Trespass

An unlawful act committed with violence, actual or implied, causing injury to the person, property, or relative rights of another. Any unlawful act committed with violence, actual or implied, to the person, property, or rights of another. Any unauthorized entry upon the realty of another to the damage thereof. The wanton and unnecessary destruction of the property of another in removing it where there is a right to do so, as, for example, in abating a nuisance or putting out of the way an obstruction' of a highway, constitutes a trespass; Beardslee v. French, 7 Conn. 125, 18 Am. Dec. 86. “Throughout the Middle Ages, trespass is regarded as a crime Maitland, 2 Sel. Essays Anglo Amer. Leg. Hist. 589. In determining the nature of the act, neither the amount of violence or the Intent with which it is offered, nor the extent of the damage accomplished or the purpose for which the act was committed, are of any importance: since a person who enters upon the land of another without leave, to lead off his own runaway horse, and who breaks a blade of grass in so doing, commits a trespass; Heermance v. Vernoy, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 6. It is said that some damage must be committed to make an act a trespass. It is undoubtedly true that damage is required to constitute a trespass for which an action will lie; but, so far as the tort Itself Is concerned, it seems more than doubtful if the mere commission of an act affecting another, without legal authority, does not constitute trespass, though until damage is done the law will not regard it, inasmuch as the law does not regard trifles. See infra. The distinction between the different classes of trespass is of importance in determining the nature of the remedy. A trespass committed with force is said to be done vi et armis; one committed by entry upon the realty, by breaking the close. In Practice. A form of action which lies to recover damages for the injury sustained by the plaintiff, as the immediate consequence of some wrong done forcibly to his person or property, against the person committing the same. The action of trespass, properly so called, is distinguished from trespass on the case, which is an action for injuries committed without force, and is usually termed simply case ( q. v.). In states where common law forms of actions are still used, the distinction between trespass and trespass on the case is generally abolished by statute and a declaration good for either is good for both. In other states, either action is known merely as an action of tort and in others as a civil action. The action lies for injuries to the person of the plaintiff, as, by assault and battery, wounding, imprisonment, and the like; Beecher v. Parmele, 9 Vt. 352, 31 Am. Dec. 633; person of another, whereby a direct injury is done to the plaintiff in regard to his rights as parent, master, etc.; Akerley v. Haines, 2 Caines (N. Y.) 292; Hornketh v. Barr, 8 S. & R. (Pa.) 36, 11 Am. Dec. 568. It does not lie for mere non-feasance, nor where the matter affected was not tangible. An action of trespass at common law will lie in a state court by the owner of one vessel against the owner of another for damages by tire at a wharf; Chappell v. Bradshaw, 128 U. S. 132, 9 Sup. Ct. 40, 32 L. Ed. 3G9. The action lies for injuries to personal property, which may be committed by the several acts of unlawfully striking, chasing if alive, and carrying away to the damage of the plaintiff, a personal chattel; 1 Wins. Saund. 84; of which another is the owner and in possession; Brainard v. Burton, 5 Vt. 97; and for the removal or injury of inanimate personal property; Robinson v. Mansfield, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 139; Betts v. Lee, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 348, 4 Am. Dec. 368; of which another has the possession, actual, or constructive; Daniels v. Pond, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 369, 32 Am. Dec. 269; Hoyt v. Gelston & Schenck, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 141; Dallam v. Fitler, 6 W. & S. (Pa.) 323; without the owner’s assent. A naked possession or right to immediate possession is sufficient to support this action; Carter v. Simpson, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 535; Hower v. Geesaman, 17 S. & R. (Pa.) 251; Whitney v. Ladd, 10 Vt. 165. An action lies for an unintentional act of trespass, even if there is no malice; Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 381, 10 Am. Dec. 234; but a man who accidentally shoots another, without negligence, is not liable in an action of trespass; [1891] 1 Q. B. 86.

See Wilson v. Live Stock Co., 153 U. S. 39, 14 Sup. Ct. 768, 38 L. Ed. 627; Trespasser.

The action lies also for injuries to the realty consequent upon entering without right upon another man’s land (breaking his close). The inclosure may be purely imaginary; Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N. C. 371; but reaches to the sky and to the centre of the earth; Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 3S1, 10 Am. Dec. 234. Where the rightful owner of land, entitled to the immediate possession, attempts to recover it, he is not liable in a civil action of trespass for assault upon a trespasser, if he used no more force than was necessary for the expulsion of the intruder; Souter v. Codinan, 14 R. I. 119, 51 Am. Rep. 364; Low v. Elwell, 121 Mass. 310, 23 Am. Rep. 272; Bristor v. Burr, 120 N. Y. 427, 24 N. E. 937, 8 L. R. A. 710; Walker v. Chanslor, 153 Cal. 118, 94 Pac. 606, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 455, and note, 126 Am. St. Rep. 61. But in such case, where the question of criminal liability is raised, it is held that the owner has no right, to resort to force to regain his possession, Com. v. Haley, 4 Allen (Mass.) 318; State v. 536, 93 C. C. A. 616, 22 U R. A. (N. S.) 728; and the same rule was said to apply with respect to recovering possession of real or personal property; Corey v. People, 45 Barb. (N-. Y.) 262. But as to the use of force by the owner to recover possession of them, there is not unanimity of decision. The right to use such force as is reasonably necessary was upheld in Hamilton v. Arnold, 116 Mich. 684, 75 N. W. 133; Wright v. So. Exp. Co., 80 Fed. 85; Heminway v. Heminway, 58 Conn. 443, 19 Atl. 766; Hopkins v. Dickson, 59 N. H. 235; at least short of wounding or the use of a dangerous weapon; Com. v. Donahue, 148 Mass. 529, 20 N. E. 171, 12 Am. St. Rep. 591, 2 L. R. A. 623, and note. In that case the transaction involved but a momentary parting with the possession of money tendered on condition that it was to be accepted as payment in full, and the other party having taken the money and then repudiated the condition, it was retaken by force, which Holmes, J., said was justified “by ancient and modern authority,” citing among others two cases in that court. The case of Churchill v. Hulbert, infra, was entirely different, turning on the right to enter upon the freehold of the other party under an irrevocable license and it can scarcely be considered as deciding the precise point under consideration. The same is true of Drury v. Hervey, infra, which was a case of default on a conditional sale, and it was held that possession of the chattel could not be forcibly resumed. Among the cases which deny the right to use force are Churchill v. Hulbert, 110 Mass. 42, 14 Am. Rep. 57S; Drury v. Hervey, 126 Mass. 519; Bliss v. Johnson, 73 N. Y. 529; Monson v. Lewis, 123 Wis. 583, 101 N. W. 1094; Stanley v. Payne, 78 Vt. 235, 02 Atl. 495, 112 Am. St. Rep. 911, 6 Ann. Cas. 501, 3