Dictum

An opinion expressed by a court, but which, not being necessarily involved in the case, lacks the force of an adjudication.

Usually given obiter dictum

An opinion expressed by a court, upon a point in a case argued and deliberately passed on, though not essential to the disposition of a case, and hence lacks the fo;rce of an adjudication.

227 111. 337.

It frequently happens that, in assigning its opinion upon a question before it, the court discusses collateral questions, and expresses a decided opinion upon them. Such opinions, however, are frequently given without much reflection, or without previous argument at the bar; and as, moreover, they do not enter into the adjudication of the point before it, they have only that authority which may be accorded to the opinion, more or less deliberate, of the individual judge who announces it. It may be observed that in recent times, particularly in those jurisdictions where appeals are largely favored, the ancient practice of courts in this respect is much modified. Formerly, judges aimed to confine their opinion to the precise point involved, and were glad to make that point as narrow as it might justly be. Where appeals are frequent, however, a strong tendency may be seen to fortify the judgment given with every principle that can be invoked in its behalf,— those that are merely collateral, as well as those that are necessarily involved. In some courts of last resort, also, when there are many judges, it is not unfrequently the case that, while the court come to one and the same conclusion, the different judges may be led to that conclusion by different views of the law, so that it becomes difficult to determine what is to be regarded as the principle upon which the case was decided, and what shall be deemed mere dicta. According to the more rigid rule, an expression of opinion, however deliberate, upon a question, however fully argued, if not essential to the disposition that was made of the case, may be regarded as a dictum; but it is, on the other hand, said that it is difficult to see why,_ in a philosophical point of view, the opinion of the court is not as persuasive on all the points which were so involved in the cause that it was the duty of counsel to argue them, and which were deliberately passed over by the court, as if the decision had hung upon but one point.

1 Abb. N. Y. Dig. pref. iv. Consult 17 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 292; 1 Phillim. Ecc. Law, 406; 1 Eng. Ecc. 129; Bam. & Aid. 341; 2 Bing. 90.

The doctrine of the courts of Prance on this subject is stated in 11 Toullier, Dr. Civ. 177, note 133. As to weight given to dicta in former decisions, see 6 Wheat. (U. S.) 399; 4 Heisk. (Tenn.) 419. In French Law. The report of a judgment made by one of the judges who has given it. Poth. Proc. Civ. pi.

1, c. 5, art. 2.