dangerous weapon

A weapon calculated to cause death or great bodily harm. Guns, swords, knives, and the like, are dangerous weapons, as a matter of law. 110 N. C. 497; 1 Baldw. (U. S.) 78. Others are dangerous or not, according to their capability of causing great bodily harm in the manner in which they are used. Thus, a champagne bottle (33 Ga. 207), a chair (3 Tex. App. 13), a club (104 N. C. 786), a stone (10 Minn. 407) or a shovel (17 S. C. 55) may be a dangerous weapon.

One dangerous to life. Cosby v. Com., 115 Ky. 221, 72 S. W. 10S9. One likely to produce death. State v. Johns, 6 Pennewill (Del.) 174, 65 Atl. 763; or great bodily injury; People v. Fuqua, 58 Cal. 245. This must often depend upon the manner of using it; Hunt v. State, 6 Tex. App. 663; and the question should go to the jury. A distinction is made between a dangerous and a deadly weapon; United States v. Small, 2 Curt. 241, Fed. Cas. No. 16,314. It is said to be anything with which death can be easily and readily produced, with a reference to the manner in which it was used and the part of the body upon which the blow was struck with it; Acers v. U. S., 164 U. S. 388, 17 Sup. Ct. 91, 41 L. Ed. 481. The following have been held to be deadly weapons: A chisel; Com. v. Branham, 8 Bush (Ky.) 387; a heavy iron weight or other ponderous instrument; State v. West, 51 N. C. 506; Killer v. Com., 124 Pa. 92, 16 Atl. 495; Mc Reynolds v. State, 4 Tex. App. 327; a sledgehammer; Philpot v. Com., 86 Ky. 595, 6 S. W. 455; a heavy pistol used as a ' bludgeon; Prior v. State, 41 Ga. 155; a club; State v. Phillips, 104 N. C. 786, 10 S. E. 463; a piece of timber; State v. Alfred, 44 La. Ann. 582, 10 South. 887; a pocket knife; State v. Scott, 39 La. Ann. 943, 3 South. 83; a razor; Scott v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. Pt. 607, 62 S. W. 419; an axe; Dollarhide v. U. S., Morris (la.) 233, 39 Am. Dec. 460; State v. Shields, 110 N. C. 497, 14 S. E. 779; but where its size, weight, character and kind are not shown, it is held that it cannot be so regarded; Melton v. State, 30 Tex. App. 273, 17 S. W. 257; Gladney v. State (Tex.) 12 S. W. 868. A jacknife may be a dangerous weapon in fact, but whether it was such as matter of law was not decided; Com. v. O'Brien, 119 Mass. 342, 20 Am. Rep. 325. A heavy oak stick, three feet long and an inch thick, is a dangerous weapon but not a "deadly" weapon in the sense that from the use of it alone an attack would be as matter of law an aggravated assault under a Texas People v. Perales, 141 Cal. 581, 75 Pac. 170; Renon v. State, 56 Tex. Cr. R. 343, 120 S. W. 174; Taylor v. State, 108 6a. 384, 34 S. E. 2; Kelly v. State, GS Miss. 343, 8 South. 745. In one way it may be true that sticks or clubs are not deadly weapons. Carrying them does not import any hostile intent, nor, even in view of an expected affray, a to take life. But when a fight is actually going on, they may become weapons of a very deadly character; Allen v. U. S., 157 l. S. 675, 15 Sup. Ct 720, 39 L. Ed. 854. When its size and the manner of its use is shown, it may be left to the jury to say whether a stick or club or piece of plank is a deadly weapon of a character likely to produce death or great bodily harm; State v. Nueslein, 25 Mo. Ill; Allen v. State, 148 Ala. 588, 42 South. 1006; State v. Brown, 67 la. 289, 25 N. W. 248. A weapon cannot be said as a matter of law to be deadly, without reference to the manner of its use; Crow v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. R. 200, 116 S. W. 52, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 497, where a baseball bat is held not to be per sc a deadly weapon, though it has been said, if viciously used, it would probably be so considered; State v. Brown, 67 la. 289, 25 N. W. 248. A piece of gas pipe 4 feet long and weighing about 4 pounds was held a deadly weapon per se; State v. Drumm, 156 Mo. 216, 56 S. W. 1086; as was a hoe; Hamilton v. People, 113 111. 34, 55 Am. Rep. 390; Krchnavy v. State, 43 Neb. 337, 61 N. W. 628; a pitchfork; Evans v. Com., 12 S. W. 767, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 551. a stone may be; State v. Wilson, 1G Mo. App. 550; North Carolina v. Gosuell, 74 Fed. 7;;4. Whether a rock used for a missile was a deadly weapon was held to be for the jury; State v. Shipley, 174 Mo. 512, 74 S. W. 612; Tribble v. State, 145 Ala. 23, 40 South. 938; but in State v. Speaks, 94 N. C. 805, the question was said to be one of law. An indictment for assault with a deadly weapon, to wit, a brick, sufficiently charges the use of a deadly weapon; State v. Sims, 80 Miss. 381, 31 South. 907. But it was held that whether a brickbat is a deadly weapon is for the jury; State v. Harper, 69 Mo. 425. Pushing a pin down the throat of an infant is a killing with a deadly weapon; State v. Norwood, 115 N. C. 789, 20 S. E. 712, 44 Am. St. Rep. 498. A stocking loaded with salt and plaster which had been hardened by wetting, used by a prisoner in assaulting his jailer while attempting to escape, may be found by the jury to be a deadly weapon; People v. Valliere, 123 Cal. 576, 56 Pac. 433. And one may be found guilty of an assault with a deadly weapon who has placed a tiu box filled with gunpowder in the stove of the prosecuting witness, where it exploded; People v. Pape, 66 Cal. 366, 5 Pac. 621. See A mere trespass on land does not justify an assault with a deadlj wea] on; Moi cry v. Com., 98 Va. v. Lightsey, 43 S. C. 114, 20 s. i:. 975; State v. Zellers, 7 N. J. L. 220; a threw down a fence and drove over a wheal "ii account of snow drifts; State v. I 9 Houst (Del.) 417, 33 Atl. 181; or one tore down and carried away a f< State v. Matthews, 1 !s Mo. 185, 19 1085, 71 Am. St Kep.:,!J4; or went on another's land to remove crops; Rauck v. State. 110 Ind. 384, 11 N. E. 450. other., that if force be necessary, a deadly wi may he used; People v. Flanagan, 60 CaL 2, 44 Am. Rep. 52; or if the owner has reason able ground for believing that he is in danger; People v. Dann, 53 Mich. 490, 19 N. W. L59, 51 Am. Rep. 151. If the trespass sault him, he may be justified in billing; Ayers v. State, GO Miss. 709; he may oppose force with force; Wenzel v. State, -is Tex. Cr. R. 625, 90 S. W. 28; in the defence of his house; People v. Coughlin, 67 Mich. 46 N. W. 72; so if the killing is believed, in good faith and upon reasonable grounds, to be necessary in order to repel the assailant or prevent his forcible entry: State v. cock, 40 Ohio St. 333. In ejecting a trespasser or preventing a trespass, a deadly weapon is not justified unless the owner reasonably believes that he is in danger of personal violence; State v. Howell, 21 Mont 165, 53 Pac. 314; Sage v. Harpending. 49 Barb. (N. Y.) 1GG. In Pryse v. State, 54 Tex. Cr. R. 523, 113 S. W. 938, it was held that a person may use all the force necessary to protect his property, and if in danger of death or serious injury he may kill. In Biggins v. Minaghan, 78 Wis. 602, 47 N. W. 941, 11 L. R. A. 138, 23 Am. St. Rep. 428, it was held that effectual means, by shooting or otherwise, was justifiable to drive away a charivari party who were causing fright to the owner's family and endangering their lives.

One dangerous to life; one by the use of which a fatal wound may probably or possibly be given. As the manner of use enters into the consideration as well as other circumstances, the question is for the jury.