G C.P

437. The principle of the exclusion of such admissions, whether verbal or documentary, therefore, seems to rest on the fact that there is some matter in controversy or some claim by one person against the other for the settlement or adjustment of which the communication is made, and that in furtherance of the maxim, "Interest respublicce ut sit finis litium," it is for the public good that communications having that end in view should not be allowed to prejudice either party in the event of their proving abortive. It is not necessary that such communications should be expressly guarded if they manifestly appear to have been made by way of compromise; 2 C. & K. 24; such admissions or negotiations are inadmissible whether made "without prejudice" or not; Reynolds v. Manning, 15 Md. 510; Frick & Co. v. Wilson, 36 S. C. 65, 15 S. B. 331; Emery v. Real Estate Exch., 88 Ga. 321, 14 S. B. 556; Smith v. Satterlee, 130 N. Y. 677, 29 N. E. 525; 2 "Whart. Ev. § 1090; but see Chaff e v. Mackenzie, 43 La. Ann. 1062, 10 South. 369; Hood v. Tyner, 3 Ind. App. 51, 28 N. E. 1033; Thom v. Hess, 51 111. App. 274. Where a letter opening negotiations for a compromise, but not stated to be without prejudice, was followed a day or two afterwards by another guarding against prejudice, it was held that the whole correspondence was thereby protected; 26 W. R. 109, and Gurney, B., refused to receive In evidence a letter written "without prejudice," even in favor of the party who had written it, saying, "If you write without prejudice so as not to bind yourself, you cannot use the letter against the other party;" 8 C. & P. 388. And evidence of plaintiff tbat offers of compromise were made by bim is inadmissible; York v. Conde, 66 Hun 316, 20 N. Y. Supp. 961. And negotiations between parties for the purpose of clearing title to land and compromising differences will not prejudice the rights of either party; Hand v. Swann, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 241, 21 S. W. 282. Correspondence of this kind is not only inadmissible as evidence at the trial of the action, but it has also been held to be privileged from production for the purpose of discovery; 11 Beav. Ill; 15 id. 321, 388. Romilly, M. R., in the last of these cases, stated the rule very much in the same way as did Tindal, C. J., supra; he said: "Such communications made with a view of an amicable arrangement ought to be held very sacred, for if parties were to be afterwards prejudiced by their efforts to compromise, it would be impossible to attempt an amicable arrangement of differences." When a correspondence for a settlement had commenced "without prejudice" but those words were afterwards dropped, it was immaterial; 6 Ont. 719. The same principle is applied where the cause of action is other than a debt, as in a bastardy proceeding, where offers of comv. Peterson, 33 Neb. 358, 50 N. W. 155; East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. Co. v. Davis, 91 Ala. 615, 8 South. 349; Carey v. Carey, 108 N. C. 267, 12 S. E. 1038; nor does the payment of a certain sum on a claim for a much larger sum constitute a recognition of a legal liability to make further payments on such claim; Camp v. U. S., 113 U. S. 648, 5 Sup. Ct. 6S7, 28 L,. Ed. 1081; but where offers of compromise are made to a third person, who has no authority to settle the claim, and there is no intimation that they were made "without prejudice" or in confidence, they are admissible in evidence; Moore v. Mfg. Co., 113 Mo. 98, 20 S. W. 975; a statement made by one of several defendants to his codefendants, advocating the settlement of plaintiff's claims is not within the rule excluding offers made for the purpose of compromise, but is competent as an admission of liability; Smith v. Whittier, 95 Cal. 279, 30 Pac. 529; and evidence of the admission of an independent fact, although made during a negotiation tending towards a compromise, is admissible; Hess v. Van Auken, 11 Misc. 422, 32 N. Y. Supp. 126; Durgin v. Somers, 117 Mass. 55. In a prosecution for rape, evidence that defendant had offered money to the foster father of prosecutrix to stop criminal proceedings was incompetent, Sanders v. State, 148 Ala. 603, 41 South. 466. The extent of the protection which may be invoked by the use of the word "without prejudice" is limited to the purposes contemplated by the rule as stated and will not be extended to exclude evidence of communications, which from their character may prejudice the person to whom it is addressed if he should reject the offer; 62 L. J. Rep. Q. B. 511; nor a letter which is intended to be used by the party writing it; the words protect both parties from its use, but if the writer declare that he will use it, from that moment it loses its privileged character; 29 U. C. Q. B. 136. Such communications, when the negotiation is successful and a compromise is agreed to, are admissible both for the purpose of showing the terms of the compromise and enforcing it; 6 Ont. 719; and also in order to account for lapse of time; 15 Beav. 388; L. R. 23 Q. B. Div. 38. But whether verbal or written, such communications cannot be regarded for the purpose of determining the question of costs; 58 L. J. Rep. Q. B. 501. In this well considered case, the English court of appeal established the rule contrary to what had been in some previous cases thought proper. See 2 Dr. & Sm. 29; 1 Jur. N. S. 899. As to a compromise on a mistaken interpretation of a will, see [1905] 1 Ch. 704. See Accokd and Satisfaction. In Civil Law. An agreement between two or more persons, who, wishing to settle their disputes, refer the matter in controversy to arbitrators, who are so called because those who choose them give them full powers to arbitrate and decide what shall appear just and reasonable, to put an end to the differences of which they are made the judges. 1 Domat, Lois, Civ. liv. 1, t. 14. COMPTE ARRETE (Fr.). An account statis stated. Chevalier v. Hyanis, 9 La. Ann. • 485.