fugitive from justice

the criminal need not do within the state every act necessary to complete the crime. If he does there an overt act which is and is intended to be a material step toward accomplishing the crime, and then absents himself from the state and does the rest elsewhere, he becomes a fugitive from justice when the crime is complete, if not before. For all that is necessary to convert a criminal under the laws of a state into a fugitive from justice is that he should have left the state after having incurred guilt there.

One who, having committed a crime, flees from the jurisdiction within which it was committed, without waiting to abide the consequences of such crime. All that is necessary is that the person shall be found in a state other than that in which he committed the crime; it being immaterial whether he left the latter state with intent to escape punishment. 106 Mass. 227; 116 U. S. 80.

One who, having committed a crime, flees from the jurisdiction within which it was committed, to escape punishment. In the absence of direct evidence on the question of flight, if it appear from the indictment or affidavit produced that the crime charged is atrocious in its nature, was recently committed, and the prosecution promptly Instituted, the unexplained presence of the accused in another state immediately after the commission of the crime ought perhaps to be regarded as prima facie evidence of flight, sufficient, at least, to warrant an order of arrest. The order of surrender is not required, by the act of congress, to he made at the same time with the order of arrest, and time, therefore, can be taken, in doubtful cases, after the accused is arrested and secured, to hear proofs to establish or rebut such prima fade evidence; 6 Am. Jur. 226; 7 Bost. Law Rep. 386. One convicted of a crime, who when called for sentence is found in another state, is a fugitive from justice; Hughes v. Pflanz, 138 Fed. 980, 71 C. C. A. 234. The accused person may be arrested to await a demand; Ex parte Cubreth, 49 Cal. 436; but he cannot be surrendered before a surrendered and returned to the state from which the requisition came, this Is not a ground of discharge then; In re Dow, 18 Pa. 39. The surrender of the accused must bo made to an agent of the executive authority of the demanding state, duly appointed to receive the fugitive. The proceedings of the executive authorities are subject to be reviewed on habeas corpus by the judicial power, and if found void the prisoner may be discharged; Ex parte Smith, 3 McI.Kian 121, Fed. Cas. No. 12,- 968; In re Fetter, 23 N. J. L. 311, 57 Am. Dec. 382; Ex parte Thornton, 9 Tex. 635; Ex parte White, 49 Cal. 434; Kingsbury’s Case, 106 Mass. 223; People v. Brady, 56 N. Y. 182; In re Cook, 49 Fed. 833. But the courts have no jurisdiction to comi>el the executive to comply with a requisition; Kentucky V. Dennison, 24 How. (U. S.) 66, 16 L. Ed. 717; Ex parte Manchester, 5 Cal. 237. Nor have the federal courts such jurisdiction; Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 'How. (U. S.) 66, 16 L. Ed. 717. Nor will the court on habeas corpus try the validity of the indictment under which he is charged; Ex parte Pearce,.32 Tex. Cr. B. 301, 23 S. W. 15. See Extbadition.

A person who, having committed a crime, flies from the state or country where it transpired, in order to evade arrest and escape justice. Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 6 Sup. Ct. 291, 29 L. Ed. 541; State v. Hall, 115 N. O. 811, 20 S. E. 729, 28 L R. A. 289, 44 Am. St. Rep. 501; In re Voorhees, 32 N. J. Law, 150; State v. Clough, 71 N. H. 594, 53 Atl. 1086, 67 L IU A. 946; People v. Hyatt, 172 N. Y. 176, 64 N. E. 825, 60 In R. A. 774, 92 Am. St. Rep. 706.

Defined under Fugitive in Black's Law Dictionary.

A person who, having committed a crime, flies from the state or country where it transpired, in order to evade arrest and escape justice.