Slave

One over whose life, liberty, and property another has unlimited control. Every limitation placed by law upon the absolute control modifies and to that extent changes the condition of the slave. In every slaveholding state of the United States the life and limbs of a slave were protected from violence inflicted by the master or third persons. Among the Romans the slave was classed among things (res). He was homo sed non persona.

Heineccius, Elem. Jur. 1. 1, $ 75.

He was considered pro nullo et mortuo, quia nec statu familice nec civitatis nec libertatis gaudet.

Id. § 77. See, also, State v. Edmund, 15 N. C. 340; Neal v. Farmer, 9 Ga. 582.

In the United States, as a person, he was capable of committing crimes, of receiving his freedom, of being the subject of homicide, and of modifying by his volition very materially the rules applicable to other species of property. His existence as a person being recognized by the law, that existence was protected by the law; State v. Tackett, 8 N. C. 217; State v. Jones, Walk. 83. Among the German peoples slavery was of a different kind from that in Rome. Slaves had their own religion and dwelling place, and they were bound to perform only certain and fixed duties for their owners. They were rather preedial serfs than slaves. Such slavery might arise from capture in war, or conviction for crimes; men sold themselves Into slavery; a father could ^ell his children; often persons were kidnapped and sold into slavery. The slave was in some respects regarded as a chattel; he might be alienated by his master, ill-treated and perhaps slain. He could not sue a free man. Somerset’s case, Somerset v. Stewart, Lofft J (1772), was the first express adjudication that a slave while in England was free (Lord Mansfield’s famous judgment). In Smith v. Gould, Ld. Raym. 1274, which was an action of trover for a negro, It was held that “the law takes no notice of negroes being different from other men,” and that “there is no such thing as a slave by the law of England.” In 1674-75, Sir Leoline Jenkins charged In an admiralty case in Old Bailey that there was “no such thing as a slave In England.”

Republished in 10 Law Mag. & Rev. (4th Ser.) 424. See Taswell-Langmead’s Eng. Const. Hist. 316; The Case of James Sommersett, a Negro, 20 How. St. Tr. 1.

As to the serfs in early English history, see Maitl. Domesday & Beyond; Holdsw. Hist. E. L.; Skrf. In the slaveholding states the relations of husband and wife and parent and child were recognized by statutes in relation to public sales, and by the courts in all cases where such relations were material to elucidate the motives of their acts. A slave had no political rights. His civil rights, though necessarily more restricted than the freemen’s, were based upon the law of the land. He had none but such as were by that law and the law of nature given to him. The civil-law rule, " partus sequitur ventrem /’ was adopted in all the slaveholding states, the status of the mother at the time of birth deciding the status of the issue; Barrington v. Logan's Adm’rs, 2 Dana (Ky.) 432; Rawlings v. Boston, 3 H. & McH. (Md.) 139; Overseers of Poor of Marbletown v. Overseers of Poor of Kingston, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 1; Williamson v. Daniel, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 568, 6 L. Ed. 731; Adams v. Roberts, 2 How. (U. S.) 496, 11 L. E d.

349.

The slave could not acquire property: his acquisitions belonged to his master; Jackson v. Lervey, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 397; Jenkins v. Brown, 6 Humphr. j (Tenn.) 299; Hall v. U. S., 92 U. S. 27, 23 L. Ed. 597. The pecuhum of the Roman slave was ex gratia, and not of right; Inst. 2.

9. 3.

In like manner, negro slaves in the United States were, as a matter of fact, sometimes permitted by their masters ex gratia, to obtain and retain property. The slave could not be a witness, except for and against slaves or free negroes. This was, perhaps, the rule of the common law. None but a freeman was othesworth. In the United States the rule of exclusion which we have mentioned was enforced in all cases where the evidence was offered for or against white persons; Winn v. Jones, 6 Leigh (Va.) 74. In most of the states this exclusion was by express statutes, while in others it existed by custom and the decision of the courts; Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 519. In the slaveholding states, and In Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa, by statute, the rule was extended to include free persons of color or emancipated slaves; Jordan v. Smith, 14 Ohio, 199; Rusk v. Sowerwine, 3 Harr. 6 J. (Md.) 97. The slave could be a suitor in court only for his freedom. For all other wrongs be appeared through his master, for whose benefit the recovery was had; Bland v. Dowling, 9 Gill & J. (Md.) 19; Berard v. Berard, 9 La. 156. The suit for freedom was favored; Lee v. Lee, 8 Pet. (U. S.) 44, 8 L. Ed. 860; Rankin v. Lydia, 2 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 467. Lapse of time worked no forfeiture by reason Of his dependent condition; Gatliff’s Adm’r v. Rose, 8 B. Mour. (Ky.) 631; Hudgins v. Wrights, 1 Hen. & M. (Va.) 141. The master was bound to maintain, support, and defend his slave, however helpless or impotent. If he failed to do so, public officers were provided to supply his deficiency at his expense. Cruel treatment was a penal offense of a high grade. Emancipation of the slave was the consequence of conviction in Louisiana; and the sale of J the slave to another master Was a part of the penalty in Alabama and Texas. It will be presumed that a person who was a slave before 1SG5 in this country is a negro; Mc Millan v. School Committee, 107 N. C. 609, 12 S. E. 330, 10 L. R. A. 823. Servus; Freedom. Slavery was abolished In the United States by the thirteenth amendment to the constitution. In U. S. v. Ah Sou, 132 Fed. 878, in the case of a Chinese woman who had been sold Into slavery in China and brought into this country, it was held that, as her deportation would be a remanding into slavery, such action would violate in spirit at least the 13th amendment to the federal constitution.