gift

A gift in the statutory sense, on the other hand, proceeds from a 'detached and disinterested generosity' ... 'out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses.' And in this regard, the most critical consideration ... is the transferor's 'intention.' ... if the payment proceeds primarily from 'the constraining force of any moral or legal duty,' or from 'the incentive of anticipated benefit' of an economic nature ... it is not a gift.

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A voluntary conveyance; that is, a conveyance not founded on the consideration of money or blood. The word denotes rather the motive of the conveyance, so that a feoffment or grant may be called a gift when gratuitous. A gift is of the same nature as a settlement, — neither denotes a form of assurance, but the nature of the transaction. Watk. Conv. (Preston Ed.) 199. The operative words of this conveyance are do, or dedi, — I give, or I have given. The maker of this instrument is called the donor, and he to whom it is made, the donee. 2 Bl. Comm. 316; Litt. 59; Shep. Touch, c. 11. Gifts inter vivos are gifts made from one or more persons, without any prospect of immediate death, to one or more others. Gifts causa mortis are gifts made in prospect of death, and on the implied condition that they shall be of no effect if the donor shall recover. 49 N. Y. 17. See "Donatio."

A voluntary conveyance or transfer of property; that is, one not founded on the consideration of money or blood. A voluntary, immediate and absolute transfer of property without consideration. Lewis’ Estate, 139 Pa. 640, 22 Atl. 635. As used by the old text writers. It signified a distinct species of deed, applicable to the creation of an estate tail; while a feoffment was strictly confined to the creation of a fee-simple estate. This use is almost obsolete; Wharton. It has been said that the word denotes rather the motive of the conveyance; so that a feoffment or grant may be called a gift when gratuitous. A gift is of the same nature as a settlement; neither denotes a form of assurance, but the nature of the transaction. Watk. Conv. 199. The operative words of this conveyance are do, or dedi — I give, or I have given. The maker of this instrument Is called the donor, and he to whom it is made, the donee, and Littleton 59;. Shepp. Touchst a 11; 2 Poll. 6 Maitl. 12, 81, 211. Gifts inter vivos are gifts made from one or more persons, without any prospect of Immediate death, to one or more others. Gifts mortis causa are gifts made in prospect of death. Gifts inter vivos have no reference to the future, and go into immediate and absolute effect; 2 Kent 439; no further act of the parties is needed to give them effect; Robson V. Jones, 3 Del. Ch. 62. Delivery is essential. Without actual possession, the title does not pass. A mere Intention or naked promise to give, without some act to pass the property, is not a gift. There may be repentance (the locus paenitenticc) as long as the gift is incomplete in the mode of making it; 1 Pars. Contr. 245; Pearson v. Pearson, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 26; but see Poullaln v. Poullain, 79 Ga. 11, 4 S. E. 81, where it was held that a donatio inter vivos, as distinguished from a donatio mortis causa, does not require actual delivery, and that it is sufficient to complete a gift inter vivos that the conduct of the parties should show that the ownership of the chattels has been changed. Under a gift, a person “may take a benefit to accrue at a future day — it may be at the donor’s death; but this can be only through I the instrumentality of a trust created either in a third person or in the donor. The effect is to divest at once the former property of the donor in the thing given. Such a gift is no more immediate than in the ordinary case.’’ Robson v. Jones, 3 Del. Ch. 62. The subject of the gift must be certain; and there must be the mutual consent and concurrent will of both parties. There must be an intention on the part of the donor to make a gift; Thornt. Gifts & Adv. § 70, and expressions of it are admissible as part of the res gestce; 1 Wils. Ch. 212; In re Ward, 2 Redf. (N. Y.) 251; Booth v. Cornell, 2 Redf. (N. Y.) 261; Stevens v. Stevens, 2 Redf. (N. Y.) 265; Williams v. Guile, 117 N. Y. 343, 22 N. E. 1071, 6 L. R. A. 366; and also declarations of the donor prior to the gift; Smith,v. Maine, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 33;‘if followed up by proof of delivery; Larimore v. Wells, 29 Ohio St. 13; and subsequent to the gift to support it; Blalock v. Mlland, 87 Ga. 573, 13 S. E. 651; Scott v. Bank, 140 Mass. 157, 2 N. E. 925; but not to disapprove it; Baxter V. Knowles, 12 Allen (Mass.) 114. See Thornt. Gift § 222. Acceptance is also necessary; Peirce v. Burroughs, 58 N. H. 302; Nickerson v. Nickerson, 28 Md. 327; Thomas V. Thomas, 107 Mo. 459, 18 S. W. 27; and this is true under both the common and civil law; De Levlllaln v. Evans, 39 Cal. 120. It most be in the lifetime of the donor; Eskridge V. F&rrar, 84 La. Ann. 709; but it is presumed if the gift is of value; Thouvenln 290. Delivery must be according to the nature of the thing. It must be an actual delivery, so far as the subject Is capable of delivery. If the thing be not capable of actual delivery, there must be some act equivalent to it; something sufficient to work an immediate change in the dominion of the property; Gartslde v. Pahlman, 45 Mo. App. 160. The donor must part not only with the possession, but with, the dominion. If the thing given be a chose in action, the law requires an assignment or some equivalent instrument, and the transfer must be executed; 1 Swanst. 436; Picot v, Sanderson, 12 N. C. 309. Delivery first and gift afterwards of a chattel capable of delivery, is as effectual as gift first and delivery afterwards; 64 Law T. 645. The presumption of a resulting trust in favor of the donor arises where a conveyance has been made, without consideration, to one of an estate or other property which has been purchased with the money of another; but this presumption Is rebutted where the purchase may fairly be deemed to be made for another from motives of natural love and affection; Appeal of Roberts, 85 Pa. 84; Gardner v. Merritt, 32 Md. 78, 3 Am. Rep. 115. Knowledge by the donee that the gift has been made is not necessary; L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 104. The gift Is complete when the legal title has actually vested in the donee; 108 E. C. L. R. 435; and in cases of gifts by husband to wife, or parent to child living at home, the necessity for an actual change of possession does not exist; Appeal of Crawford, 61 Pa. 52, 100 Am. Dec. 609. A chose in action not negotiable and negotiable paper not endorsed may be the subject of a gift, and a delivery which vests in the donee the equitable title is sufficient without a compiete transfer of the legal title; First Nat. Bank of Richmond v. Holland, 99 Va. 495, 39 S. E. 120, 65 L. R. A. 1.55, 86 Am. St. Rep. 898; Basket v. Hassell, 107 U. S. 602, 2 Sup. Ct 415, 27 L. Ed. 500; Grover v. Grover, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 261, 35 Am. Dec. 319. Where a father gives money deposited in bank to his infant son, the gift will not be defeated by the failure of the father to deliver to the son the pass book evidencing the gift, the father as natural guardian being the proper custodian of such book during the infancy of the son; Beaver V. Beaver, 62 Hun 194, 16 N. Y, Supp. 476, 746. The instances here given are merely illustrative of the cases on the subject of the necessity of delivery, the number of which is almost witliout limit. The mere deposit by one in trust for another does not establish an irrevocable trust. It is a tentative trust, revocable at will, until the depositor dies or completes the gift during his lifetime; In re Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. B. 748, 70 L. R. A. 711, 1 Ann. Cas. 900, reversing id., 89 App. Div. 368, 85 387, 69 N. 1. 782, 101 Am. St Rep. 814; Cleveland v. Bank, 182 Mass, 110, 65 N. E. 27; Estate of Smith, 144 Pa. 428, 22 Atl. 916, 27 Am. St. Rep. 641; Rombo v. Pile, 220 Pa'. 235, 69 Atl. 807. See 14 Yale L. J. 315; Brady, Bank Deposits, The declaration of the depositor may make the trust valid; Merlgan v. Mc Gonigle, 205 Pa. 321, 64 Atl. 994. The retention of the pass book by the depositor does not rebut the idea of a trust; Bath Sav. Inst v. Ha thorn, 88 Me. 122, 33 Atl. 836, 32 L. R. A. 377, 51 Am. St. Rep. 382; Elstate of Gaffney, 146 Pa., 49, 23 Atl. 163: Robertson v. Mc Carty, 54 App. Div. 103, 66 N, Y. Supp. 327. But the delivery of the pass book will render the trust irrevocable; In re Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. E. 748, 70 L. R. A. 711, 1 Ann. Cas. 900.. Notice to the beneficiary may create a trust; but absence of notice does not establish conclusively that there was no trust; Bath Sav. Inst. v. Hathorn, 88 Me. 122, 33 Atl. 836, 32

A voluntary conveyance of land or transfer of goods, from one person to another, made gratuitously, and not upon any consideration of blood or money. 2 Bl. Comin. 440 ; 2 Steph. Comm. 102; 2 Kent, Comm. 437. And sce Ingram v. Colgan, 106 Cal. 113, 38 Pac. 315, 28 In R. A. 187, 46 Am. St. Rep. 221; Gray v. Barton, 55 N. Y. 72, 14 Am. Rep. 181; Wllliamson v. Johnson, 62 Vt 378, 20 Atl. 279, 9 L. R. A. 277, 22 Am. St Rep. 117; Flanders v. Blandy, 45 Ohio St 113,12 N. E. 321. A gift is a transfer of personal property, made voluntarily and without consideration. Civll Code Cal. § 1146. In popular language, a voluntary conveyance or assignment is called a "deed of glft." "Gift" and "advancement" are sometimes used interchangeably as expressive of the same operation. But, while an advancement is always a gift, a gift is very frequently not an advancement. In re Dewees' Estate, 3 Brewst (Pa.) 314.

In English law. A conveyance of lands In tall; a conveyance of an estate tall in which the operative words are "I give," or "I have given." 2 Bl. Comm. 316; 1 Steph. Comm. 473.
—Absolute gift, as distinguished from one made in contemplation of death, is one by which the donee becomes in the lifetime of the donor the absolute owner of the thing given, whereas a donatio morti causa leaves the whole title in the donor, unless the event occurs (the death of the donor) which is to divest him. Buecker v. Carr, 60 N. J. Eq. 300, 47 Atl. 34. As distinguished from a gift in trust, it is one where not Only the legal title but the beneficial ownership as well is vested in the donee. Watkina v. Bigelow, 93 Minn. 210, 10O N. W. 1104,

— Gift enterprise. A scheme for the division or distribution of certain articles of property, to be determined by chance, among those iyho have taken shares in the scheme. The phrase has attained such a notoriety as to justify a court in taking judicial notice of what is meant and understood by it. Lohman v. State, 81 Ind. 17; Lansburgh v. District of Columbia, 11 App. D. C. 524; State v. Shugart, 138 Ala. 86, 35 South. 28, i00 Am. St. Rep. 17; Winston v. Beeson, 135 N. C. 271, 47 S. E. 457. 65 L. R. A. 167.

A voluntary and gratuitous goods from one to another, not money or blood.

In English law. A conveyance of ' estate tail, in which the operative given.''

A voluntary conveyance of land, or transfer of goods, from one person to another, made gratuitously, and not upon any consideration of blood or money. 2 BL Comm. 410; 2 Steph. Comm. 102; 2 Kent, Comm. 437. A gift isa transfer of personal property, made voluntarily and without consideration. Civil Code Cal. § 1146. In popular language, a voluntary conveyance or assignment is called a “deed of gift." “Gift” and “advancement” are sometimes used interchangeably as expressive of the saine operation. But, while anadvancement is always a gift, a gift is very frequently not an advancement. 38 Brewst. 314.

In English law. A conveyance of lands in tail; a conveyance of an estate tail in which the operative words are “I give,” or “Thaye given.” 2 BI. Comm. 316; 1 Steph. Comm. 473.

See Give. The gratuitous transfer of personalty.' The trarigf er of property without consideration.* X^ The thing itself~-so transferred. An immediate, voluntary and gratuitous transfer of his personal property by one to another, the transfer being executed by delivery.5 A word of the largest signification, applied to either realty or personalty.^ As a general rule, delivery is essential.' A true and proper gift is always accompanied with delivery of possession — after which the gift is executed in the donee; and it is not in the donor's power to retract it, unless it be prejudicial to creditors, or the donor was under some legal incapacity, as, infancy, coverture, duress, or was imposed upon. H the gift does not take effect by immediate possession it is not properly a gift, but a contract.* A gift may be to a charity not in existence. See Charity, 2. To complete a gift of money in trust, it is not necessary that the beneficiary should be informed of the fact of the gift.* > [Baldwin v. Van Deusen, 37 N. Y. 492 (1868). « [Cox V. North Western Stage Co., 1 Idaho, 380 (1871), Whitson, J. •2B1. Com. 441. * Kehr v. Smith, 20 Wall. 34 (1873), Davis, J. See also Gray «. Barton, 65 N. T. 72 (1873); Chadsey, Administrator II. Lewis, 6 111. 155 (1844); Hynson v. Terry, 1 Ark. 87 (1833). As to the difference, in a liquor law, between " gift" and " sale," see Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 194, 197 (1859); Ho Uey v. State, 14 Tex. Ap. 512 (1883). s [Flanders v. Blandy, 45 Ohio St. 113 (1887), cases, Dickman, J.: 26 Am. Law Beg. 587-92 (1887), cases. In general, 19 Cent. Law J. 422-26 (1884), oases. « See Allen v. White, 97 Mass. 507 (1867). Where the local law does not forbid, the United States government may take property by gift.' A naked promise to give, without some act sufdcient to pass title, is not a gift,— a locus pcenitentioe exists.' See Advancement; Donatio; Dondm; Influbnob; Onerous; Possession; Presents, 2; Service, 3, Civil Service. Gift enterprise. In common parlance, a scheme for the division or distribution of certain articles of property,' to be determined by chance, among those who have taken shares in the scheme.^ See Game, 3. 2. At common law, also, the creation of an estate-tail.*

[L. Lat. donatio; L. Fr. dan, done.] A voluntary and gratuitous conveyance, or transfer of lands or goods from one to another, not founded on the consideration of money or blood.* 2 BL Com. 440. 2 Steph. Com. 102. 2 Kenfs Com. 437.

In English law. A conveyance of lands in tail; a conveyance of an estate tail m which the operative words are ** I give," {do,) or "I have given," (dedi.) 2 BL Com. 316. 1 Steph, Com. 473. SeeX>onatio, Done, In a general sense, a gift is the most comprehensive kind of transfer in law. The ancient conveyances of land in England were nearly all gifts. Bracton calls donatio, (gift) the most important and distinguished, as well as the most ordinary method by which property could be acquired. Inter alias causas acquisitionis magna, Celebris etfamosa est causa donationis, <fec. Quia per eam magis acquiritur et sapius quam per aliam, <&c. Bract, fol. 11. J give, (do,) is the term constantly employed by the same writer in his examples of the most free, large, and absolute kind of conveyance. Id. fol. 17. Gifts indeed at this time expressly included conveyances in fee simple, as well as fee tail. Donationum, qucedam absoluia et larga, et qucedam stricta et coarctata, sicut certis hceredibus. Id. fol..IL b. Afterwards, the term gift came to acquire the peculiar and technical meaning now appropriated to it in the English law of real estate, being restricted in its application to estates tail; the distinction being made between a gift in tail and a feoffment in fee. The latter conveyance however continued to be called a gift {donatio feudi,) and its aptest word was do, (I give,) or dedi, (I have given.) 2 BL Com. 316, 310. See Oraiuitmu.

conveyancing, is properly applied to the creation of an estate tail; as that of feoffment is to that of an estate in fee simple. It differs in nothing from a feoffment, but in the nature of the estate passing by it; and livery of seisin must be given to render it effectual. The operative words of this conveyance are do or dedi. The maker of this instrument is called the donor, and he to whom it is made, the donee. 2 BI. Com. 316; Litt.59; Touchs. ch. 11. oo