extradition

the surrender by one nation to another .

(Lat. ex, from, traditio, handing over). The surrender by one sovereign state to another, on its demand, of persons charged with the commission of crime within its jurisdiction, that they may be dealt with according to its laws; the surrender of persons by one federal state to another, on its demand, pursuant to their federal constitution and laws. Without treaty stipulations. Public jurists are not agreed as to whether extradition, independent of treaty stipulations, is a matter of imperative duty or of discretion merely. Some have maintained the doctrine that the obligation to surrender fugitive criminals is perfect, and the duty of fulfilling it is, therefore, imperative, especially where the crimes of which they are accused affected the peace and safety of the state; but others regard the obligation as imperfect in its nature, and a refusal to surrender such fugitives as affording no ground of offence. Of the former opinion are Grotius, Heineccius, Burlamaqui, Vattel, Rutherforth, Schmelzing, and Kent; the latter opinion is maintained by Puffendorf, Voet, Martens, Kliiber, Leyser, Kluit, Saalfeld, Schmaltz, Mittermeyer, Heffter, and Wheaton. Except under the provisions of treaties, the delivery by one country to another of fugitives from justice is a matter of comity, not of obligation; TJ. S. v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 7 Sup. Ct. 234, 30 L. Ed. 425. Many nations have practised extradition without treaty engagements to that effect, States has always declined to surrender criminals unless bound by treaty to do so; 1 Kent 39 n.; 1 Opin. Attys. Gen. 511; 6 id. 85, 431; People v. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 321, 10 Am. Rep. 483; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet (U. S.) 540, 10 L. Ed. 579; Ex parte Holmes, 12 Vt. 631. The existence of an extradition treaty does not prohibit the surrender by either country of a person charged with a crime not enumerated in the treaty; Ex parte Foss, 102 Cal. 347, 36 Pac. 669, 25 L. R. A. 593, 41 Am. St. Rep. 182. No state has an absolute right to demand of another the delivery of a fugitive criminal, though it has what is called an imperfect right, but a refusal to deliver the criminal is no just cause of war. Per Tilghman, C. J., in Com. v. Deacon, 10 S. & R. (Pa.) 125. Under treaty stipulations. Tbe sovereignty of the United States, as it respects foreign states, being vested by the constitution in the federal government, it appertains to it exclusively to perform the duties of extradition which, by treaties, it may assume; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 540, 10 L. Ed. 579; U. S. v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 7 Sup. Ct. 234, 30 L. Ed. 425; and, to enable the executive to discharge such duties, congress passed the acts of Aug. 12, 1848, July 12, 1889, and June 6, 1900. The general government alone has the power to enact laws for the extradition of foreign criminals. It possesses that power under the treaty power in the constitution; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 540, 10 L. Ed. 579; People v. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 321, 10 Am. Rep. 483; In re De Giacomo, 12 Blatch. 391, Fed. Cas. 3,747. While a violation of an extradition treaty with Italy might render the treaty denounceable by the United States, it does not render it void and of no effect. The refusal of Italy to surrender its nationals has not had the effect of abrogating the treaty but of merely placing the government in the position of having the right to denounce it; Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U. S. 447, 33 Sup. Ct. 945, 57 L. Ed.. In the absence of a treaty, it has been said the president has no power as well as no duty to surrender a fugitive; Ex parte Mc Cabe, 46 Fed. 363, 12 L. R. A. 589. As to whether congress has this power was said in Neely v. Henkel, 180 U. S. 109, 21 Sup. Ct. 302, 45 L. Ed. 448, to be an undecided question. It was there said to be competent for congress to enforce or give efficacy to the provisions of the treaty between the U. S. and Spain with respect to Cuba, and that the act of June 6, 1900, providing for the extradition of criminals in certain cases "to foreign countries or territories" occupied by or under the control of the United States was constitutional. See 14 Harv. L. Rev. 607. mutual surrender of persons charged with certain crimes. These treaties may be found in full in the United States Statutes at Large, in 2 Moore on Extradition 1072; I laswell, Treaties, etc., U. S.; see 4 Moore, Int. L. Dig. The United States interstate extradition laws extend to Porto Rico; People v. Bingham, 211 U. S. 4GS, 29 Sup. Ct. 190, 53 L. Ed. 28G; and to any portion of the country not within the limits of a state, but organized under the laws of congress, with an executive, legislative and judicial system of its own; In re Lane, 135 U. S. 443, 10 Sup. Ct. 7G0, 34 L. Ed. 219; this does not include the Cherokee Nation; Ex parte Morgan, 20 Fed. 298, approved in People v. Bingham, 211 U. S. 4G8, 29 Sup. Ct. 190, 53 L. Ed. 28G; nor (at that time) Oklahoma; In re Lane, 135 U. S. 443, 10 Sup. Ct. 7G0, 34 L. Ed. 219. The general principle of international law is that in all cases of extradition the act done on account of which extradition is demanded must be considered a crime by both countries. For nearly all crimes, the laws of the states, and not the enactments of congress, must be looked to for the definition of the offence; Wright v. Ilcnkel, 190 U. S. 40, 23 Sup. Ct. 781, 47 L. Ed. 94S; Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U. S. 210, 24 Sup. Ct. 057, 48 L. Ed. 938. Where a British fugitive was demanded in New York, and the British and New York statutes both covered the publication of fraudulent statements by corporate officers, it was held that the two statutes were substantially analogous under an extradition treaty relating to fraud by corporate officers; Wright v. Henkel, 190 U. S. 40, 23 Sup. Ct. 781, 47 L. Ed. 94S. In the construction and carrying out of such treaties, the ordinary technicalities of criminal proceedings are applicable only to a limited extent. Proceedings for surrender simply demand of the accused that he shall do what all good citizens are required and ought to be willing to do, viz. submit themselves to the law of their country. Care should be taken that the treaty be not made a pretext for collecting private debts, wreaking individual malice, or forcing the surrender of political offenders; but where the proceeding is manifestly taken in good faith, a technical non-compliance with some formality should not be allowed to stand in the way of a faithful discharge of our obligations; Grin v. Shine, 187 U. S. 181, 23 Sup. Ct 98, 47 L. Ed. 130. When a person is held in custody as a fugitive from justice under an extradition warrant in proper form and showing upon its face all that is required by law to be shown. he should not be discharged from custody until it is made clearly to appear that he is not a fugitive from justice within the meaning of the constitution and laws of the Unit- Sup. Ct. 58, 52 L. Ed. 121; Ex parte Massee, 95 S. C. 315, 79 S. E. 97. The extradition act of Canada pr that a pi -i.11 be surrendered only upou such evido riminality as would, under the Canadian law, justify his committal for trial if the crime had been com: in Canada. Canadian law should determine whether the act alleged constituti the extradition crimes; 6 P.. & S. '<-'!; 4 V.

Delivery from one nation or state to another of a fugitive from justice, in pursuance of a law or treaty.

The surrender of a criminal by a foreign state to which he has fled for refuge from prosecution to the state within whose jurisdiction the crime was committed, upon the demand of the latter state, in order that he may be dealt with according to its laws. Extradition may be accorded as a mere matter of comity, or may take place under treaty stipulations between the two nations. It also obtains as between the different states of the American Union. Extradition between the states must be considered and defined to be a political duty of imperfect obligation, founded upon compact, and requiring each state to surrender one who, having violated the criminal laws of another state, has fled from its justice, and is found in the state from which he is demanded, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled. Abbott.

[from ex, from or out of, and traditio, a delivery.] Delivery from one nation or state to another. Particularly applied to the delivery by one nation or state to another, of fugitives from justice, in pursuance of a law or treaty. Webster. Lewis' U. S. Crim. Law, 241, et seq.