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criminal contempt

Definitions from Case Law · United States Supreme Court

Definitions from Case Law

From 391 U.S. 194 - Bloom v. Illinois · 1968Most cited · 2,231 citing opinions

Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense; it is a violation of the law, a public wrong which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both

How the Supreme Court has restated “criminal contempt”

19141920193019401950196019701972 most cited: 391 U.S. 194 - Bloom v. Illinois (1968)
first stateddeparted

Each Supreme Court definition of “criminal contempt,” sized by how often later courts cited it. “Change” is measured by wording overlap with earlier definitions — a rough signal, not a semantic judgment.

How often courts cite the cases defining “criminal contempt”

191019201940196019802000202020302.0k

Court decisions citing the 8 opinions that defined “criminal contempt” — 6,315 in all, by decade. Counts are citations to the defining cases as a whole, not verified uses of the term. The dip in the most recent years is a data-coverage gap, not a real trend — our corpus holds fewer opinions from the latest years.

All 8 definitions, chronological · 1914–1972

  1. ORIGINAL

    It does not follow that contempts of the class under consideration are not crimes, or rather, in the language of the statute, offenses, because trial by jury as it had been gradually worked out and fought out has been thought not to extend to them as a matter of constitutional right. These contempts are infractions of the law, visited with punishment as such. If such acts are not criminal, we are in error as to the most fundamental characteristic of crimes as that word has been understood in English speech.

    as offense for limitations

  2. The proceeding for criminal contempt, unlike that for civil contempt, is between the public and the defendant, is an independent proceeding at law, and no part of the original cause. The dominating purpose of the proceeding is punitive — to vindicate the authority of the court and punish the act of disobedience as a public wrong.

  3. 1925·267 U.S. 87 - Ex parte Grossman[p14]· cited 455×

    For criminal contempts the sentence is punitive in the public interest to vindicate the authority of the Court and to deter other like derelictions.

  4. The only substantial difference between such a proceeding for criminal contempt and a criminal prosecution is that in the one the act complained of is the violation of a decree and in the other the violation of a law.

  5. 1966·384 U.S. 373 - Cheff v. Schnackenberg[p10]· cited 914×

    The nature of criminal contempt, an offense sui generis, does not, of itself, warrant treatment otherwise than as a petty offense.

  6. 1971·400 U.S. 455 - Mayberry v. Pennsylvania[p90]· cited 1,372×

    [b]y reason of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a defendant in criminal contempt proceedings should be given a public trial before a judge other than the one reviled by the contemnor,' as a judge who has been personally attacked 'necessarily becomes embroiled in a running, bitter controversy' and cannot maintain 'that calm detachment necessary for fair adjudication

    judicial disqualification

  7. The vehemence of the language used is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The danger must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil.