Interpretation

The act of finding out the true sense of any form of words — that is, the sense which their author intended to convey — and of enabling others to derive from them the same idea which the author intended to convey. 14 How. Pr. R. (N. Y.) 272. The discovery and representation of the true meaning of any signs used to convey ideas. Lieber, Leg. & Pol. Herm. "Construction" is sometimes used as a synonym (Jones, Const, p. 3), though it has been said that "construction" is the broader The "true meaning" of any signs is that meaning which those who used them were desirous of expressing. A perspn adopting or sanctioning them ''uses" them as well as their immediate author. Both parties to an agreement equally make use of the signs deplaratory of that agreement, though one only is the originator, and the other may be entirely passive. The most common signs used to convey ideas are words. When there is a contradiction in signs intended to agree, resort must be had to construction, — that is, the drawing of conclusions from the given signs, respecting ideas which they do not express. (1) Close interpretation (interpretatio restncta) is adopted if just reasons, connected with the formation and character of the text, induce us to take the words in their narrowest meaning. This species of interpretation has generally been called "literal," but the term is inadmissible. Lieber, Leg. & Pol. Herm. 66. (2) Extensive interpretation (interpre Uvtio extensiva, called, also, "liberal interpretation") adopts a more comprehensive signification of the word. (3) Extravagant interpretation (interpretatio excedens) is that which substitutes a meaning evidently beyond the true one. It is therefore not genuine interpretation. (4) Free or unrestricted interpretation (interpretatio soluta) proceeds simply on the general principles of interpretation in good faith, not bound by any specific or superior principle (5) Limited or restricted interpretation (interpretatio limitata) is when we are influenced by other principles than the strictly hermeneutic ones. Emesti, Inst. Interp. (6) Predestined interpretation (interpretatio predestinata) takes place if the interpreter, laboring under a strong bias of mind, makes the text subservient to his preconceived views or desires. This includes artful interpretation (interpretatio vafer), by which the interpreter seeks to give a meaning to the text other than the one he knows to have been intended. The civilians divide interpretation into: (1) Authentic (interpretatio authentiea), which proceeds from the author himself. (2) Usual (interpretatio nsualis), when the interpretation is on the ground of usage. (3) Doctrinal (interpretatio doctrinalis), when made agreeably to rules of science. Doctrinal interpretation is subdivided into extensive, restrictive, and declaratory, — extensive, whenever the reason of a proposition has a broader sense than its terms, and it is consequently applied to a case which had not been explained; restrictive, when the expressions have a greater latitude than the reasons; and declaratory, when the reasons and terms agree, but it is necessary to settle the meaning of some term or terms to make the sense complete.

The art or process of discovering and expounding the intended signification of the language used in a statute, will, contract or any other written document, that is, the meaning which the author designed it to convey to others. People v. Com'ra of Taxes, 95 N. Y. 559; Rome v. Knox, 14 How. Prae. (N. Y.) 272; Ming v. Pratt, 22 Mont. 262, 56 Pac. 279; Tallman v. Tallman, 3 Misc. Rep. 465, 23 N. Y. Supp. 734. The discovery and representation of the true meaning of any signs used to convey ideas. Lieb. Herm. "Construction" is a term of wider scope than "interpretation;" for, while the latter is concerned only with ascertaining the sense and meaning of the subject-matter, the former may also be directed to explaining the legal effects and consequences of the instrument in question. Hence interpretation precedes construction, but stops at the written text. Close interpretation (interpretatio restricta.) is adopted if just reasons, connected with the formation and character of the text, induce us to take the words in their narrowest meaning. This species of interpretation has generally been called "literal," but the term is inadmissible. Lieb. Herm. 54. Extensive interpretation (interpretatio extensiva, called, also, "liberal interpretation") adopts a more comprehensive signification of the word. Id. 58. Extravagant interpretation (interpretatio excedens) is that which substitutes a meaning evidently beyond the true one. It is therefore not genuine interpretation. Id. 59. Free or unrestricted interpretation (interpretatio soluta) proceeds simply on the general principles of interpretation in good faith, not bound by any specific or superior principle. Id. 59. Limited or restricted interpretation (interpretatio limitata) is when we are influenced by other principles than the strictly hermeneutic ones. Id. 60. Predestined interpretation (interpretatio predestinata) takes place if the interpreter, laboring under a strong bias of mind, makes the text subservient to his preconceived views or desires. This includes artful interpretation, (interpretatio vafer,) by which the interpreter seeks to give a meaning to the text other than the one he knows to have been intended. Id. 60. It is said to be either "legal," which rests on the same authority as the law itself, or "doctrinal," which rests upon its intrinsic reasonableness. Legal interpretation may be either "authentic," when it is expressly provided by the legislator, or "usual," when it is derived from unwritten practice. Doctrinal interpretation may turn on the meaning of words and sentences, when it is called "grammatical," or on the intention of the legislator, when it is described as "logical." When logical interpretation stretches the words of a statute to cover its obvious meaning, it is called "extensive;" when, on the other hand, it avoids giving full meaning to the words, in order not to go beyond the intention of the legislator, it is called "restrictive." Holl. Jur. 344. As to strict and liberal interpretation, see Construction. In the civil law, authentic interpretation of laws is that given by the legislator himself, which is obligatory on the courts. Customary interpretation (also called "usual") is that which arises from successive or concurrent decisions of the court on the same subject-matter, having regard to the spirit of the law, jurisprudence, usages, and equity; as distinguished from "authentic" interpretation, whjch is that given by the legislator himself. Houston v. Robertson, 2 Tex. 26.

— Interpretation clause. A section of a statute which defines the meaning of certain word? occurring frequently in the other sections.

Explanation tion or authoritative of some clause or word

Is used interchangeably with " construction." Opposed, misinterpretation. The act of finding out the true sense of any form of words, that is, the sense their > [3 Bl. Com. 448. = Atkinson v. Marks, 1 Cow. 703 (1883). s Howe Machine Co. v. Gif Eord, 66 Barb. B99 (1872). See also 2 Paige, Ch. 800; 8 Story, Eq. Oh. XX. * Killian v. Ebbinghaus, 110 U. S. 571 (1884), cases. " )i Story, Eq, S 820; Third Nat. Bank v. Lumber Co., 138 Mass. 410 (1888), cases. See generally Mc Munn v. Carpthers, 4 Clarke, Pa., 134r^6 (1848); 8 Pomeroy, Eq. §§ 1319-89. author intended; and of enabling others to derive from them the same idea.i Properly precedes construction, but does not go beyond the written text." See furtlier Constbdotioh; Ikterpretatio.