Doubt

The uncertainty which exists in relation to a fact, a proposition, or other thing; an equipoise of the mind arising from an equality of contrary reasons. Ayliife, Pand. 121. See "Reasonable Doubt."

The uncertainty which exists in relation to a fact, a proposition, or other thing; an equipoise of the mind arising from an equality of contrary reasons. Ayl. Pand. 121. The term “reasonable doubt” is often used, but not easily defined. It is not mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs and depending on moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in such a condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. The burden of proof isuponthe prosecutor. All the presumptions of law independent of evidence are in favor of innocence; and every person is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. If upon such proof there is reasonable doubt remaining, the accused is entitled to the benefit of it by an acquittal; for it is not sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong one, arising from tho doctrine of chances, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary, but the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty,—a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisiies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. This is proof beyond reasonable doubt; because if the law, which mostly depends upon considerations of a moral nature, should go further than this, and require absolute certainty, it would exclude circumstantial evidence altogether. Per Shaw, C. J., in 5 Cush. 320,

i Fluctuation of mind arising from want of evidence or knowledge; uncertainty of mind; unsettled opinion.2 Equipoise of mind arising from an equality of contrary reasons.' In civil cases, a doubt is to be resolved against tbe party who might have furnished facts to remove it, but has neglected so to do. In charges of fraud, the presumption of innocence will remove a doubt. In ■criminal cases, whenever a reasonable doubt exists as to the guilt of the accused he is to receive the benefit of the doubt. Where, in a civil proceeding, proving the cause of.action or the defense will also prove a crime committed by the adverse party, it is not necessary that the proof be of the degree required in a criminal proceeding for the offense, that is, beyond a reasonable doubt. The issue should be determined in accordance with the preponderance of the proof.* Reasonable doubt. "That state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge." 5 The expression is not easily defined. It does not mean mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs and depending on moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt... All the presumptions of law independent of evidence are in favor of innocence; and every person is presumed to be innocent until proved guilty. If upon such proof there is reasonable doubt remaining, the accused is entitled to the benefit of it by an acquittal." It is not sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong one, arising from the doctrine of. chances, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary; but the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty; a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding, and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are biund to act conscientiously upon it. 5 If the law, which mostly depends upon considerations of a moral nature, should require absolute certainty, it would exclude circumstantial evidence altogether.' > F. douter: L. dubitare (q. v.), to waiver in mind. " [ Webster's Diet. ' [Bouvier's Law Diet. • Thoreson v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 29 Minn. 107 (1882), eases. " Proof beyond a reasonable doubt " is not beyond all possible or imaginary doubt, but such proof as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which tends to support. It is proof "to a moral certainty," as distinguished from an absolute certainty. As applied to a judicial trial for crime, the two phrases are synonymous and equivalent; each has been used by eminent judges to explain the other; and each signifies: Such proof as satisfies the judgment and consciences of the jury as reasonable men, and applying their reason to the evidence before them, that the crime charged has been committed by the defendant, and so satisfies them as to leave no other reasonable conclusion possible.i See Certainty, 1, Moral. Such doubt must be founded on something growing out of the state of the testimony, which leaves a rational uncertainty as to guilt, and which nothing else in the case removes. The degree of conviction of guilt gbould be something more than a bai'e preponderance of belief; something more than the probability of guilt merely outweighing the probability of innocence. The mind should be able to rest reasonably satisfied of the guilt of the accused before a verdict of that character is given.'' A doubt founded upon a consideration of aU the circumstances and evidence, and not a doubt resting upon conjecture or speculation.^ The jury must find the facts established to such a degree of certainty as they would regard suf Bcient in the important aflau-s of life. The proof need not necessarily exclude all doubt.* " A doubt which a reasonable man of sound judgment, without bias, prejudice, or interest, after calmly, conscientiously, and deliberately weighing all the testimony, would entertain as to the guilt of the prisoner." The guilt must be established to a reasonable, not an absolute, demonstrative or mathematical, certainty.* An indefinable doubt which cannot be stated, with the reason upon which it rests, is not a reasonable doubt, within the rule that an accused is to be given the benefit of such doubt.' Not any fanciful conjecture which an imaginative man may conjure up, but a doubt which reasonably 108; 3 Monta.l3r, 162; 6 Nev. 340; 26 N. J. L. 615; 103 U. S. 312; 120 id. 440, ^ost,— commented on. 1 Commonwealth v. Costley, 118 Mass. 24 (1875), cases, Gray, C. J.; cited, 120 0. S. 440, post. "United States v. Gleason, 1 Woolv. 137 (1867), Mi Uer, J. 3 United States v. Knowles, 4 Saw. 621 (1864), Field, J. ' United States v. Wright, 16 F. B. 114 (1883), Billings, J. s state V. Bounds, 76 Me. 125 (1884), Peters, C. J., quoting State v. Reed, 62 id. 144, 142-45 (1874). flows from the evidence or the want of, evidence; a doubt for which a sensible man could give a good reason, based upon the evidence; such a doubt as h^ would act upon in his own concerns. 1 It is difficult to conceive what amount of conviction would leave the mind of a juror free from a reasonable doubt, if it be not one which is so settled and fixed as to control his action in the more weighty and important matters relating to his own affairs. Out of the domain of the exact sciences and actual observation there is no absolute certainty. The guilt of the accused, in the majority of cases, niust necessarily be deduced from a variety of circumstances leading to proof of the fact. Persons of speculative minds may in almost every case suggest possibilities of the truth being different from that established by the most convincing proof. Jurors are not to be led away by speculative notions as to such possibilities.'' " The jiu-y are not to go beyond the evidence to hunt up doubts, nor must they entertain such doubts as are merely chimerical or conjectural." To justify acquittal, a doubt must arise from an impartial investigation of all the evidence, and be such that, " were the same kind of doubt interposed in the graver transactions of life, it would cause a reasonable and prudent man to hesitate and pause." " If, afteV considering all the evidence, you can say you have an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt;.. you are not at liberty to disbelieve as jurors, if, from the evidence, you believe as men." ^ An instruction which says that the doubt must be "real," substantial, well-founded, arising out of the evidence, is not reversible.' As to questions relating to human affairs, a knowledge of which is derived from testin^ony, it is impossible to have the kind of certainty created by scientific demonstration. The only certainty we can have is a moral certainty, which depends upon the confidence placed in the integrity of witnesses, and their capacity to know the truth. If, for example, facts not improbable are attested by numerous witnesses who are credible, consistent, uncontradicted, and had every opportunity of knowing the truth^ a reasonable or moral certainty would be inspired by their testimony. In such case a doiibt would be unreasonable, imaginary, or speculative, which it ought not to be. It is not a doubt whether the party may not possibly be innocent in the face of strong proof of his guilt, but a sincere doubt whether he has been proved ginlty, that is called "reasonable." And even where the testimony is contradictory, so much more credit may be due to one side than the other, that the same result will be produced. On the other hand, the opposing proofs may be so nearly balanced that the jury may justly doubt on which side lies the truth. In such case the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. As certainty advances, doubt recedes. If one is reasonably certain, he cannot, at the same time, be reason- I [United States v. Jones,.31 F. E. ?84 (188T), Speer, J.; ib. 718, note. ' Hopt V. Utah, ISO U. S. 439^^1 (1887), cases, Field, J. ably doubtful, that is, have a reasonable doubt, of a fact. All that a jury can be expected to do is to b© reasonably or morally certain of the fact which they declare by their verdict' See also Evidence; Pbbpondbrancb; Proof. Doutatftil. Where, ^t the date of an assignment, certain choses were reported as "doubtful," it was held that the assignee could not be charged with them unless the creditors proved that they might have been collected by due diligence."