certainty

Certainty in the fact of damage is essential. Certainty as to the amount goes no further than to require a basis for a reasoned conclusion. The certainty of the evidence as to damages for rejection of a lease depends upon the same tests as in other situations where damages are difficult of proof.

In Contracts. Distinctness and accuracy of statement. A thing is certain when its essence, quality, and quantity are described, distinctly set forth, etc. Dig. 12. 1. 6. It is uncertain when the description is not that of an individual object, but designates only the kind. Civ. Code La. art. 3522, No. 8; 5 Coke, 121. In Pleading. Such clearness and distinctness of statement of the facts which constitute the cause of action or ground of defense that they may be understood by the party who is to answer them, by the jury who are to ascertain the truth of the allegations, and by the court who are to give the judgment. 1 Chit. PI. 257; Cowp. 682; Hob. 295; 13 East, 107; 2 Bos. & P. 267; Co. Litt. 303; Comyn, Dig. "Pleader," c. 17. Certainty is said to be of three sorts: (1) "Certainty to a common intent," which is attained by a form of statement in which words are used in their ordinary meaning, though by argument or inference they may be made to bear a different one. See 2, H. Bl. 530. (2) "Certainty to a certain intent in general," which is attained when the meaning of the statute may be understood upon a fair and reasonable construction, without recurrence to possible facts which do not appear. 1 Wm. Saund. 49; 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 317; 5 Conn. 423. (3) "Certainty to a certain intent in particular," which is attained by that technical accuracy of statement which precludes all ■ argument, inference, and presumption against the party pleading. When this cerprecise way, but add to them such a show that they are not to be controverted, and, as it were, anticipate the case of his adversary. 1 Chit. PI. 258; Lawes, PI. 54, 55.

In Contracts. Distinctness and accuracy of statement A thing is certain when its essence, quality, and quantity are described, distinctly set forth, etc. Dig. 12, 1. 6. It is uncertain when the description is not that of an individual object, but designates only the kind. La. Civ. Code, art. 3522, no. 8; 5 Co. 121. If a contract be so vague in its terms that its meaning cannot be certainly collected, and the statute of frauds preclude the admissibility of parol evidence to clear up the difficulty; 5 B. & C. 583; or parol evidence cannot supply the defect then neither at law nor in equity can effect be given to it; 1 R. & M. 116. If it is impossible to tain any definite meaning, such agreement is necessarily void; [1892] Q. B. 478. As to uncertainty of contract see Davie v. Min. Co., 93 Mich. 491, 53 N. W. 625, 24 L. R. A. 357; Van Schaick v. Van Buren, 70 Hun 575, 24 N. Y. Supp. 306. It is a maxim of law that that is certain which may be made certain: id certum est quod certum reddi potest; Co. Litt 43. For example, when a man sells the oil he has in his store at so much a gallon, although there is uncertainty as to the quantity of oil, yet, inasmuch as it can 1 lined, the maxim applies, and the sale is good. See, generally, Story, Eq. § 240; Mitf. Eq. PI., Jeremy ed. 41. In Pleading. Such clearness and distinctness of statement of the facts which constitute the cause of action or ground of defence that they may be understood by the party who is to answer them, by the jury who are to ascertain the truth of the allegations, and by the court who are to give the judgment. 2 B. & P. 267; Co. Litt 303; Com. Dig. Pleader. See Giroux Amalgamator Co. v. White, 21 Or. 435, 28 Pac. 390. Certainty to a common intent is attained by a form of statement in which words are used in their ordinary meaning, though by argument or inference they may be made to bear a different one. See 2 H. Bla. 530; Andr. Steph. PI. 384. Certainty to a certain intent in general is attained when the meaning of the statute may be understood upon a fair and reasonable construction without recurrence to possible facts which do not appear; 1 Wins. Saund. 49; Spencer v. Sonthwick, 9 Johns. (X. Y.) 317; Fuller v. Hampton, 5 Ooni Certainty to a >■■ rtain intent in particular is attained by that technical accuracy of statement which precludes all argument, inference, and presumption against the party pleading. When this certainty is required, the party must not only state the facts of controverted, and, as it were, anticipate the case of his adversary; Lawes, PL 54. The last description of certainty is required in estoppels; Co. Litt. 303; 2 EL Bla. 530; Dougl. 159; and in pleas which are not favored in law, as alien enemy; 8 Term 167; Russel v. Skipwith, G Binn (Pa.) 247. See Clarke v. Morey, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 70. With respect to an indictment, it is laid down that "an indictment ought to be certain to every intent, and without any intendment to the contrary;" Cro. Eliz. 490; and the charge contained in it must be sufficiently explicit to support itself; for no latitude of intention can be allowed to include anything more than is expressed; 2 Burr. 1127; U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588; U. S. v. Simmons, 96 TJ. S. 360, 24 L. Ed. 819; State v. Stiles, 40 la. 148; State v. Philbrick, 31 Me. 401; Com. v. Terry, 114 Mass. 263; State v. Fancher, 71 Mo. 460; State v. Messenger, 58 N. H. 348. These definitions, which have been adopted from Coke, have been subjected to severe criticism, but are -of some utility in drawing attention to the different degrees of exactness and fulness of statement required in different instances. Less certainty is required where the law presumes that tbe knowledge of the facts is peculiarly in the opposite party; 8 East 85; 13 id, 112; 3 Maule & S. 14; People v. Dunlap, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 437. Less certainty than would otherwise be requisite is demanded in some cases, to avoid prolixity of statement; 2 Wms. Saund. 117, n. 1. See, generally, 1 Chit. PI. CERTIFICANDO DE REC0GNITI0NE STAPUL/E. In English Law. A writ commanding the mayor of the staple to certify to the lord chancellor a statute staple taken before him where the party himself detains It, and refuses to bring in the same. There is a like writ to certify a statute merchant and in divers other cases. Reg. Orig. 148; Black, Diet.

In pleading. Distinct. ness; clearness of statement; particularity, Such precision and explicitness in the state ment of alleged facts that the pleader’s averments and contention may be readily understood by the pleader on the other aide, as well as by the court and jury. This word is technically used in pleading in two different senses, signifying either distinctness, or particularity, as opposed to undue generality, Certainty is said to be of three sorts: (1) Certainty to a common iniené is such as is attained by using words in their ordinary meaning, but is not exclusive of another meaning which might be made out by argument or inference. (2) Certainty to @ certain intent in general is that which allows of no misunderstanding if a fair and reasonable construction is put upon the language employed without bringing in facts which are possible, but not apparent. (8) Certainty to a certain intent in particular is the highest degree of technical accuracy and preciaion. Co. Litt. 303; 2 H. BL. 5380; 9 Johns. 317. In contracts, The quality of being apecific, accurate, and distinct. A thing is certain when its essence, quality, and quantity are described, distinctly set forth, ote, Dig. 12, 1,6. It is uncertain when the description is not that of an individual object, but designates only the kind, Civil Code La. art. 3522, no. 8; 5 Coke, 121. CERTIFICANDO DEH RECOGNI-

[L. Lat. certitudo.] In pleading. Clearness or distinctness, as opposed to obscurity or ambiguity. Particularity, as opposed to undue generality. Steph. PL 132, 880, note. Lord Coke distinguishes three kinds of certainty; first, certainty to a common intent, [that ]&» according to reasonable intendment or construction, Steph. PL 380:] "which is sufficient in a bar [plea,] which is to defend the party, and to excuse him: secondly, certainty to a certain intent in general, which is sufficient in counts, [declarations,J replications, and other pleadmgs of the plaintiff: thirdly, certainty to a certain intent in every particular, which is required in estoppels. Co, Litt 303 a. 1 Tidd's PracL 461.

UNCERTAIN. TY, contracts; in matters of obligation; a thing is certain, when its essence, quality and quantity, arc sufficiently described, such as one hundred dollars, such a iouiaes or such a horse. It is uncertain when the description is not that of one individual object, but designates only the kind, such as some corn, some wine, a horse. Louis. code, art. 3522, No. 8; 5 Co. 121. If a contract be so vague in its terms, that its meaning cannot be certainly collected, and the statute of frauds preclude the admissibility of parol evidence to clear up the difficulty, 5 Barn. & Cr. 583; S.C. 12 Eng. Com. L. R. 327; or the parol evidence will not supply the defect, then neither at law, nor in equity, can effect be given to it. 1 Russ. & M. 116; 1 ‘Ch. Pr. 123.: