compromise

where the claimant voluntarily enters into a compromise and accepts a smaller sum and executes a discharge in full for the whole claim, he cannot subsequently recover in the Court of Claims for any part of the claim voluntarily relinquished in the compromise.

An agreement made between two or more parties as a settlement of matters in dispute between them. In Civil Law. An agreement between two or more persons, who, wishing to settle their disputes, refer the matter in controversy to arbitrators, who are so called because those who choose them give them full powers to arbitrate and decide what shall appear just and reasonable, to put an end to the differences of which they are made the judges. 1 Domat, Civ. Law, liv. 1, tit. 14.

An agreement made between two or more parties as a settlement of matters in dispute. Such settlements are sustained at law; Poll. Contr. 180; Durham v. Wadlington, 2 Devisees v. Zane, 6 Munf. (Va.) 406; Taylor v. Patrick, 1 Bibb (Ky.) 168; Truett v. Chaplin, 11 N. C. 178; Stoddard v. Mix, 14 Conn. 12; Barlow v. Ins. Co., 4 Mete. (Mass.) 270; Hart v. Gould, 62 Mich. 262, 28 N. W. 831. The amount in question must, it seems, be uncertain; 2 B. & Ad. 889. And see Muirhead v. Kirkpatrick, 21 Pa. 237; Livingston v. Dugan, 20 Mo. 102; Wilbur v. Cm Pick. (Mass.) 284; 3 M. & W. 648. The compromise of a doubtful or disputed claim is a sufficient consideration to uphold an assumpsit; Cox v. Stokes, 156 N. Y. 491, 51 N. E. S16. See Battle v. Mc Arthur, 49 Fed. 715. The compromise of a doubtful claim made in good faith is a good consideration for a promise, though it afterwards appears that the claim was wholly groundless; L. R. 5 Q. B. 449; Union Collection Co. v. Buckman, 150 Cal. 159, SS Pac. 708, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 568, 119 Am. St. Rep. 164, 11 Ann. Cas. 609. It is not necessary that the claim settled should be one that could be successfully maintained; Neibles v. Ry. Co., 37 Minn. 151, 33 N. W. 332. Nor is necessary that there should be any doubt about the claim; it is enough if the parlies consider it doubtful; City Electric Ry. Co. v. Floyd County, 115 Ga. 655, 42 S. E. 45; Bement v. May, 135 Ind. 664, 34 N. E. 327, 35 N. E. 387; or if the parties thought at the time that there was a real question between them; Alexander v. Trust Co., 106 Md. 170, 66 Atl. 836. In Pitkin v. Noyes, 48 N. H. 294, 97 Am. Dec. 615, 2 Am. Rep. 218, it was held that the claim must be one which was understood by both parties to be doubtful. It is said that the question is as to the belief, in good faith, of the claimant in the validity of his claim. There must be a colorable ground for the claim; Smith v. Boruff, 75 Ind. 412; an agreement not to contest a will is not enough, if the party had no right to make a contest; Bement v. May, 135 Ind. 664, 34 N. E. 327, 35 N. E. 387. "A claim is honest if the claimant does not know that his claim is unsubstantial, or if he does not know the facts which show that his claim is a bad one;" L. R. 32 Ch. Div. 266; Grandin v. Grandin, 49 N. J. D. 514, 9 Atl. 756, 60 Am. Rep. 642. But it has been held that one may buy his peace by compromising a claim which he knows is without right; Dailey v. King. 79 Mich. 568, 44 N. W. 959. But the compromise of an illegal claim will not sustain a promise; Read v. Hitchings, 71 Me. 590; so of a note given for a gambling debt; Tyson v. Woodruff, 108 Ga. 368, 33 S. E. 981; and a note given for liquor sold without a license; Melchoir v. Mc Cafty, 31 Wis. 2.~>2, 11 Am. Rep. 605; where, however, the illegal contract has been fully performed, a compromise may be valid; Antoine v. Smith, 40 La. Ann. r><>0, 4 South. 321; and where the parties have disputed claims against each other gal; Wilder v. R. Co., 05 Vt. 43, 25 Atl. after a claim is in suit, it is said to make no difference whether it could have been maintained or not; Clark v. Turnbull, 47 N. J. L. 265, 54 Alii. Eep. 157. The fully treated in Armijo v. Henry, 14 N. M. 181, 89 Pac. 305, 25 L. R. A. (N. Where a debtor tenders part of a di claim to the creditor in full satisfaction, if the latter accepts the tender, he is bound by the terms thereof; Deutmann v. Kilpatrick, 46 Mo. App. 624. An offer of at by plaintiff, but not accepted by defendant, not bind either party; Clark v. Pope, "Jit 1'la. 238, 10 South. 586. As to a compromise of a criminal charge, see Compounding a Felony. An offer to pay money by way of compromise is not evidence of debt, since, as was said by Lord Mansfield, "it must be permitted to men 'to buy their peace' without prejudice to them, if the offer did not succeed; and such offers are made to stop litigation without regard to the question whether anything, or what, is dua" If the terms "buy their peace" are attended to, they 'will resolve all doubts on this head of evidence; Bull. N. P. 236; and the author adds an example: If A sue B for one hundred pounds, and B offer to pay him twenty pounds, it shall not be received in evidence, for this neither admits nor ascertains any debt, and is no more than saying he would give twenty pounds to get rid of the action. But if an account consist of ten articles, and B admits that a particular one la due, It is good evidence for so much. In one of the oldest cases on the subject, Lord Kenyon declared at nisi prius: "Evidence of concessions made for the purpose of settling matters la dispute I shall never admit;" 3 Esp. 113; but evidence was admitted that after the action was brought the defendant called upon the plaintiff and said he was sorry that the thing had happened, and offered two hundred pounds in settlement, which was not accepted; 3 Stark. N. P. 12S; and In other cases evidence of offers of compromise made, but not expressed to be without prejudice, were held to be admissible; 1 M. & "W. 4-16; apparently In opposition to the rule laid down by Lord Mansfield and Lord Kenyon above referred to. It may, however, be considered settled that letters or admissions containing the expression in substance that they are to be without prejudice will not be admitted in evidence; 4 C. & P. 402; L. R. 6 Ch. 827. 3 Sc. N. R. 741. In the last ease the rule Is put definitely on the ground of public policy by Tindal, C. J., who said: "It Is of great consequence that parties should be unfettered by correspondence entered into upon the express understanding that it is to be without prejudice," and he also declared "that where used In the letter containing the offer, the words 'without prejudice' must cover the whole correspondence." And this rule has been followed and it was held that not only the letter bearing the words "without prejudice," but also the answer thereto, which was not so guarded, was inadmissible in evidence; and to the same effect Is L. R. 10 Ch. 264. It is the recognized rule in the United States that admissions made in treating for an adjustment cannot be given in evidence; Ferry v. Taylor, S3 Mo. 323; Durgin v. Somers, 117 Mass. 65; Molyneaux r. dence depended upon the Intention of the party seeking the compromise. If he intended it as an admission of liability, it was admissible; if he only intended it as a compromise settlement, it was not. Verbal offers of ■ compromise of a claim made by a defendant's solicitor are also protected and cannot be given in evidence against bis client; 2 C. & K. 24; 6 C. P. 437. An account rendered by the defendant to the plaintiff, showing a balance in the plaintiff's favor, accompanied by a letter proposing an arrangement and stating that the letter and account were without prejudice was held to be inadmissible as evidence;

An arrangement arrived at, either in court or out of court, for settling a dispute upon what appears to the parties to be equitable terms, having regard to the uncertainty they are In regarding the facts or the law and the facts together. Colburn v. Groton, 66 N. H. 151, 28 Atl. 95, 22 L. R. A. 763; Treitschke v. Grain Co., 10 Neb. 358, 6 N. W. 427; Attrill v. Patterson, 58 Md. 226; Bank v. McGeoch, 92 Wis. 286, 66 N. W. 606; Rivers v. Blom, 163 Mo. 442, 63 S. W. 812. An agreement between two or more persons, who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their difficulties by mutual consent in the manner which they agree on, and which every one of them prefers to the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of losing. Sharp v. Knox, 4 La. 456.

In the civil law. An agreement whereby two or more persons mutually bind themselves to refer their legal dispute to the decision of a designated third person, who is termed "umpire" or "arbitrator." Dig. 4, 8; Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 471. Compromissarii sunt jndices. JeniL Cent. 128. Arbitrators are judges.

A mutual agreement between persons at difference, to put an end to such difference upon terms agreed on; a mutual agreement to submit matters in dispute to the decision of arbitrators; any adjustment of matters in dispute, by mutual concession without resort to the law.

An arrangement arrived at, either in court or out of court, for settling a dispute upon what appears to the parties to be equitable terms, haying regard to the uncertainty they are in regarding the facts, or the law and the facts together. Brown. An agreement between two or more persons, who, for preventing or putting an end toa lawsuit, adjust their diflculties by mutual consent in the manner which they agree on, and which every one of them prefers to the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of losing. 4 La. 456, In the civil law. An agreement whereoy two or more persons mutually bind themselves to refer their legal dispute to the decision of a designated third person, whu is Compromissarii sunt judicea. Jenk. Cent. 128. Arbitrators are judges.

* An agreement in settlement of a controverted matter. The yielding of something by each of two parties.^ A mutual yielding of opposing claims; the surrender of some right or claimed right in consideration of a like surrender of some counter-claim. 6 Compromises are highly favored in law. An *' offer " to do something by way of compromise of a controversy, as, to pay a sum of money, to allow a certain price, to deliver certain property, and like offers, made to avoid litigation, is not receivable in evidence against the maker as an admission. If the offer is plainly for a compromise, the rule is to presume it to have been made without prejudice — it is open to explanation. But an admission made during or inconsequence of the offer is receivable.^ To admit evidence of an offer to compromise litigation would discoiu:age the amicable settlement of disputes. When the object is to buy peace, an offer will be excluded. =r See Prejudice, Without. / If the right surrendered is of doubtful validity, its surrender may be a valuable consideration for the promise." ' [Haskins v. Newcomb, 2 Johns. *408 (1807), Kent, Chief Justice. " [4 Bl. Com. 136. See Smith, Contr. 226. 3 4B1. Cora. 133. *L. com-promittere, to mutually promise; to arbitrate. "Bellows V. Sowles, 55 Vt. 399 (1883). " Gregg V. Wethersfleld, 55 Vt. 387 (1883); ib. 397; 10 Neb. 360; 2 Wis. *6. 'West u. Smith, 101 U. S. S73 (1879), cases; Home Ins. Co. V. Baltimore Warehouse Co., 93 id..548 (1876)'; 1 Pet. 222; 16 Op. Att-Gen. 850; 87 Ind. 465; 4 La. 456; 50 Md. 45; 41 N. J. L. 174; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 192; 2 Whart. An administrator may compound a debt, if for the benefit of the estate; ' and so may a partner for the benefit either of himself or of the firm — statutes in many of the States making a release of one joint debtor not a release of others.'' The courts, are inclined to favor a compromise fairly made by an attorney at law, and will uphold it for good reason shown.' See Accord.

[Lat. compromissum, q. v.] A mutual agreement between two or more persons at difference, to put an end to such difference upon certain terms agreed upon. Whishaw. A mutual agreement to submit matters in dispute to the decision of arbitrators. Termes de la ley. Cowell. This was formerly the ordinary meaning of the term, derived from the compromissum of the civil law, (q. v.) Any adjustment of matters in dispute, by mutual concession without resort to the law. Tomlins.