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guilty

Defined in 7 dictionaries — Case Law, Cyclopedic (1922), Ballentine's (1916), Bouvier (1914), Black's (1910), Black's (1891), Anderson (1889)

Definitions from Case Law

From 383 U.S. 392 - Perry v. Commerce Loan Co. · 1966Most cited · 460 citing opinions

the same thing when applied to general arrangements in § 366, to real property arrangements in § 472, and to compositions and extensions in § 656.

The Cyclopedic Law Dictionary

Walter A. Shumaker and George Foster Longsdorf; ed. James C. Cahill · 1922

The state or condition of a person who has committed a crime, misdemeanor, or offense. This word implies a malicious intent, and must be applied to something universally allowed to be a crime. Cowp. 275. In Pleading. A plea by which a defendant who is charged with a crime, misdemeanor, or tort admits or confesses it. In criminal proceedings, when the accused is arraigned, the clerk asks him, "How say you, A. B., are you guilty or not guilty?" His answer, which is given ore tenus, is called his "plea"; and when he admits the charge in the indictment, he answers or pleads "guilty."

Ballentine's Law Dictionary

James A. Ballentine · 1916

The plea of a defendant in a criminal prosecution who admits having committed the crime charged.

Bouvier's Law Dictionary and Concise Encyclopedia

John Bouvier; revised by Francis Rawle · 1914

The state or condition of a person who has committed a crime, misdemeanor, or offence. This word implies a malicious intent, and can only be applied to something universally allowed to be a crime. Cowp. 275. In Pleading. A plea by which a defendant who is charged with a crime, misdemeanor, or tort admits or confesses it. In criminal proceedings, when the accused is arraigned, the clerk asks him, “How say you, A. B., are you guilty or not guilty?’’ His answer, which is ^ven ore tenus, is called his plea; and when he admits the charge in the indictment, he answers or pleads guilty; otherwise, not guilty. See Culpbit; Abeaignment. A plea of guilty in a capital case shduld not be received unless the court is satisfied that “it is made by a person of complete intelligence, freely and voluntarily, and with full understanding of the nature and effect of the plea and of the facts upon which it is founded’*; Green v. Com., 12 Allen (Mass.) 166; in Henning v. People, 40 Mich. 733, a Judgment was affirmed when it appeared that the trial judge had had repeated interviews plea was made with every circumstance of fairness and deliberation. The subject is regulated by statute in Michigan and in Texas. In Coleman v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 404, 33 S. W. 1083, where the record stated that the defendant had pleaded guilty after being by the court fully warned of the consequences of such plea, the appellate court held that it did not sufficiently appear that the prisoner was considered sane by the court, or that he was uninfluenced by any fear, or by any persuasion or any hope of pardon, and that these matters should have been presented to the court and the findings made a part of the record. So also where the judgment recited that the defendant “had been duly and legally warned by the court. In open court, of the legal cons^uences” of such plea; Sanders v. State, 18 Tex. App. 372. See 22

Black's Law Dictionary

Henry Campbell Black, M.A. · 1910

Having committed a crime or tort; the word used by a prisoner in pleading to an indictment when he confesses the crime of which he is charged, and by the jury in convicting. Com. v. Walter, 83 Pa. 108, 24 Am. Rep. 154; Jessie v. State, 28 Miss. 103; State v. White, 25 Wis. 359.

A Dictionary of Law

Henry Campbell Black · 1891

Having committed a crime or tort; the word used by a prisoner in pleading to an indictment when he eonfesses the crime of which he is charged, and by the jury in convicting.

A Dictionary of Law

William C. Anderson · 1889

" 1. The state or condition of one who has committed a crime, a civil in- ' See Lamar v. Micou, 112 U. S. 463-70 (1884), cases; Boaz V. MUliken, 83 Ky. 638 (1886); Eyster's Appeal, 16 Pa. 372 (1851). = See Reeves, Dom. R. 311; Schouler, Dom. R. § 283; 1 Pars. Contr. 134-37; Lord v. Hough, 37 Cal. 600-69 (1869); 1 Johns. Ch. 109.. » Hudson V. Bishop, 32 F. R. 621 (1887). ' Curtis V. Murphy, 63 Wis. 6 (1885), cases. Cole, C. J. See also Russell v. Ryan, Sup. Ct. Del. (1886), Comegys, Chief Justice. » See Story, Bailm. § 477; 2 Pars. Contr. 160; Hancock (Mrs. Gen.) v. Rand, 94 N. Y. 5, 10 (1883), cases; Mc Daniels V. Robinson, 26 Vt. 330-M (1854), eases; Calye's Case, 1 Sm. L. C. 211-47, cases; Coggs v. Bernard, ib. 401-6, eases; 16 Ala. 666; 26 id. 377; 33 Cal. 657; 35 Conn. 183; 25 Iowa, 653; 53 Me. 163; 100 Mass. 495; 145 id. 244; 12 Mich. 52; S3 Mo. 547; 33 N. Y. 577; 61 id. 34; 36 Pa. jury, or a contempt of court. 2. As a plea, the judicial confession of a crime charged. Not guilty. A plea denying the commission of a crime or a tort. The plea of "not guilty" raises the general issue; it denies the whole indictment or declaration. In civil law, applicable in delicts sounding in trespass or case, for misfeasance or non-feasance, in ejectment, in garnishment, and in interpleader.^ When an accused person is arraigned (g. v,\ the clerk inquii-es: " How say you, A. B., are you guilty or not guilty? " His answer, which is recorded, constitutes his plea. If "not guilty," the trial proceeds. The plea waives objection to the complaint for misnomer or for neglect to add a place of residence.'' Where guilty knowledge is an ingredient of a crime, evidence of the commission of other Idndred offenses about the same time is admissible as tending to prove that ingredient. Many cases of fraud require the application of the same principle, — as fraud involves intent, and intent can be deduced only from a variety of circumstances. Collateral facts, each insufficient in itself, whose joint operation tends to support the charge, or to disprove it, are then receivable. ^ Where a statute prohibits an act being done, or being done under certain circumstances, without making knowledge or intent an in^edient in the offense, the person doing the act is bound at his peril to see that the circumstances are such as do not make it unlawful,* Jurors are not called to pass upon a defendant's innocence, but solely whether or not the State has proven beyond reasonable doubt an affirmative proposition, to wit, his guilt.* See Confession, 2; Convict; Crime; Doubt; Intent; Negligence;, Will, 1. Compare Culpa.