expropriation

Compulsorily depriving a person of a right of property belonging to him in return for a compensation. The term has been introduced from its use in foreign countries to denote a compulsory purchase of land, etc., for the purposes of a railway, canal, or the like. "Expropriation pour cause d'utilite publique." Id.; 1 App. Cas. 384. EXPULSION (Lat. expellere, to drive out). The act of depriving a member of a body politic or corporate, or of a society, of his right of membership therein, by the vote of such body or society, for some violation of his duties as such, or for some offense which renders him unworthy of longer remaining a member of the same. It is sometimes loosely used in the sense of "eject." The term is ordinarily applied only to voluntary associations and public bodies, "disfranchisement" (q. v.) being the appro-

A taking of private property for public use upon providing compensation. Brownsville v. Pavazos, 2 Woods 293, Fed. Cas. No. 2,043. It corresponds to the right of eminent domain in our law. In Louisiana expropriation is used as is taking under eminent domain in most of the other states. In England "compulsory purchase" is used; Halsbury, Laws of England. In French Law. The compulsory realization of a debt by the creditor out of the lands of a debtor, or the usufruct thereof; confined first to lands (if any) in hypothgquc, EXPULSION (Lat. expellere, to drive out). The act of depriving a member of a body politic or corporate, or of a society, of his right of membership therein, by the vote of such body or society, for some violation of his duties as such, or for some offence which renders him unworthy of longer remaining a member of the same. By the constitution of the United States, art. 1, s. 5, § 2, each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member. In the case of John Smith, a senator from Ohio, who was expelled from the senate in 1807, the committee made a report which embraces the following points: First. That the senate may expel a member for a high misdemeanor, such as a conspiracy to commit treason. Its authority is not confined to an act done in its presence. Second. That a previous conviction is not requisite in order to authorize the senate to expel a member from their body for a high offence against the United States. Third. That although a bill of indictment against a party for treason and misdemeanor has been abandoned, because a previous indictment against the principal party had terminated in an acquittal, owing to the inadmissibility of the evidence upon that indictment, yet the senate may examine the evidence for themselves, and if it be sufficient to satisfy their minds that the party is guilty of a high misdemeanor it is sufficient ground of expulsion. Fourth. That the fifth and sixth articles of the amendments of the constitution of the United States, containing the general rights and privileges of the citizens as to criminal prosecutions, refer only to prosecutions at law, and do not affect the jurisdiction of the senate as to expulsion. Fifth. That before a committee of the senate, appointed to report an opinion relative to the honor and privileges of the senate, and the facts respecting the conduct of the member implicated, such member is not entitled to be heard in his defence by counsel, to have compulsory process for witnesses, or to be confronted with his accusers. It is before the senate that the member charged is entitled to be heard. Sixth. In determining on expulsion the senate is not bound by the forms of judicial proceedings or the rules of judicial evidence; nor, it seems, is the same degree of proof essential which is required to convict of a crime. The power of expulsion must, in its nature, be discretionary, and its exercise of a more summary character. 1 Hall,.Law Journ. 459, 465; Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. (U. S.) 204, 5 L. Ed. 242; Cooley, Const. Lim. 162. Corporations have the right of expulsion in certain cases, as such power is necessary to the good order and government of corporate bodies; and the cases in which the inherent power may be exercised are classified by Lord Mansfield as follows: 1. When an offence is committed which has no immediate relation to a member's corporate duty, but is of so infamous a nature as to render him unfit for the society of honest men; such as the offences of perjury, forgery, and the like. But before an expulsion is made for a cause of this kind it is necessary that there should be a previous conviction by a jury according to the law of the land. 2. When the offence is against his duty as a corporator, in which case he may be expelled on trial and conviction before the rator, and also indictable by the law of the land; 1 Burr. 517; Diligent Fire Co. v. Com., 75 Pa. 291; Evans v. Philadelphia Club, 50 Pa. 107; Gregg v. Medical Society, 111 Mass. 185, 15 Am. Rep. 27. The decisions of any kind of a voluntary association in admitting, disciplining, suspending or expelling members are of a quasijudicial character; the courts will not interfere in such cases except to ascertain whether or not the proceeding was pursuant to the rules of the society, in good faith, and not in violation of the law of the land. If so found, the proceeding is conclusive, like that of a judicial proceeding; Connelly v. Masonic Ass'n, 58 Conn. 552, 20 Atl. 671, 0

This word properly denotes a voluntary surrender of rights or claims; the act of divesting oneself of that which was previously claimed as one's own or renouncing it. In this sense it is the opposite of "appropriation." But a meaning has been attached to the term, imported from its use in foreign jurlsprudence, which makes it synonymous with the exercise of the power of eminent domain, i. e., the compulsory taking from a person, on compensation made, of his private property for the use of a railroad, canal or other public work.

In French law. Expropriation is the compulsory realization of a debt by the creditor out of the lands of his debtor, or the usufruct thereof. When the debtor is cotenant with others, it is necessary that a partition should first be made. It ls confined, in the first place, to the lands (if any) that are in hypotMque, but' afterwards extends to the lands not in hypotMque. Moreover, the debt must be of a liquidated amount. Brown.

‘This word properly denotes a voluntary surrender of rights orclaims; the act of divesting oneself of that which was previously claimed as one’s own, or renouncing it. In this sense it is the opposite of “appropriation.” But a meaning has been attached tothe term, imported from its use in foreign jurisprudence, which makes it synonymous with the exercise of the power of eminent domain, @% e¢, the compulsory taking froma person, on compensation made, of his private property for the use of a railroad, canal, or other public work.

In French law. Expropriation is the eompulsory realization of a debt by the creditor out of the lands of his debter, or the usufruct thereof. When the debtor is co-tenant first place, to the lands (if any) that are in hypotheque, but afterwards extends to the lands not in f Aypothtque. Moreover, the debt must be ofa liquidated amount. Brown.