repeal by implication
Definitions from Case Law · United States Supreme Court
Definitions from Case Law
From 296 U.S. 497 - Posadas v. National City Bank · 1936Most cited · 1,087 citing opinions
There are two well-settled categories of repeals by implication: (1) Where provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one; and (2) if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act. But, in either case, the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least as a general thing, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue to speak, so far as the two acts are the same, from the time of the first enactment.
How the Supreme Court has restated “repeal by implication”
Each Supreme Court definition of “repeal by implication,” sized by how often later courts cited it. “Change” is measured by wording overlap with earlier definitions — a rough signal, not a semantic judgment.
How often courts cite the cases defining “repeal by implication”
Court decisions citing the 11 opinions that defined “repeal by implication” — 2,557 in all, by decade. Counts are citations to the defining cases as a whole, not verified uses of the term. The dip in the most recent years is a data-coverage gap, not a real trend — our corpus holds fewer opinions from the latest years.
All 11 definitions, chronological · 1851–1936
- ORIGINAL
As a general rule it is not open to controversy, that where a new statute covers the whole subject-matter of an old one, adds offences, and prescribes different penalties for those enumerated in the old law, that then the former statute is repealed by implication; as the provisions of both cannot stand together.
A latter act is never construed to repeal a prior act unless there be a contrariety or repugnancy in them, or at least some notice taken of the former act so as to indicate an intention to repeal it. The law does not favor a repeal by implication unless the repugnance be quite plain; hence it has been decided that, although two acts of parliament be seemingly repugnant, yet if there be no clause of non obstante in the latter they shall, if possible, have such construction that the latter may not be a repeal of the former by implication.
Repeal by implication, upon the ground that a subsequent provision upon the same subject is repugnant to the prior law, is not favored in any case; but where such repeal, if admitted, would operate to the prejudice of the government, the supposed repugnancy ought to be clear and controlling before it can be held to have that effect.
Repeal by implication, when the prior and the later act can consistently stand together, is never admitted
Courts do not favor repeals by implication, and never sanction them if the two acts can stand together.
Repeals by implication are not favored. They are seldom admitted except on the ground of repugnancy; and never, we think, when the former act can stand together with the new act.
When there are two acts on the same subject the rule is to give effect to both if possible. But if the two are repugnant in any of their provisions, the latter act, without any repealing clause, operates to the extent of the repugnancy as a repeal of the first; and even where two acts are not in express terms repugnant, yet if the latter act covers the whole subject of the first, and embraces new provisions, plainly showing that it was intended as a substitute for the first act, it will operate as a repeal of that act.
when there are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both, if possible. But if the two are repugnant in any of their provisions, the latter act, without any repealing clause, operates to the extent of the repugnancy as a repeal of the first; and even where two acts are not, in express terms, repugnant, yet, if the latter act covers the whole subject of the first, and embraces new provisions, plainly showing that it was intended as a substitute for the first act, it will operate as a repeal of that act.
Repeals by implication are never favored, and a later treaty will not be regarded as repealing an earlier statute by implication unless the two are absolutely incompatible and the statute cannot be enforced without antagonizing the treaty.
It is true that repeals by implication are not favored. The repugnancy between the later act upon the same subject and the former legislation must be such that the first act cannot stand and be capable of execution consistently with the terms of the later enactment.