common carrier
Definitions from Case Law · United States Supreme Court
Definitions from Case Law
From 226 U.S. 491 - Adams Express Co. v. Croninger · 1913Most cited · 1,837 citing opinions
negligence exemption
That a common carrier cannot exempt himself from liability for his own negligence or that of his servants is elementary. The rule of the common law did not limit his liability to loss and damage due to his own negligence, or that of his servants. That rule went beyond this, and he was liable for any loss or damage which resulted from human agency, or any cause not the act of God or the public enemy.
How the Supreme Court has restated “common carrier”
Each Supreme Court definition of “common carrier,” sized by how often later courts cited it. “Change” is measured by wording overlap with earlier definitions — a rough signal, not a semantic judgment.
How often courts cite the cases defining “common carrier”
Court decisions citing the 23 opinions that defined “common carrier” — 7,517 in all, by decade. Counts are citations to the defining cases as a whole, not verified uses of the term. The dip in the most recent years is a data-coverage gap, not a real trend — our corpus holds fewer opinions from the latest years.
All 26 definitions, chronological · 1829–1949
That doctrine is, that the carrier is responsible for every loss which is not produced by inevitable accident. It has been pressed beyond the general principles which govern the law of bailment, by considerations of policy... A slave has volition, and has feelings which cannot be entirely disregarded. These properties cannot be overlooked in conveying him from place to place. He cannot be stowed away as a common package... In the nature of things, and in his character, he resembles a passenger, not a package of goods. It would seem reasonable, therefore, that the responsibility of the carrier should be measured by the law which is applicable to passengers, rather than by that which is applicable to the carriage of common goods.
of slaves vs. inanimate goods
- ORIGINAL
The law applicable to common carriers is one of great rigour. Though to the extent to which it has been carried, and in the cases to which it has been applied, we admit its necessity and its policy, we do not think it ought to be carried farther, or applied to new cases.
limited rigour, ancient rule
A common carrier is one who undertakes for hire to transport the goods of those who may choose to employ him from place to place. He is, in general, bound to take the goods of all who offer, unless his complement for the trip is full, or the goods be of such a kind as to be liable to extraordinary danger, or such as he is unaccustomed to convey.
He exercises, in one sense, a public employment, and has duties to the public to perform. Though he may limit his services to the carriage of particular kinds of goods, and may prescribe regulations to protect himself against imposition and fraud, and fix a rate of charges proportionate to the magnitude of the risks he may have to encounter, he can make no discrimination between persons, or vary his charges from their condition or character. He is bound to accept all goods offered within the course of his employment, and is liable to an action in case of refusal. He is chargeable for all losses except such as may be occasioned by the act of God or the public enemy. He insures against all accidents which result from human agency, although occurring without any fault or neglect on his part; and he cannot, by any mere act of his own, avoid the responsibility which the law thus imposes.
as a carrier of passengers it was bound, unless there was reasonable ground for refusal, to take all persons who applied for passage, and their baggage, and as a carrier of goods, to take all other property offered for transportation, and was responsible for the safe conveyance of the baggage and other property to the point for which they were destined, or the termination of the road, unless prevented by inevitable accident or the public enemy. Its obligations and liabilities in these respects were not dependent upon the contract of the parties, though they might have been modified and limited by such contract. They were imposed upon it by the law, from the public nature of its employment, independent of any contract.
[I]t is the duty of the carrier, in the absence of any special contract, to carry safely to the end of his line and to deliver to the next carrier in the route beyond.
when a carrier has a regularly established business for carrying all or certain articles, and especially if that carrier be a corporation created for the purpose of the carrying trade, and the carriage of the articles is embraced within the scope of its chartered powers, it is a common carrier, and a special contract about its responsibility does not divest it of the character.
While no one can be compelled to engage in the business of a common carrier, yet, when he does so, certain duties are imposed which can be enforced by mandamus or other suitable remedy. ... No legislative enactment, no special mandate from any commission or other administrative board, was necessary, for the duty arose from the fact that it was a common carrier. This lies at the foundation of the law of common carriers. Whenever one engages in that business, the obligation of equal service to all arises; and that obligation, irrespective of legislative action or special mandate, can be enforced by the courts.
duties
The indisputable effect of the Carmack amendment is to hold the initial carrier engaged in interstate commerce and 'receiving property for transportation from a point in one state to a point in another state' as having contracted for through carriage to the point of destination, using the lines of connecting carriers as its agents.
initial carrier under Carmack Amendment
Manifestly, this rule has no application when a railroad company is acting outside the performance of its duty as a common carrier. In such case, it is dealing with matters involving ordinary considerations of contractual relation; those who choose to enter into engagements with it are not at a disadvantage; and its stipulations even against liability for its own neglect are not repugnant to the requirements of its public service.
acts outside public duty
It is the established doctrine of this court that common carriers cannot secure immunity from liability for their negligence by any sort of stipulation. The rule rests on broad grounds of public policy, justifying the restriction of liberty of contract because of the public ends to be achieved. The great object of the law governing common carriers was to secure the utmost care in the rendering of a service of the highest importance to the community.
no exemption for negligence
A common carrier may, by a fair, open, just, and reasonable agreement, limit the amount recoverable by a shipper in case of loss or damage to an agreed value, made for the purpose of obtaining the lower of two or more rates of charges proportioned to the amount of the risk.
limitation of liability by agreed value
by §1 of the original act of 1887, as amended by the act of June 29, 1906... 'the term 'common carrier,' as used in this act, shall include express companies and sleeping car companies.' And thus the liability of common carriers, created by §10, stands as if it read that express companies violating §6 should be guilty of a misdemeanor and liable to fine.
Interstate Commerce Act
It is the right of the public to use the road's facilities and to demand service of it, rather than the extent of its business, which is the real criterion determinative of its character. ... The extent to which a railroad is in fact used does not determine the fact whether it is or is not a common carrier.
test
The railroad property is private property devoted to a public use. As a corporation, the owner is subject to the obligations of its charter. As the holder of special franchises, it is subject to the conditions upon which they were granted. Aside from specific requirements of this sort, the common carrier must discharge the obligations which inhere in the nature of its business. It must supply facilities that are reasonably adequate; it must carry upon reasonable terms; and it must serve without unjust discrimination. These duties are properly called public duties, and the state, within the limits of its jurisdiction, may enforce them.
duties
Ordinarily a shipper, on reasonable demand, would be entitled to all the cars which it could promptly load with freight to be transported over the carrier's line. But that is not an absolute right, and the carrier is not liable if its failure to furnish cars was the result of sudden and great demands which it had no reason to apprehend would be made, and which it could not reasonably have been expected to meet in full. The common law of old, in requiring the carrier to receive all goods and passengers, recognized that 'if his coach be full' he was not liable for failing to transport more than he could carry.
duty to furnish cars
One bound to furnish transportation to the public as a common carrier must serve all, up to the capacity of his facilities, without discrimination and for reasonable pay.
Within settled principles, one who undertakes for hire to transport from place to place the property of others who may choose to employ him is a common carrier. They are common carriers, not because of legislative fiat, but by reason of the character of the business they carry on.
neither of them, as a common carrier, was under any duty, either by the common law or statute, to transport or assume any responsibility for the transportation of respondent beyond its own line
Whether a transportation agency is a common carrier depends not upon its corporate character or declared purposes, but upon what it does.
the term 'common carrier' as used in this chapter shall include all pipe-line companies; the last clause 'engaged as common carriers for hire' is a conjunctive not a modifier. It does not affect the generality of the first clause as to pipe-line companies
pipe-line companies
The character of the service, in its relation to the public, determines whether the calling is a public one, and a common carrier does not cease to be such merely because in rendering service to the public it acts as the agent of another
public calling
a special type of bailee who has assumed the obligation of an insurer
admiralty
one 'which holds itself out to the general public to engage in the transportation by water * * * of * * * property * * * for compensation
water
The duty of a common carrier, on the other hand, is to transport for hire whoever employs it.