Condonation

The conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or vidfe, of a matrimonial offense which the other has committed. Condonation is the remission by one of the named parties of an offense which he knows the other has committed, on the condition, implied where it is not expressed, of being continually afterwards treated by the other with conjugal kindness. 2 Bish. Mar., Div. & Sep. § 269. Condonation may be either express or implied (27 Ind. 186), as by continued matrimonial cohabitation after knowledge of the offense (13 N. J. Eq. 81). Conditional forgiveness, whereby one parlation of the marriage vows. 59 111. App. 571.

The conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or of a matrimonial offence which the other has committed. "A 1 'bitting out of an imputed offence against the marital relation so as to restore the offending party to the same position he or she occupied before the offence was committed." 1 Sw. & Tr. 334. See, as to this definition, 2 Pish. Mar. & Div. § 35; Odom v. Odom, 36 Ga. 286; [1893] P. D. 31 While the condition remains unbroken, condonation, on whatever motive it proceeded, is an absolute bar to the remedy for the particular injury condoned; Bish. Mar. & Div. S 354. The doctrine of condonation is chiefly. though not exclusively, applicable to the offence of adultery. It may be eithei i. e. signified by words or writing, or Implied from the conduct of the parties. The latter, however, is much the more common; and it is in regard to that that the chief legal difficulty has arisen. The only general rule is. that any cohabitation with the guilty party. after the commission of the offence, and with the knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation; but this presumption may be rebutted by evidence; 60 L. J. Prob. 73. The construction, however, is m< when the wife than when the husband is the delinquent party; Bish. Mar. & Div. § 355; Miles v. Miles, 101 111. App. 40(5. A. mere promise to condone is not in itself a condonation; ] Sw. & Tr. 183; Qnarles v. Quarles, 1'.' Ala. 303; but see, contra, Chrlstianberry v. Christianberry, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 202, 25 Am. Dec. 96, where there was only an unaccepted inducement held out to the wife to return. Knowledge of the offence is essential; Burns v. Burns. 60 Ind. 250; Turnbull v. Turnbull, 23 Ark. 615; Connelly v. Connelly, '.is Mo. App. 95. 71 S. W. 1111. A divorce will not be granted for adultery where the parties continue to live together after it was known; Land v. Martin. 46 La. Ann. 1246, 1.". South. G57; Day v. Day, 71 Kan. 385, 80 Pac. 974, <"> Ann. Oas. 169; or there is sexual intercourse after knowledge of the adultery; Rogers v. Rogers. 67 X. J. Eq. 534, 58 Atl. Todd v. Todd (N. J.) 37 Atl. 7G6 (the wife alleging that he had intercourse with her); contra, where for three or four nights they occupied the same bed, but there was no reconciliation and no sexual intercourse; Hann v. Hann, 58 N. J. Eq. 211, 42 Atl. 564; or where they continued to cohabit but a disease was communicated to the wife; Muir v. Muir, 92 S. W. 314, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 1355, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 909; or where the husband had a venereal disease which he told the wife was the result of an injury; Wilkius v. Wilkins (N. J.) 58 Atl. 821; or where the wife denied actual guilt, and the husband, after belief in her innocence was no longer possible, left her; Gosser v. Gosser, 183 Pa. 499, 38 Atl. 1014; or where the husband lied to the wife as to his offence, and she left him after she learned the truth; Merrill v. Merrill, 41 App. Div. 347, 5S N. Y. Hupp. 503. Every implied condonation is upon the implied condition that the party forgiven will abstain from the commission of the like offence thereafter; and also treat the forgiving party, in all respects, with conjugal kindness. Such, at least, is the better opinion; though the latter branch of the proposition has given rise to much discussion. It is not necessary, therefore, that the subsequent injury be of the same kind, or proved with the same clearness, or sufficient of itself, when proved, to warrant a divorce or separation. Accordingly, it seems that a course of unkind and cruel treatment will revive condoned adultery, though the latter be a ground of divorce a vinculo matrimonii, while the former will, at most, only authorize a separation from bed and board; Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 637; Warner v. Warner, 31 N. J. Eq. 225; Wagner v. Wagner, 6 Mo. App. 573; Atteberry v. Atteberry, 8 Or. 224. Acts of cruelty against a wife revive acts of cruelty which have been condoned; Straus v. Straus, 67 Hun 491, 22 N. Y. Supp. 567; Denison v. Denison, 4 Wash. 705, 30 Pac. 1100. Condonation is not so strict a bar against the wife as the husband; Armstrong v. Armstrong, 32 Miss. 279; Phillips v. Phillips, 1 111. App. 245; 1 Hag. Ec. 773. The presumption of condonation from cohabitation in cases of cruelty is not so strong as in cases of adultery; 2 Bish. Mar. & Div. § 50 ct seq. A divorce on the ground of cruelty will not be granted where the parties lived together a long time after the alleged cruelty and before the action was brought, as the offence will be presumed to have been condoned; O'Connor v. O'Connor, 109 N. C. 139, 13 S. E. S87; Hitchins v. Hitchins, 140 111. 326, 29 N. E. 8S8; Nullmeyer v. Nullmeyer, 49 111. App. 573. But not in cases where it is overlooked for a time, but its Gauntt, 34 Pa. C. C. R. 100; Breedlove v. Breedlove, 27 Ind. App. 560, 61 N. E. 797. Enduring cruelty for several years in the hope of better treatment will not prevent a reliance upon the original cruelty; Creyts v. Creyts, 133 Mich. 4, 94 N. W. 383; Cochran v. Cochran, 93 Minn. 284, 101 N. W. 179; Twj man v. Twyman, 27 Mo. 383. Where a husband's infidelity was condoned, a remedy because of such infidelity was revived by his subsequent cruelty to her Moorhouse v. Moorhouse, 90 111. App. 401 Fisher v. Fisher, 93 Md. 298, 48 Atl. 833 or by subsequent adultery; 19 L. Q. R. 365 or by subsequent desertion; 29 id. 108. Condonation of husband's cruelty is upon the explicit condition that he will thereafter treat her kindly. A breach of this condition revives the right of suit for the original misconduct; Smith v. Smith, 167 Mass. 87, 45 N. E. 52; and it is not necessary that the subsequent misconduct shall be sufficient to warrant divorce without regard to previous cruelty if there is such frequent unkindness as to warrant the belief that it will break out into acts of gross cruelty; Jefferson v. Jefferson, 168 Mass. 456, 47 N. E. 123. If condonation was based upon conditions which the husband failed to perform, it was ineffective; Ferguson v. Ferguson, 145« Mich. 290, 108 N. W. 682. It is always based upon the condition of proper conduct afterwards; a breach of a condition revives the original offence; Owens v. Owens, 96 Va. 191, 31 S. E. 72; Mosher v. Mosher, 16 N. D. 269, 113 N. W. 99, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 820, 125 Am. St. Rep. 654; [1905] P. 94. There is no condonation in case of a continuing venereal disease; Hooe v. Hooe, 122 Ky. 590, 92 S. W. 317, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 729, 13 Ann. Cas. 214.

Forgiveness; the forgiveness, express or implied, by a husband or wife, of a breach of marital duty on the part of the other, — express when signified by words or writing, and implied where the injured party, with knowledge, continues or renews the matrimonial connection.

The conditional remission or forgiveness, by one of the married parties, of a matrimonial offense committed by the other, and which would constitute a cause of divorce; the condition being that the offense shall not be repeated. See Civil Code Cal. § 115; 3 Hagg. Ecc. 351, 629. "A blotting out of an offense [against the marital relation] imputed so as to restore the offending party to the same position he or she occupied before the offense was committed." 1 Swab. & T. 534. Condonation is a conditional forgiveness founded on a full knowledge of all antecedent guilt. 36 Ga. 286.

/. Condonation, the forgiveness, either breach of marital duty, repeated. Conduct-money. Money penses and maintenance.

[Lat. condonatio, from condonare, to forgive.] In ecclesiastical law. Forgiveness. The forgiveness by a husband or wife, of a breach of marital duties on the part of the other, as of acts of adultery or cruelty. Shel/ord Marr, <k IHv. 486, 446. It is either express or implied; express when signified by words or writing, and implied from the conduct of the parties, as where for instance the injured party, after reasonable knowledge of the mfidelity of the other, continues to live with him or her, in a state of matrimonial connection, or renews such connection when it has been suspended.* Id, 445. Sanchez de Divorti Oy lib. 10, disp. 5, cited ibid, 1 Haggard's Eccl. Rep, 130. 2 Kent's Com. 101, and notes. It is called a conditional forgiveness, being accompanied by an implied condition that the injury shall not be repeated. 3 Haqg. R. 629, 351. Id, 733, 762. 4 Paige's^R. 460.

a term used in the canon law. It is a forgiveness by the husband of his wife, or by a wife of her husband, of adultery committed, with an implied shall be treated with conjugal kind. ness. 1 Hagg. Rep. 773; 3 Eccl. Rep. 310. See 5 Mass. 320; 6 Mass. 69; 1 Johns. Ch. R. 488. It may be express or implied, as if a husband knowing of his wife’s infidelity, cohabit with her. 1 Hagg. Rep. 789; 3 Eccl. Rep. 338. Condonation is not, for many reasons, held so strictly against a wife as against a hus. band. 3 Eccl. Rep. 330. Ib. 341, n. As all condonatigns by operation of jaw, are expressly or impliedly conditional, it follows that the effect is taken off by the repetition of misconduct. 3 Eccl. R. 329; 3 Phillim. Rep. 6; 1 Eccl. R. 35; and cruelty revives condoned adultery. Worsley v. Worsley, cited in Durant v. Durant, 1 Hagg. Rep. 733; 3 Eccl. Rep. 311. re the parties have separate beds, there must, in order to found condonation, be something of matrimonial intercourse presumed; it does not rest merely on the wife’s not withdrawing herself. 3 Eccl. Rep. 341, n, Condonation is a bar to a sentence of divorce. 1 Eccl. Rep. 284. In Pennsylvania, by the act of the 13th of March, 1815, § 7,6 Reed’s Laws of Penna. 288, it is enacted that “ in suit or action for divorce for cause of adultery, if the defendant shall allege and prove that the plaintiff has admitted the defendant into conjugal socicty or embraces, after he or she knew of the criminal fact, or that the plaintiff (if the husband,) allowed of his wife’s prostitutions, or received hire for them, or exposed his wife to lewd company, whereby she became ensnared to the crime aforesaid, it shall be a good defence and perpetual bar against the same.” The same rule may be found, perhaps, in the codes of most civilized countries. Vilanova Y Maries, Materia Criminal Forense, Obs. 11, ¢c. used in the phrase safe conduct, to signify the security given, by authotity of the government, under the great seal, to a stranger, for his quiet coming into and passing out of the territories over which it has jurisdiction. A safe conduct differs from 2 passport, the former is given to enemies, the latter to friends or citizens.