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Excepta Dignitate Regali

Defined in 1 dictionary — Burrill (1850)

A New Law Dictionary and Glossary

Alexander M. Burrill · 1850

Lat. Saving the royal dignity. 1 Bl, Com. 205. 67 EXCfiPTlO. Lat. [from empere, to eicept or take out.] In the Roman law. An exception.

In a general sense, — a judicial allegation opposed by a defendant to the plaintiff's action; {judicialis quadarn ailegatio reo eompetens adversus aciiO' nem.) Calv. Lex. Jur, citing Hotoman. — A stop or stay to an action opposed by the defendant. Cowell. Hallifax Anal. b. 3, ch. 6. Answering to the defence or plea of the common law. — An allegation and de« fence of a defendant by which the plaintiff's claim or complaint is defeated, either according to strict law, or upon grounds of equity; {omnis rei ailegatio ac defensio, qua inteniio actoris vel ipso jure, vel ob cequitatern eliditur.) Heinecc. Elem. Jur. Civ, lib. 4, tit. 13, § 1277.

In a stricter sense, — ^the exclusion of an action that lay in strict law, on grounds of equity, (actianis jure stricto competentis ob cequitatem exclusio.) Heinecc, El, J, 0. ub. sup. — A kind of limitation of an action, by which it was shown that the action though otherwise just, did not lie in the particular case. Calv, Lex. Jur, citing Goeddceus de Verb, Signif, — A species of defence allowed in cases where, though the action, as brought by the plaintiff was in itself just; yet it was unjust as against the particular party sued, {licet ipsa persecutio, qud actor experitur, justa sity tamen iniqua sit adversus eum cum quo agitur.) Inst 4. 13. pr. — A mode of defence to an action, consisting of facts, which although they did not, ipso jure, destroy the right of action, served to protect the defendant upon equitable grounds.* Thus, if a person, upder the influence of fear, deception or mistake, made a promise to another which he ought not to have made, he was nevertheless bound according to the law, {jure civili, that is according to the strict rule of law,) to fulfil such promise, and was liable to an action to enforce it; but as it was unjust that he should be condemned, he was allowed to plead the facts of the case by way of exc^' turn, so as to defeat the acdon, {ad impug^ nandam actionem.) Inst. 4. 13. 1. The exception in these cases was called ezceptio metds causa, exceptio doli mali, &c. Id. Und. See Dig. 44. 1 <fe 4. 1 Mackeld. Civ, Law, 207, § 204. Id. 209, § 206, and note. These exceptions of the Roman law were originally exceptions, in the literal meaning of the term, that is, they were allowed by the praetor on the ground that the facts of the particular case constituted, in equity, an exception to the general rule of law, of which the defendant might avail himself.* 1 Mackeld, Civ. Law, nb, $up. In the time of Justinian, however, they had lost this original signification; nor has this sense of exceptio been revived in modern times. And yet it may be remarked that the whole of the modem system of equitable relief is essentially a system of exception. One of the most eminent of American statesmen and jurists has observed that the great and primary use of a court of equity is to give relief in extraordinary cases, which are exceptions to general rules; and that, though the principles by which that relief is governed are now reduced to a regular system, it is not the less true that they are, in the main, applicable to special circumstances, which form exceptioriH to general rules. Federalist, No. 83, by Hamilton.