Definitions from Black's Law Dictionary: 2nd Edition and Ballentine's Law Dictionary as are available for each term in each dictionary.
  • Ballentine's Law Dictionary

    A restriction; a circumstance as distinguished from a cause. See 29 Fla. 590, 10 South. 590.

  • Black's Law Dictionary: 2nd Edition

    In the civil law. The rank, situation, or degree of a particular person in some one of the different orders of society. An agreement or stipulation in regard to some uncertain future event, not of the essential nature of the transaction, but annexed to it by the parties, providing for a change or modification of their legal relations upon its occurrence. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 184. Classification. In the civil law, conditions are of the following several kinds: The casual condition' is that which depends on chance, and is in no way in the power either of the creditor or of the debtor. Civ. Code La, art. 2023. A mixed condition is one that depends at the same time on the will of one of the parties and on the will of a third person, or on the will of one of the parties and also on a casual event. Civ. Co.de La. art 2025. The potestative condition is that which makes the execution of the agreement depend on an event which it is in the power of the one or the other of the contracting parties to bring about or to hinder. Civ. Code La. art. 2024. A resolutory or dissolving condition is that which, when accomplished, operates the revocation of the obligation, placing matters in the same state as though the obligation had not existed. It does not suspend the execution of the obligation. It only obliges the creditor to restore what he has received in case the event provided for in the condition takes place. Civ. Code La. art. 2045; Moss v. Smoker, 2 La. Ann. 991. A suspensive condition is that which depends, either on afuture and uncertain event, or on an event which bas actually token place, without its being yet known to the parties. In the former case, the obligation cannot be executed till after the event; in the latter, the obligation has its effect from the day on which it was contracted, but it cannot be enforced until the event be known. Civ. Co.de La. art. 2043 : New Orleans v Railroad Co., 171 U. S. 312, 18 Sup. Ct. 875, 48 L. Ed. 178; Moss v. Smoker, 2 La. Ann. 991. In French law. In French law, the following peculiar distinctions are made:
    (1) A condition is casuelle when it depends on a chance or hazard;
    (2) a condition is potestative when it depends on the accomplishment of something which is in the power of the party to accomplish;
    (3) a condition is mixte when It depends partly on the will of the party and partly on the will of others;
    (4) a condition is suspensive when it ls a future and uncertain event, or present but unknown event, upon which an obligation takes or fails to take effort;
    (5) a condition is resolutoire when it is the event which undoes an obligation which has already had effect as such. Brown. In common law. The rank, situation, or degree of a particular person in some one of the different orders of society; or hls status or situation, considered as a juridicial person, arising from positive law or the institutions of society. Thili v. Pohlman, 76 Iowa, 638, 41 N. W. 385. ' A clause in a contract or agreement which has for its object to suspend, rescind, or modify the principal obligation, or, in case of a will, to suspend, revoke, or modlfy the devise or bequest. Towle v. Remsen, 70 N. Y. 303. A modus or quality annexed by him that hath an estate, or interest or right to the same, whereby an estate, etc., may either be defeated, enlarged, or created upon an uncertain event. Co. Litt. 201a. A qualification or restriction annexed to a conveyance of lands, whereby it ls provided that in case a particular event does or does not happen, or in case the grantor or grantee does or omits to do a particular act, an estate shall commence, be enlarged, or be defeated. Heaston v. Randolph County, 20 Ind. 398; Cooper v. Green, 28 Ark. 54; State v. Board of Public Works, 42 Ohio St. 615; Selden v. Pringle, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 465. Classification. The different kinds of conditions known to the common law may be arranged and described as follows: They are either express or implied, the former when incorporated in express terms in the deed, contract, lease, or grant; the latter, when inferred or presumed by law, from the nature of the transaction or the conduct of the parties, to have been tacitly understood between them as a part of the agreement, though not expressly mentioned. 2 Crabb, Reni Prop. p. 792; Bract, fol. 47; Civ. Co.de La. art 2076; Raley v. Umatilla County, 15 Or. 172, i3 Pan. 890, 3 Am. St. Rep. 142. Express and implied conditions are also called by the older writers, respectively, conditions in deed (or in fact, the Law French term being conditions en fait) and conditions in law. Co.. Litt. 201 a. They are possible or impossible; the former when they admit of performance in the ordinary course of events; the latter when it is contrary to the course of nature or human limitations that they should ever be performed. They are lawful or unlawful; the former when their character is not in violation of any rule, principle, or policy of law; the latter when they are such as the law will not allow to be made. They are consistent or repugnant; the former when they are in harmony and concord with the other parts of the transaction; the latter when they contradict, annul, or neutralize ths main purpose of the contract Repugnant conditions are also calied "insensible." They are affirmative or negative; the former being a condition which consists in doing a thing; as provided that the lessee shall pay rent, etc., and the latter being a condition which consists in not doing a thing; as provided that the lessee shall not alien, etc. Shep. Touch. 118. They are precedent or subsequent. A condition precedent is one which must happen or be performed before the estate to which it is annexed can vest or be enlarged ; or it is one which is to be performed before some right dependent thereon accrues, or some act dependent thereon is performed. Towle v. Remsen. 70 N. Y. 309: Jones v. U. S., 96 U. S. 26, 24 L. Ed. 644; Redman v. Insurance Co., 49 Wis. 431, 4 N. W. 591; Beatty's Estate v. Western Co.llege, 177 111. 280, 52 N. E. 482, 42 In R. A. 797, 69 Am. St. Rep. 242; Warner v. Bennett, 31 Conn. 475; Blean v. Messenger, 33 N. J. Law, 503. A condition subsequent is one annexed to an estate already vested, by the performance of which such estate is kept and continued, and by the failure or non-performance of which it is defeated; or it is a condition referring to a fufure event, upon the happening of which the obligation becomes no longer binding upon the other party, if he chooses to avail himself of the condition. Co.. Litt. 201; 2 Bl. Comm. 154; Civ. Co.de Cal. § 1436; Co.de Ga. § 2722; Goff v. Pensenhafer, 190 111. 200, 60 N. El 110; Moran v. Stewart, 173 Mo. 207, 73 S. W. 177; Hague v. Ahrens, 53 Fed. 58, 3 C. C. A. 426; Towle v. Remsen. 70 N. Y. 309; Chapin v. School Dist., 35 N. H. 450; Blanchard v. Railroad Co., 31 Mich. 49, 18 Am. Rep. 142; Co.'oper v. Green, 28 Aria 54. Conditions may also be positive (requiring that a specified event shall happen or an act be done) and restrictive or negative, the latter being such as impose an obligation not to do a particular thing, as, that a lessee shall not alien or sub-let or commit waste, or the like, Shep. Touch 118. They may be single, copulative, or disjunctive. Those of the first kind require the performance of one specified thing only; those of the second kind require the performance of divers acts or things; those of the third kind require the performance of one of several things. Shep. Touch. 118. Conditions may also be independent, dependent, or mutual. They belong to the first class when each of the two conditions must be performed without any reference to the other; to the second class when the performance of one condition is not obligatory until the actual performance of the other; and to the third class when neither party need perform his condition unless the other is ready and willing to perform his, or, in other words, when the mutual covenants go to the whole consideration on both sides and each is precedent to the other. Huggins v. Daley, 99 Fed. 609, 40 C. C. A. 12, 48 L. R. A. 320. The following varieties may also he noted: A condition collateral is one requiring the performance of a collateral act having no necessary relation to the main subject of the agreement. A compulsory condition is one which expressly requires a thing to be done, as, that a lessee shall pay a specified sum of money on a certain day or his lease shall be void. Shep. Touch. 118. Concurrent conditions are those which are mutually dependent and are to be performed at the same time. Civ. Co.de Cal. § 1437. A condition inherent is one annexed to the rent reserved out of the land whereof the estate is made, or rather, to the estate in the land, in respect of rent. Shep. Touch. 118. Synonyms distinguished. A "condition" is to be distinguished from a limitation, in that the latter may be to or for the benefit of a stranger, who may then take advantage of its determination, while only the grantor, or those who stand in his place, can take advantage of a condition, (Hoselton v. Hosel-ton, 166 Mo. 182, 65 S. W. 1005; Steams v. Gofrey, 16 Me. 158;) and in that a limitation ends the estate without entry or claim, which is not true of a condition. It also differs from a conditional limitation; for in the latter the estate is limited over to a third person, while in case of a simple condition it reverts to the grantor, or his heirs or devisees, (Church v. Grant, 3 Gray [Mass.] 147, 63 Am. Dec. 725.) It differs also from a covenant, which can be made by either grantor or grantee, while only the grantor can make a condition, (Co. Litt. 70.) A charge ls a devise of land with a bequest out of the subject-matter, and a charge upon the devisee personally, in respect of the estate devised, gives him an estate on condition. A condition also differs from a remainder; for, while the former may operate to defeat the estate before Its natural termination, the latter cannot take effect until the completion of the preceding estate.