concealment

It is admitted, that a concealment, to be fatal to the insurance, must be of facts material to the risk; and, certainly, of this doctrine, there cannot at this time be any legal doubt. It is further admitted, (and so is the unequivocal language of the authorities,) that generally, the materiality of the concealment is a question of fact for the jury.

The Improper suppression of any fact or circumstance by one of the parties to a contract from the other, which in justice ought to be known. The omission by an applicant for insurance preliminarily to state facts known to him, or which he is bound to know, material to the risk proposed to be insured against, or omission to state truly the facts expressly inquired about by the underwriters to whom application for insurance is made, whether the same are or are not material to the risk. See 12 Cush. (Mass.) 416.

The Improper suppression of any fact or circumstance by one of the parties to a contract from the other, which in justice ought to be known. The omission by an applicant for insurance preliminarily to state facts known to him, or which he is bound to know, material to the risk proposed to be insured against, or omission to state truly the facts expressly application for insurance is made, whether the same are or are not material to the risk. Concealment, when fraudulent, avoids a contract, or renders the party using it liable for the damage arising in consequence thereof; Kidney v. Stoddard, 7 Mete. (Mass.) 2.j2; Prentiss v. Russ, 16 Me. 30; Jackson v. Wilcox, 1 Scam. (111.) 344; 3 B. & C. G05; Daniels v. Ins. Co., 12 Cush. (Mass.) 416, 59 Am. Dec. 192. But it must have been of such facts as the party is bound to communicate; Webb, Poll. Torts 36S; 3 E. L. & Eq. 17; Otis v. Raymond, 3 Conn. 413; Van Arsdale & Co. v. Howard, 5 Ala. 596; Kintzing v. Mc Elrath, 5 Pa. 467; Stevens v. Fuller, 8 N. H. 463; Hamrick v. Hogg, 12 N. C. 351; Fleming v. Slocum, IS Johns. (N. Y.) 403, 9 Am. Dec. 224; George v. Johnson, 6 Huinphr. (Tenn.) 36, 44 Am. Dec. 2S8. A concealment of extrinsic facts is not, in general, fraudulent, although peculiarly within the knowledge of the party possessing them; Laidlaw v. Organ, 2 Wheat. (U. S.) 195, 4 L. Ed. 214; Blydenburgh v. Welsh, Baldw. 331, Fed. Cas. No. 1,583; Bench v. Sheldon, 14 Barb. (N. Y.) 72; Burnett v. Stanton, 2 Ala. 181. But see Frazer v. Gervais, Walk. (Miss.) 72; Baker v. Seahorn, 1 Swan (Tenn.) 54, 55 Am. Dec. 724; Hough v. Evans, 4 Mc Cord (S. C.) 169. And the rule against the concealment of latent defects is stricter in the case of personal than of real property; Mason v. Crosby, 1 Woodb. & M. 342, Fed. Cas. No. 9,234; 3 Campb. 508; 3 Term 759. A failure to state facts known to an insurer or his agent, or which he ought to know, or which lessen the risk, for that only is material which tends to increase the risk, in the absence of express stipulation, and where no inquiry is made, is no concealment; May, Ins. § 207; Lexington Fire, Life & Marine Ins. Co. v. Paver, 16 Ohio 334.. Where there is confidence reposed, concealment becomes more fraudulent; 9 B. & C. 577. See, generally, 2 Kent 482; Deceit; Misrepresentation; Representation.

The improper suppression or disguising of a fact, circumstance, or qualification which rests within the knowledge of one only of the parties to a contract, but which ought in fairness and good faith to be communicated to the other, whereby the party so concealing draws the other into an engagement which he would not make but for his ignorance of the fact concealed. A neglect to communicate that which a party knows, and ought to communicate, is called a "concealment." Civ. Code Cah § 256L The terms "misrepresentation" and "concealment" have a known and definite meaning in the law of insurance. Misrepresentation is the statement of something as fact which is untrue in fact, and which the assured states, knowing it to be not true, with an intent to deceive the underwriter, or which he states positively as true, without knowing it to be true, and which has a tendency in mislead, such fact in either case being material to the risk. Concealment is the designed and intentional withholding of any fact material to the risk, which the assured, in honesty and good faith, ought to communicate to the underwriter j mere silence on the part of the assured, especially as to some matter of fact which he dees not consider it important for the underwriter to know, is not to be considered as such concealment. If the fact so untruly stated or purposely suppressed is not material, that is, if the knowledge or ignorance of it would not naturally influence the judgment of the underwriter in making the contract, o in estimating the degree and character of the risk, or in fixing the rate of the premium, it is not a "misrepresentation" or "concealment," within the clause of the conditions annexed to policies. Daniels v. Insurance Co., 12 Cush. (Mass.) 416, 59 Am. Dec. 192.

Defined under Conceal in Black's Law Dictionary.

v. Conceal

The suppression or keeping back of a fact or circumstance privately known to one of the parties to a contract, either through inadvertence or mistake, or intentionally in order to draw the other into a bargain from his ignorance of such fact, and his believing the contra- 17.* Lord Mansfield, 3 Burr, 1005. 2 Kent's Com. 482-^485. 3 Id. 282. Thus, where the insured keeps back from, or neglects to communicate to the underwriter, any material circumstance in his knowledge, in consequence of which the latter is led into a belief that the circumstance does not exist, and is induced to estimate the risk as if it did not exist, such concealment renders the policy void.* 3 Burr, ub. sup. Concealment, however, is distinguished by Lord Mansfield from an innocent silence as to grounds open to both parties to exercise their judgment upon. Aliud est celare. aliud tacere; neque enim id est celare quic' quid reticeas; s^ cum quod tu sdas, id ig^ norare emolumenti tui causa velis eos, quorum inter sit id scire. (It is one thing to conceal, another thing to be silent; for mere silence does not always amoimt to concealment, but only when it is coupled with a desire that those whose interest it is to know a fact known to yourself, should remain ignorant of it, with a view to your own advantage.) Id, ibid. See 2 Duer on Ins. Lect. ziii.

contracts, is the unlawful suppression of any fact or circumstance, by one of the parties toa contract, from the other, and which in justice ought to be made known. - _ Fraud clearly occurs when one person: substantially misrepresents or conceals a material fact peculiarly within his own knowledge, in consequence of which a delusion exists; or uses a device naturally calculated to lull the suspicions of a careful man, and induce him to forego inquiry into a matter upon which the other party has information although such information be not exclusively within his reach. 2 Bl. Com. 451; 3 Ib. 166; Sugd. Vend. 1 to 10; 1 Com. Contr. 38; 3 B.& C. 623; 5 D. & R. 490; 2 Wheat. 183; 11 Ib. 59; 1 Pet. Sup: C. R. 15, 16. The party is not bound however to disclose patent defects. Sugd. Vend. 2 t, cealment which is only the effect of accident, negligence, inadvertence, or mistake, if material, is equally fatal to the contract as if it were intentional and fraudulent. 1 Bi. r ‘R. 594; 3 Burr. 1909. Fraudulent concealment avoids _ the contract. See, generally, Verpl. on Contr. passim.; Marsh. Ins. B. l,c. 9.