owners of a ship to employ the ship, taking a bond for the protection of the minority; 3 Kent 151; a dissenting part-owner, receiving security cannot claim compensation or a share of the profits; 4 Sim. 439; and is not liable for a collision; Scull v. Raymond, 18 Fed. 547. “American vessels are of two classes, those registered and those enrolled and licensed.” Registry declares the nationality of a vessel in foreign trade; enrolment is to evidence the national character of a vessel engaged in the coasting trade or home traffic; Anderson v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co., 225 U. S. 187, 32 Sup. Ct. 626, 56 L. Ed. 1047. The British registry act divides a ship into sixty-four parts or shares, which may be held in severalty. Ownership of a fraction of a share cannot be registered, but any number not exceeding five (except in case of transfer by operation of law) may be registered as joint owners of a share. Carriers by water are to a certain extent common carriers, in all the strictness of the common-law rule; 3 Kent *217; Garrison v. Ins. Co., 19 How. (U. S.) 312, 15 L. Ed. 656; like common carriers, apart from express contract, they are absolutely responsible for the goods intrusted to them, and insure them against all contingencies excepting only the act of God and the queen’s enemies; per Lopes, L. J., in 16 Q. B. D. 633; see, also, L. R. 9 Ex. 342; 1 C. P. D. 19; this rule is said to have been established in the seventeenth century; 1 C. P. D. 430. The master of a general ship is liable where his goods were stolen by robbers; 1 Mod. 85; and an action will lie against the owners as well as the master; Carth. 58. It has been held that the owner of a private ship is subject to the same rule; L. R. 9 Ex. 638. Lord Cockburn has denied that a carrier by sea is subject to the same liability as a common carrier by land; 1 C. P. D. 426; and Brett, J., was of opinion that he is not a common carrier, but that his liability to carry at his absolute risk arises from recognized custom; L. R. 9 Ex. 338; 7 id, 267.

See article in 5 L. Q. Rev. 15.

It is said that they are not common carriers, because not bound to receive all goods, offered.

See 1 Pars. Ship. 248.

Stringent regulations in regard to the number of passengers to be taken on board of sailing-vessels, and the provisions to be made for their safety and comfort, are also prescribed by R. S. § 4465. Numerous acts of congress have been passed from time to time in reference to the registering, enrolling, licensing, employment, and privileges of the vessels of commerce owned in the United States.

See R. S. §§ 4399, 4500.

Harter Act (see that title), was not Intended as general legislation concerning the rights or liabilities of ship-owners, but only to deal with the carrying vessel and her own cargo. And all principles and rules of decisions previously applicable, as to the apportionment of damages in case of mutual fault, should still be followed as closely as possible and no more changes admitted than the evident intent of the act necessitates; The Viola, 60 Fed. 296; The Chattahoochee, 74 Fed. 899, 21 C. C. A. 162, 33 U. S. App. 510; The Jason, 225 U. S. 32, 32 Sup. Ct. 560, 56 L. Ed. 969. In determining the effect of the statute in restricting the operation of general and well-settled principles, the course of decision has been to treat those principles as still existing, and limit the relief from their operation afforded by the statute to precisely that called for by the language of the statute, and no more. It is said that the intent of the act is that damages to the cargo arising from negligence in navigation shall be borne by the cargo owner and not by the ship, and that the act was not designed to increase or diminish the liability of the other vessel in cases of mutual fault and a division of damages; The Niagara, 77 Fed. 329. The provision of the act making invalid contracts relieving a carrier from liability for negligence apply to a special as well as a common carrier; B. S. Shipping Co. v. Crossman, 206 Fed. 183. The requirement in the act of due diligence to exempt the owner from liability to cargo owners means not only the personal diligence of the owner but also of his agents employed to fit the vessel for sea; The Colima, 82 Fed. 665. Such diligence is not exercised where no inspection is made of the cement covering the bottom of an iron steamship; The Alvena, 79 Fed. 973, 25 C. C. A. 261, 51 U. S. App. 100; s. c.

79 Fed. 973, 25 C. C. A. 261.

Covenants avoiding exercise of due diligence are void; The Toronto, 174 Fed. 632, 98 C. C. A. 386. That a vessel was one man short of her full complement of seamen, and was being unlawfully navigated at full speed in a fog at the time of a collision, because she was a slow boat, do not establish faults in navigation; Boston Marine Ins. Co. v. Lumber Co., 197 Fed. 703, 117 C. C. A. 97. The word “management” in the act relates to management on the voyage and not to the master’s acts in stowing the ship; The Colima, 82 Fed. 665. Exemption from liability for faults or errors in management applies only after the voyage has commenced; Steamship Wellesley Co. v. C. A. Hooper & Co., 185 Fed. 733, 108 C. C. A. 71. A schooner in first class condition at the beginning of the voyage is not liable for damage to cargo from sea- water caused by dangerous after leaving port raises a presumption that she was unsea worthy; Carolina Portland Cement Co. v. Anderson, 186 Fed. 145, 108