cross-examination

a matter of right; it is necessarily exploratory; and the rule that the examiner must indicate the purpose of his inquiry does not, in general, apply. It is the essence of a fair trial that reasonable latitude be given the cross-examiner, even though he is unable to state to the court what fact a reasonable cross-examination might develop

In practice. The examination of a witness by the party opposed to the party who called him, and who examined or was entitled to examine him in chief.

The examination of a witness by the party opposed to the party who called him, and who examined, or was entitled to examine him in chief. The purpose of the cross-examination i.- to test the truthfulness, intelligence, memory, bias or interest of the witness, and any question to that end within reason is usually allowed: Briggs v. People, 219 111. 3 X. E. 499; Real v. People. 42 N. Y. 270; Wroe v. State, 20 Ohio St 4G0. In England and some of the states, when a competent witness is called and sworn, the other party is ordinarily entitled to cri amine him as to matters not covered by the direct examination; 1 Esp. 357; Moody v. Rowell. IT Pick. (Mass.) 490, 28 Am. Dec. 317; Varick v. Jackson. 2 Wend. (X. Y.) 166, 19 Am. Dec. 571: Fulton Bank v. Stafford, 2 Wend. (X. Y.) 483; Aiken v. CatO, 23 Ga. Ga. 154; but see Swift v. Ins. Co., 122 Mass. 578; but it is beld iu other states and in the federal courts that the cross-examination must be confined to facts connected with the direct examination; Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. C. C. 580, Fed. Cas. No. 6,141; Philadelphia & Trenton R. Co. v. Stimpson, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 44S, 10 Lr. Ed. 535; Ellmaker v. Buckley, 16 S. & R. (Pa.) 77; Floyd v. Bovard, 6 W. & S. (Pa.) 75; Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. Law, 463; Landsberger v. Gorham, 5 Cal. 450; Cokely v. State, 4 la. 477; Pearson v. Hardin, 95 Mich. 300, 54 N. W. 904; Hansen v. Miller, 145 111. 53S, 32 N. E. 548; In re Westerfield, 96 Cal. 113, 30 Pac. 1104; Winkler v. Roeder, 23 Neb. 706, 37 N. W. 607, 8 Am. St. Rep. 155; Fulton v. Bank, 92 Pa. 112; Monongahela Water Co. v. Stewartson, 96 Pa. 436. It may extend to every fact which is part of the plaintiff's case, but not to matter of defense; Smith v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 202 Pa. 54, 51 Atl. 345; New York Iron Mine v. Bank, 39 Mich. 644; affirmative defenses cannot be introduced on cross-examination; Mc Crea v. Parsons, 112 Fed. 917, 50 C. C. A. 612. Inquiry may be made in regard to collateral facts in the discretion of the judge; 7 C. & P. 3S9; Lawrence v. Barker, 5 Wend. (N. T.) 305; Huntsville Belt Line & Monte Sano Ry. Co. v. Corpening & Co., 97 Ala. 681, 12 South. 295; but not merely for the purpose of contradicting the witness by other evidence; 7 C. & P. 7S9; Com. v. Buzzell, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 157; Ware v. Ware, 8 Greenl. (Me.) 42. And see Howard v. Ins. Co., 4 Denio (N. Y.) 502; State v. Patterson, 24 N. C. 346, 38 Am. Dec. 699; Philadelphia & T. R. Co. v. Stimpson, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 461, 10 L. Ed. 535. Considerable latitude should be allowed in cross-examining witnesses as to value, in order that the ground of their opinion may appear; Phillips v. Inhabitants of Marblehead, 148 Mass. 326, 19 N. E. 547. A written paper identified by the witness as having been written by him may be introduced in the course of cross-examination as a part of the evidence of the party producing it, if necessary for the purposes of the cross-examination; 8 C. & P. 369. A witness may be asked whether he has not made previous statements contradictory to his present testimony; People v. Walker, 140 Cal. 153, 73 Pac. 831; Dillard v. U. S., 141 Fed. 303, 72 C. C- A. 451; but he must be given a chance to explain; Rice v. Rice, 43 App. Div. 458, 60 N. Y. Supp. 97. Where the statement about, which he is asked is in writing, it is necessary that his attention be called to the writing and if he denies that he made such statement, the writing must be proved in the ordinary way; Gaffney v. People, 50 N. Y. 416. In Queen Caroline's Case, 2 B. & B. 286, it was held that on cross-examination counsel is not allowed to reprewhether the witness wrote a letter to any person with such contents, or contents to the like effect, without first having shown the letter to the witness and asked whether he wrote such letter. This is commonly spoken of as the rule in the Queen's Case. It is severely and ably criticised in Wigmore, Evidence 1259-1263. In England it was unanimously condemned by the bar, and in 1854 a statute was passed which abolished it. In the United States it was adopted in People v. Lambert, 120 Cal. 170, 52 Pac. 307; Simmons v. State, 32 Fla. 3S7, 13 South. 896; Taylor v. State, 110 Ga. 150, 35 S. E. 161; Momence Stone Co. v. Groves, 197 111. 8S, 64 N. E. 335; Glenn v. Gleason, 61 la. 28, 15 N. W. 659; Hendrickson v. Com. (Ky.) 64 S. W. 954; State v. Cain, 106 La. 708, 31 South. 300; O'Riley v. Clampet, 53 Minn. 539, 55 N. W. 740; Story v. State, 6S Miss. 609, 10 South. 47; State v. Matthews, 8S Mo. 121; Omaha Loan & Trust Co. v. Douglas County, 62 Neb. 1, S6 N. W. 936; Haines v. Ins. Co., 52 N. H. 467; Gaffney v. People, 50 N. Y. 423; State v. Steeves, 29 Or. 85, 43 Pac. 947; Kann v. Bennett, 223 Pa. 36, 72 Atl. 342; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Artery, 137 U. S. 520, 11 Sup. Ct. 129, 34 L. Ed. 747; Kalk v. Fielding, 50 Wis. 339, 7 N. W. 296; Mr. Wigmore thinks that its repudiation in England was not known at the time of its early adoption here. A cross-examination as to matters not otherwise admissible in evidence entitles the party producing the witness to re-examine him as to those matters; 3 Ad. & E. 554; Stuart v. Baker, 17 Tex. 417. If the defendant be permitted on cross-examination to bring out new matter, constituting his own ease, which he had not opened to the jury, to the injury of the plaintiff, it may be ground for reversal; Thomas & Sons v. Loose, Seaman & Co., 114 Pa. 35, 6 Atl. 326; Hughes v. Coal Co., 104 Pa. 207. Leading questions may be put in cross-examination; 1 Stark. Ev. 96; Floyd v, Bovard, 6 W. & S. (Pa.) 75; Moody v. Rowell, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 490, 28 Am. Dec. 317. The trial court has not such a discretion as to the scope of cross-examination of the defendant in a criminal cause as in the examination of other witnesses; People v. O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171, 31 Pac. 45. See State v. Wright, 40 La. Ann. 589, 4 South. 4S6. A refusal to permit cross-examination as to relevant matters brought out in direct examination is usually ground for reversal; Prout v. Bernards Land & Sand Co., 77 N. J. L. 719, 73 Atl. 4S6, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 683, note; Eames v. Kaiser, 142 U. S. 4S8, 12 Sup. Ct. 302, 35 L. Ed. 1091; Graham v. Larimer, 83 Cal. 173, 23 Pac. 286. A full and fair cross-examination is a matter of right and a denial of it is error; after such has been allowed, further cross-examination becomes A. 180; City of Florence v. Calmet, 43 Colo. 510, 96 Pac. 183. It is improper for a trial judge to crossexamine defendant's witnesses in such a manner as to impress the jury with the idea that he thinks the defendant guilty. If he participates in the cross-examination, he should do it in such a way as to indicate his entire impartiality; Adler v. U. S., 182 Fed. 464, 104 C. C. A. 608.

In practice. The examination of a witness upon a trial or hearing, or upon taking a deposition, by the party opposed to the one who produced him, upon his evidence given in chief, to test its truth, to further develop it, or for other purposes.

Defined under Examination in Black's Law Dictionary.

In practice. The examination of a witness upon a trial or hearing, or upon taking a deposition, by the party opposed to the one who produced him, upon his evidence given in chief, to test its truth, to further develop it, or for other purposes.

In practice. The examination of a witness by the party opposed to the party who has first examined him, in order to test the truth of such first or direct examination, which is also called examination in chief.* Cross examination is usually by the party who did not call the witness; but the courts frequently permit an adverse witness to be cross examined by the party who calls him. 1 Siarkie on Evidence, 187, 188.

prac. tice, is the examination of a witness by the party who did not call him. very party has a right to cross examine a witness produced by his antagonist, in order to test whether the witness has the knowledge of the things he testifies, and, if upon such examination, it is found that the witness’ had the means and ability to ascertain the facts about which he testifies, then his memory, his motives, every thing may be scrutinized by the cross-examination. In cross-examinations a great latitude is allowed in the mode of putting questions, and the counsel may put leadsng questions (q. v.). Vide further on. this subject, and for some rules which limit the abuse of this right 1 Stark. Ev. 96; 1 Phil. Ev. 210.