Entire

That which is not divided; that which is whole. When a contract is entire, it must, in general, be fully performed before the party can claim the compensation which was to have been paid to him; for example, when a man hires to serve another for one year, he will not be entitled to leave him at any time before the end of the year, and claim compensation for the time unless it be done by the consent or default of the party hiring; Hair v. Bell, 6 Vt. 35; Stark v. Parker, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 267, 13 Am. Dec. 425; Mc Clure v. Pyatt, 4 Mc Cord (S. C.) 26; Byrd v. Boyd, 4 Mc Cord (S. C.) 246, 17 Am. Dec. 740; Rounds v. Baxter, 4 Greenl. (Me.) 454; Hoar v. Clute, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 224; Watkins v. Hodges, 6 H. & J. (Md.) 38. See Olmstead v. Bach, 78 Md. 132, 27 Atl. 501, 22 L. R. A. 74, 44 Am. St. Rep. 273. A contract is entire if the consideration be single and eutire, notwithstanding the subject of the contract consists of several distinct items; 2 Pars. Cont. 517. See Divisible. An entire day is an undivided day, from midnight to midnight; Robertson v. State, 43 Ala. 325; Haines v. State, 7 Tex. App. 30; Lawrence v. State, 7 Tex. App. 192. The words "entire use, benefit," etc., in a trust deed for the benefit of a married woman, have been construed as equivalent to "sole and separate use"; Hcathman v. Hall, 38 N. C. 414. Entire tenancy "is contrary to several tenancy, signifying a sole possession in one man, whereas the other signifieth joint or common in more." Co well.

Whole; without division, separation or diminution.

— Entire contract. See Contract.

— Entire day. This phrase signifies an undivided day, not parts of two days. An entire day must have a legal, fixed, precise time to begin, and a fixed, precise time to-end. A day, in contemplation of law, comprises all the twenty-four hours, beginning and ending at twelve o'clock at night. Robertson v. State. 43 Ala. 325. In a statute requiring the closing of all liquor saloons during "the entire day of any election," etc., this phrase means the natural day of twenty-four hours, commencing and terminating at midnight. Haines v. State, 7 Tex. App. 30.

— Entire interest. The whole interest or right, without diminution. Where a person in selling his tract of land sells also his entire interest in all improvements upon public land adjacent thereto, this vests in the purchaser only a quitclaim of his interest in the improvements. McLeroy v. Duckworth, 13 La. Ann. court, appeal 410.

— Entire tenancy. A sole possession by one person, called "severalty," which is contrary to several tenancy, where a joint or common possession is in one or more.

— Entire use, benefit, etc. These words in the habendum of a trust-deed for the benefit of a married woman are equivalent to the words "sole use," or "sole and separate use," and consequently her husband takes nothing under such deed. Heathman v. Hall, 38 N. Cl 414.

1. fr. Entire; whole. Entier

Whole; without division, separation, or diminution.

Untouched: complete; unbroken, whole; undivided, indivisible, inseverable: as, an entire — consideration, covenant, contract, 3 g. v. See Separable. An entire claim arising out of one transaction, contract or tort, cannot be divided into separate and distinct claims. A verdict for one portion will bar an action on another.* See Damages; Multipucity. Entirely. " Entirely ^tisfied " implies a flrih and thorough assent of the mind and judgment to the truth "of a proposition; and this may exist, notwithstanding a possibility that the fact may be otherwise.' Entirety. The whole, as opposed to a moiety. ' If an estate in fee be given to a man and his wife, they are neither properly jointtenants, nor tenants in common; for, being one person in law, they cannot take the estate by moieties, but both are seized of the entirety, — the oo Qsequence of which is, that neither can dispose of any part without the assent of the other, but the whole must remain to the survivof.s The right, at common law, to control the possession of the estate during their joint liv^s is in the husband. Subject to the limitation that neither can defeat the right of the survivor to the whole estate, the husband has such rights as are incident to his own property, and which he acquires in her realty. Having the usufruct of all her realty interests, by th» weight of authority he may lease the estate during coverture. Statutes enab Ung;narried women to hold and dispose of their property as if sole do not affect this species of estate, unless expressly so stated.' The survivor does not take as a new acquisition, but under the original limitation, his (or her) estate being simply freed from participation by the other; so that 1 Muir V. Keay, L. E., 10 Q. B. 597-98 (1875). ° Terry v. Brighton Aquarium Co., L. R.p 10 Q. B. 306 (1875). See Howes v. Board of Eevenue, 1 Ex. Div. 385 (1876). « See 2 Pars. Contr. 517. * Phillips V. Berick, 16 Johns. 136 (1819). » People V. Phipps, 39 Cal. 335 (1870). if, for instance, the wife survives and then dies, her heirs would take to the exclusion of the heirs of the husband. Nor can partition be made of the estate. During coverture the husband has control of the estate. Upon his death, the wife, or her heir, may enter without action against his alienee— by 32 Hen. Vin (1541), c. 28, which is in force in Kentucky, Massachusetts, Tennessee, and possibly in New Tork and New Jersey. Divorce of the wife from the husband restores her to her moiety. A grant or devise to them and another invests them with an entirety in one-half only. It is always competent, however, to make husband and wife tenants in common by proper words. The law of the States is not uniform on the subject.*