impair

the displacement of some portion of a statute or its preclusion in certain contexts." Id., at 14.

To weaken; to affect injuriously; to diminish.

To make worse: to diminish in quantity, value, excellence, strength; to lessen in power; to deteriorate.' To relax, weaken, injure. Impair liealth. See Intemperate. " No state shall... pass any.. Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." ' 1 See Thompson v. Gibson.. 8 M. & W. *286-89 (1841'); Mc Lure v. Colclough, 17 Ala. 100 (1849); Gaddis ads. Howell, 31 N. J. L. 316 (1865); Lockwood v. Middlesex Mut. Assur. Co., 47 Conn. 560-08 (1880), cases; 11 F. E. S55; 44 Ind. 460; 51 Md. 512; 14 Neb. 151-53; 20 Barb. 468; 29 Pa. 198; 40 id. S89; 75 id. 378; 43 Wis. 318, 479; 62 id. 244; 5 Biss. 476; 43 111. 155; 13 N. J. L. 313; L. E., 4 Q. B. 471; 20 Moak, 466, 463. 'The Head^oney Cases, 18 F. E. 135 (1883), Blatchford, J.: s. c. 112X7. S. 580 (1884), Miller, J. »L. immunis, free from public service: in, not; munu Sy duty. * Lonas v. State, 3 Heisk. 306 (1871). » Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 810 (1879). ' Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U. S. 223 (1876), cases. ' Webster's Diet.; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 600 To relieve the distress which followed the war of the Eevolution, paper money was issued, worthless lands, and other property of no use to the creditor, were made a tender in payment of debts, and the time of payment stipulated in contracts was extended by law. These were the peculiar evils of the day. So much mischief was done and so much more apprehended, that general distrust prevailed, and confidence between man and man was destroyed.. To restore. public confidence, the f ramers of the Constitution prohibited the use of any means by which the same mischief might again be produced: they established the principle that contracts should be inviolable.* The reference is to contracts respecting property, under which an individual may claim a right to something beneficial to himself." The contracts protected are such as relate to property rights, not governmental. It may not be easy to tell on which side of the line a particular case is to be put.^ There was no intention to restrain the States in the regulation of their civil institutions, adopted for internal government." The prohibition does not include grants for public purposes, which are in effect mere regulations of internal police.* See further Monopoly; Policy, 1, Public. " Obligation " means the law which binds the parties to perform their undertaking. ^ See Obligation, 3. The prohibition applies to implied as well as to ex-. press, and to executory as well as to executed, contracts: as, a grant of lands by a State to an individual; • or, a compact between States; ' or, a grant of corporate powers 8 — unless a right of revocation or alteration is reserved in the grant or by a general law." But it does not include all contracts by a State with its public officers or municipal corporations.''* After a public officer has rendered the services required of the committee on style, resolute not "to countenance the issue of paper money, and the consequent violation of contracts," of himself added " No State shall pass laws altering or impairing the obligation of contracts." In the shorter form adopted by the convention. " an end was designed to be made to barren land laws, laws for the installment of debts, and laws closing the courts against suitors," — 2 Bancroft, Hist. Const. 214 (1882). 1 Sturges V. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 204, 208, 199 (1819), Marshall, C. J. "Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 628 (1819), Marshall, C. J.; Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 416 (1860); Newton v. Commissioners, 100 IT. S. 567 (1879); Charles Elver Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. •572 (1837); 2 Bancroft, Hist. Const. 213; Federalist, No. 44. » Stone V. Mississippi, 101 TJ. S. 830, 816 (1879). * East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 635 (1850). ' Sturges V. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 197 (1819), supra. « Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 137 (1810). ' Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 84 (1833). 'Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 628 (1819); Home of the Friendless v. Eouse, 8 Wall. 437 him under an enactment which fixes the rate of compensation {q. v.\ the obligation to pay for the services at that rate is perfected and rests on the remedies which the law then gives for its enforcement. ' A charter granted to a private corporation, which, in effect is a mere license, may be withdrawn; ^ so may any other engagement which is a mere gratuity; ' but not, without consent of the bona fide bondholder, power given a municipality to levy a tax with which to pay its bonds.* And a State may not tax mortgage bonds, secured on property within it, held by nonresidents.' Liability for a tort, created by statute, although reduced to judgment, is not such a debt by contract as is contemplated.* Imprisonment for debt, not being regarded as a part of a«onti^ct, may be abolished.' The prohibition extends to provisions of a State constitution, as well as to ordinar.7 legislation.^ The existing laws of the place where, or in reference to which, the contract is made, affecting its validity, construction, discharge, or enforcement, form part of the contract. The remedy, or means of enforcing the contract, is part of the obligation.^ Judicial construction, being a part of a statute, a change of decision is the same in effect as a new enactment, ^f* The Constitution intended to prohibit a law interpolating a new term or condition foreign to the original agreement." In short, any deviation from the terms of the contract, by postponing or accelerating the period of performance which it prescribes, by imposing conditions not expressed in the contract, or -by dispensing with the performance of those which are expressed, however minute or apparently immaterial in their effect upon the contract, impairs its obligation. '^ Diminishing value by legislation is impairment. ^^ But it is not necessarily impaired by a reasonable change in the mode of enforcing it; ^* unless it substantially lessens the rights of the creditor; ^^ nor is it ■risk V. Jefferson Police Jmy, 116 U. S. 131, 134 (1885). 'Stone V. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 820, 816 (1879). s West Wisconsin E. Co. v. Supervisors, 93 U. S. 595 (1876). <Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 635, 544 (1866); Wolff V. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 858 (1880). "State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 325 (1872). "Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109 U. S. 285 (1883); Chase v. Curtis, 113 id. 464 (1885). ' Penniman's Case, 103 U. S. 717, 720 (1880), cases. 'Dodge V. Woolsey, 18 How. 331 (1855); New Orleans Gas Co. V. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650, 673 (1885), cases; Fislc v, Jefferson Police Jury, 116 id. 131 (1885). » Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 317 (1872); Edwards V. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 600 (1877), cases; 102 id. 533. ■"Douglass V. County of Pike, 101 U. S. 687 (1879). 1' West Eiver Bridge Co. u Dix, 6 How. 633 (1848). 12 Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 84 (182.3), Washington, J. IS Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 327 (1848). impaired, necessarily, by a new statute of limitations.* In modes of proceeding and forms to enforce a contract, the legislature has control, and may enlarge, limit, or otherwise alter them, provided it does not deny a remedyor so embarrass it with"Conditions or restrictions as seriously to impair the value of theright.^ia See Remedy: Bounty. The prohibition in the Constitution refers to enactments to which the State gives the force of law; it does not apply to decisions of the courts, or acts of executive or administrative boards or officers, or doings of corporations or individuals... " When the- State court decides against a right claimed under a contract, and there was no law subsequent to the contract, this (the Supreme) court clearly has no jurisdiction. When the existence and the construction of a contract are undisputed, and the State court upholds a subsequent law, on the ground that it did not impair the obligation of the admitted contract, it is equally clear that this court has jurisdiction. When the State court holds that there was a contract c Dnten-ing certain rights, and that a subsequent law did not impair those rights, this court has jurisdiction to consider the true construction of the supposed contract, and, if it is of opinion-that itdid not confer the rights affirmed by the State court, and therefore its obligation was not impaired by the subsequent law, may on. that ground affirm the judgment. So, when the State com-t upholds the subsequent law, on the ground that the contract did not confer the right claimed, this court may inquire whether the supposed contract did give the right, because, if it did, the subsequent law cannot be upheld. But when the State court gives no effect to the subsequent law, but decides, on grounds independent of that law, that the right claimed was not conferred by the contract, the case stands just asif the subsequent law had not been passed, and this court has no jurisdiction."*