Intendment

TTnderstanding; judgment; intention. Intendment of law: the understanding or intelligence of the law; the judgment or meaning of the law; a presumption of law.

The correct understanding or intention of the law; the true meaning or correct policy of a law. INTENT; INTENTION. Design; determination; purpose. "Intent" implies purpose only — refers to the quality of the mind with which an act is done. " Attempt " (q. v.) implies an effort to carry intent into execution.' Common intent. The ordinary meaning of words. 1 County of Allegheny v. Gibson, 90 Pa. 417 (1879): Worcester's Diet. 'Ortwein v. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. 42i (1874); Bennett V. State, 57 Wis. 86 (1883). " Tatum V. State, 63 Ala. 163 (1879), Stone, J. * Brockway v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 9 F. E. 863 (1881). See Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Foley, 105 U. S. 354 (1881); 122 id. 512; Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. 1). Reif, 36 Ohio St. 599 (1881); 62 Cal. 178; 34 Iowa, 222; 70 N. Y. 605; 9 E. I. 346; 1 F. & F. 736. ' Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v, Muskegon Bank, 182 U. S. 608 (1887), Miller, J. sEtna Life Ins. Co. v. Davey, 123 U. S. 743-44 (1887); N. W. Life Ins. Co. v. Muskegon Bank, 132 id. 506 (1887), Criminal intent. Evil, malicious will expressed in a criminal act. While crime proceeds from a criminal mind, ignorance of the law is not a defense. General intent. A purpose to do something in general: as 1, to benefit a class of persons or objects by a charitable devise; 3, to violate law. Opposed, 1, particular intent: an intent, expressed in a will, which cannot be given effect, — see Cy Pkes; and, 2, specific intent: applied to an act done with a particular design. When an act, in general terms, is indictable, a criminal intent need not be shown, unless, from the language or effect of the law, a purpose to require the existence of such intent can be discovered. To introduce into the law the requisite of a guilty mind it must appear that such was the intent of thelaw-maker.i Neglect to discharge a duty, or indifference to consequences, is, in cases, equivalent to a specific criminal intent.' '* Act " and " intention," in the phrase " die by his own act or, intention," mean the same as "act " alone, for act implies intention. A criminal intent and a criminal act make a crime. But here a " specific intent " and a " criminal intent " are not to be confounded: they have nothing in com- mon except as mental operations. The former deter-, mines the object toward which the act shall be directed; the latter that the act so directed shall be done. The former, as part of the crininal act, must be alleged and proved as any other portion of the act; the latter is neither alleged nor proved, but inferred from the commission of the act. Thus, a criminal act presumes criminal intent, though the accused was intoxicated; but where th& existence of a specific intent is necessary to the act, a degree of drunkenness incom- ' patible with the formation of that intent negatives the act and dispi-oves the crirne.' See further Crime; Indictment; Malice: PREMEmTATE. Intention is judged of with reference to volimtary action. When guilty knowledge is an ingredient of an offense, evidence may be given of the commission of other acts of a like character where they are necessarily connected in time or place or as furnishing a clue to the motive." See further Guilty. Intention may be proved inductively by collateral facts; as, in trespass, slander, libel, fraud, adultery, questions of good faith, of prudence, etc' > Halsted v. State, 41 N. J. L. 652, 589-91 (1879), cases, Beasley, C. J. See also United States v. Bayaud, 16 P. K. 383 (1883). = United States v. Thomson, 13 F. E. 245 (1882). ' Chapman v. Eepubliclns. Co., 6 Biss. 340 (1874). See 3 Greenl. Ev. §§ 13-19; 1 Bish. Cr. L. §§ 488-9'3; Broom, Com. 876, 887-88; 2 Steph. Hist. Cr. Law Eng. 110-13; Commonwealth v. Hersey 3 Allen, 179-81 (1861), cases. Ee Binlnger, 7 Blatch. 267 (1870). At common law, an intention to commit a felonydoes not amount to the felony, though it did, by statute, where the intention was to commit treason. An intention to commit a fraud has been given the force and effect of fraud.' " Intent to injure and defraud " charges embezzlement, forgery, and like offenses.' As men seldom do unlawful acts with innocent intentions, the law presumes a wicked intent from any such act; but the prima facie case thus made out may be rebutted by showing the contrary. Thus, in murder, malice is presumed from the fact of killing.* Every person of sound mind is presumed to intend the necessary, natural, or legal consequences of his deliberate act.' This presumption may be conclusive, as when the consequences must necessarily follow the act; or be disputable, rebuttable by evidence of want of intention, where the consequences do not necessarily follow the act. Thus, where one voluntarily points a loaded pistol at a vital part, the law declares that the natural, inevitable consequence of that act is to kill, provided the pistol be fired; and the individual cannot be heard to say that he had no intent to kill. So, when a debtor procures his property to be taken on legal process, the effect being to defeat or delay the operation of a bankrupt act, he is held to have intended that effect." The intention is the turning point in an issue to decide whether a judgment against an insolvent was obtained with a view to give a preference.' Persons of sound mind and discretion are understood to intend, in the ordinary transactions of life, that which is the necessary and unavoidable consequences of their acts, as they are supposed to know what the consequences of their acts will be in such transactions. This rule applies in civil and criminal cases. Exceptions may arise; as, where the consequences likely to flow from the act are not matters of common knowledge, or where the act or the consequence is attended by circumstances tending to rebut the ordinary probative force of the act or to exculpate the intent of the agent — as, that the holder of a warrant to confess judgment could enter judgment to get a preference.' See further Oonsequences. Intention is gathered from all the things done, said, written; in ordinary documents, any words expressing it may be used. In wills it is " the pole-star of interpretation," when no rule of law is violated. In construing writings generally, the courts strive after the intention, putting themselves in the place of the party or parties.' See Abandon; Contkact; Domicil; Grant; Iqnobanoe; Statute; Wh Ij. 1 4 Bl. Com. 221. s 2 Pars. Contr. 772. = United States v. Taintor, 11 Blatch. 378 (1873). * 1 Greenl. Ev. § 34. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 167 (1878). Be Bininger, 7 Blatch! 268, 277 (1870), cases. ' Little V. Alexander, 21 Wall. BOO (1874). 'Clarion Bank v. Jones, 21 Wall. 337 (1874), Clifford, -Justice. 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 287-89. As to presumptions, see 30 Alb. Law J. 66-70 (1884), cases; evidence of, 22 Cent.