duplicity

The charge is unitary in relating to one continuous conspiracy, although in proof of it different circumstances constituting it and overt acts in pursuance of it are disclosed. This does not constitute duplicity.

The technical fault, in pleading, of uniting two or more causes of action in one count in a writ, or two or more grounds of defense in one plea, or two or more breaclies in a replication.

' Double pleading. Alleging two or more distinct grounds of complaint or defense wlien one would be as effectual as both or all.8 Because it produces useless prolixity, and tends to confusion, and to the multiplication of issues, regarded as a fault in all pleading.' Predicated of a plea which contains more than one matter. To avoid a multitude of issues in one dispute every plea is to be confined to a single point. "Duplicity begets confusion," that is, defeats the object of all pleading — a single issue upon the same matter. 10 In criminal practice, joining two or more distinct offenses in one count, i' Not applicable to the union of several fact@ in one matter, nor to matters of explanation, nor where but one of the defenses is valid. *L. duplicafus, two-fold: duplicare, to double. = [Toms V. Cuming, 49 E. C. L. 94 (1845). ' Lewis V. Eoberts, 103 E. C. L. ''29 (1861), Erie, C. J. * Benton v. Martin, 40 N. Y. 347 (1869). '1 Whart.Ev. §74; 1 Greenl. Ev. §5S8., « R. S. § 3702. ^ F. duplicitS: L. duplicitatem^ doubleness. ^ [Gould, Plead. 389. Approved,

— Sprouse v. Commonwealth, infra. ' [Sprouse u Commonwealth, 81 Va. 376 (1886), Lacy, J. '"S Bl. Com. 308, 311; 1 Chitty, Plead. 226; 10 Me. 63; 21 N. J. L. 344; 2 Johns. 465; 7 Cow. 452; 10 Vt. 353; 11 F. E. 238. May exist in any part of the pleadin Rs. At common law was a fatal defect, reached by special demurrer; but not now so regarded: in the discretion of the court, tolerated for the fm-therance of justice.' See DiscLAiMEB, 4; Pleadino; Repugnant

The fault of pleading a double plea.

In pleading. That fault which consists in employing two or more distinct allegations or answers, where one is sufficient.* Steph. Plead. 261, 262. See Double Plea.

pleading. Duphcity, or double pleading, consists in alleging, for one single purpose or object, two or more distinct ds of complaints or defence,. when one of them would be as effectual in law, as both or all. This the common law does not allow, because it produces useless prolixity, and always tends to confusion, and to the multiplication of issues. Co. Litt. 304, a; Finch’s Law, 393; 3 Bl. Com. 311; Bac. Ab. Pleas, K 1. Duplicity may be in the declaration, or the subsequent proceedings. Duplicity in the declaration consists in joining, in one and the same count, different grounds of action, of different natures. Cro. Car. 20; or of the same nature, 2 Co. 4 a; 1 Saund. 58, n. 1; 2 Ventr. 198; Steph. Pl. 266;-to enforce only a single right of recovery. This is a fault in pleading, only because it tends to useless prolixity and confusion, and is, therefore, only a fault to Lord Coke, ‘to pleas perpetual or peremptory, and not to pleas dilatory; for in their time and place a man. may use divers of them.” Co. Litt. 304, a. But by this is not meant that any dilatory plea may be double, or, in other words, that it may consist of different matters, or answers to one and the same thing; but merely, that as there are several kinds or classes of dilatory pleas, having distinct offices or effects, a defendant may use “ divers of them” successively, (each being in itself single,) in their proper order. Steph. Pl. App. note 56. The inconveniences which were felt in consequence of this strictness were remedied by the statute 4 Ann, c. 16,8. 4, which provides that “it shall be lawful, for any defendant, or tenant in any action or suit, or for any plaintiff in replevin, in any court of record, with leave of the court to plead as many several matters thereto as he shall think necessary for his defence.” This provision, or a similar one is in force probably im most of the states of the American Union. Under this statute, the defendant may, with leave of court, plead as many different pleas in bar, (each being in itself single,) as he may think proper;: but although this statute allows the defendant to plead several distinct and substantive matters of defence, in several distinct pleas, to the whole, or one and the same part of the plaintiff’s demand; yet, it does not authorise him to allege more than one ground of defence in one plea. Each plea must still be single, as by the rules of the common law. Lawes, Pl. 131; 1 Chit. Pl. 512. This statute extends only to pleas to the declaration, and does not embrace replications, rejoinders, or any of the subsequent pleadings. Lawes, Pl. 132; 2 Chit. rally; 1 Chit. Pl. 230, 512; Steph. Pl. c. 2, s. 8, rule 1; Gould on Pi. c. 8, p. 1; Archb. Civ. Pl. 191; Doct. Pl. 222; 5 one 240; 8 Vin. Ab. 183. DYVOUR in the ‘Scotch law, is a bankrupt.