Dukess

2 In its more extended sense, that degree of constraint or danger, either actually inflicted or threatened and impending, which is sufficient, in severity or in apprehension, to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary firmness. 3 Actual violence is not necessary to constitute duress, even at common law, as understood in the parent country, because consent is the very essence of a contract, and, if there be compulsion, there is no actual consent, and moral compulsion, such as that produced by threats to take life or to inflict great bodily harm, as well as that produced by imprisoimient, is everywhere regarded as sufficient, in law, to destroy free agency, without which there can be no contract, because, in that state of the case, there is no consent. Text- writers divide the subject into duress per minas and diiress of imprisonment. This classification was uniformly adopted in the early history of the common law, and is generally preserved in the decisions of the English courts. Where there is an arrest for an improper purpose, without just cause, or where there is an arrest for a just cause but without law- > See 8 Ark. 378; 8 Ind. 96; 33 Mass. 104; 32 Mo. 185;