Iso U.S

452. 21 Sup. Ct. 423, 4T> I.. I'd. 619; People v. Miller, S4 App. Div. 171. 82 N. Y. Sup]). f>^2, where Budd v. New York. 143 C. s. 517, 12 Sup. Ct. 468, 36 I.. Ed. 247, and Munn v. Illinois, 91 V. S. 113, -1 1- Ed. 77, were eited with the comment that i'1 oT them the point was a minor one and did not receive full consideration, and upon that point they bad been much criticized. So it was held that coal mined in one slate and sent LntO another to await shipment to pur- Chasers was not exempt from slate taxation as subject-matter of Interstate commerce; Lehigh & Wilkes Iiarre Coal Co. v. Bo of Junction, 75 N. J. L. 922, OS Atl. 806, 15 L. R, A. (N. S.) 514, in the power of congress to enact, and its power to regulate interstate commerce does not require that the regulation should apply to all commodities alike, nor does an exception of one invalidate it; U. S. v. Delaware & H. Co., 213 U. S. 36G, 29 Sup. Ct. 527, 53 L. Ed. S36. The Employers' Liability Act of June 11, 1906, providing that every common carrier jed in trade and commerce in the District of Columbia or in the territories or between the several states shall be liable for the death or injury of any of its employes which may result from the negligence of any of its officers, agents or employes was held to be a regulation of intrastate as well as of interstate commerce, and therefore one beyond the power of congress to enact; Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 2S Sup. Ct. 141, 52 L. Ed. 297, four Justices dissenting. As to the case of the Second Employers' Liability Act of 1908, see supra. Transportation in and out of the state is interstate commerce. A railroad entirely in a state, but a connecting link of interstate roads, is engaged in interstate commerce: Houston Direct Nav. Co. v. Ins. Co., 89 Tex. 1, 32 S. W. 8S9, 30 L. R. A. 713, 59 Am. St. Rep. 17; but an interstate shipment (in this case, of car load lots) on reaching the point designated in the original contract of transportation ceases to be an interstate shipment, and its further transportation to another point within the same state, on the order of the consignee, is controlled by the law of the state and not by the interstate commerce act; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Texas. 204 U. S. 403, 27 Sup. Ct. 360, 51 L. Ed. 540. Shipments of lumber on local bills of lading from one point in a state to another point in the same state destined from the beginning for export, are foreign and not intrastate commerce; De Bary & Co. v. Louisiana, 227 U. S. 108, 33 Sup. Ct. 239, 57 L. Ed.; following Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 498. 31 Sup. Ct. 279, 55 L. Ed. 310; Railroad Commission of Ohio v. R. Co., 225 U. S. 101, 32 Sup. Ct. 653, 56 L. Ed. 1004; distinguishing Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403, 27 Sup. Ct. 360, 51 L. Ed. 540. When the Power of Congress is Exclusive. The power of congress over interstate commerce "is necessarily exclusive whenever the subject-matter is national in its character and properly admits of only one uniform system," and in such cases non-action by congress is equivalent to a declaration that it shall be free and untrammelled; Philadelphia & S. Mail S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 336, 7 Sup. Ct. 1118, 30 L. Ed. 1200; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. Ed. 347; Robbins v. Taxing Dist, 120 U. S. 4S9, 498, 7 Sup. Ct. 592, 30 L. Ed. 694; where it was said that if selling goods by the whole country, and congress alone can do it; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 5 Sup. Ct 1091, 29 L. Ed. 257; Bowman v. R, Co., 125 U. S. 465, 8 Sup. Ct. 6S9, 1062, 31 L. Ed. 700; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 35, 18 L. Ed. 745, where it was held that the states have no right to tax interstate commerce although they may tax the instruments of such commerce in like manner as other property of the same description. Such a regulation, national in its nature, is the requirement of a bond of indemnity from passengers arriving from foreign ports; Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259, 23 L. Ed. 543; or the payment of a tax on each such passenger; Smith v. Turner, 7 How. (U. S.) 283, 12 L. Ed. 702 (but the requirement of a list of passengers, with ages, occupations, etc., is a police regulation within the power of the state; New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. [U. S.] 103, 9 L. Ed. 648); so also the transportation of persons or merchandise "is in its nature national, admitting of but one regulating power"; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681, 34 L. Ed. 128; Bowman v. R. Co., 125 U. S. 465, 8 Sup. Ct. 6S9, 1062, 31 L. Ed. 700; Sloman v. Moeba Co., 139 Mich. 334, 102 N. W. 854; Richter v. Poppenhausen, 42 N. Y. 374; Greek- American Sponge Co. v. Drug Co., 124 Wis. 469, 102 N. W. 888, 109 Am. St. Rep. 961; though the delivery is made by an agent, residing in the state, of the non-resident seller; Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60, 25 Sup. Ct. 403, 49 L. Ed. 663; whether the sale is made directly to the customer or to a retailer; id.; imported goods in unbroken original packages are not subject to state taxation; In re Doane, 197 111. 376, 64 N. E. 377; State v. Board of Assessors, 46 La. Ann. 145, 15 South. 10, 49 Am. St. Rep. 318; but merchandise consigned by non-resident sellers to and stored by a warehouseman, awaiting future sale and delivery, is not protected from local assessment as interstate commerce; Merchants' Transfer Co. v. Board of Review, 128 la. 732, 105 N. W. 211, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 662, 5 Ann. Cas. 1016. As to matters under the exclusive power of congress, national in their character and requiring general and not local rules of regulation, the fact that congress has not legislated does not make it lawful for the states to do so. Such inaction shows only that no restrictions are to be put upon commerce in that direction. The right to legislate is exclusively vested in congress; and when congress legislates on a subject within its exclusive power a state loses control of any right it may have had to apply the police power to it, even though the federal act is not to take effect until a future period; Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370, 32 Sup. Ct. 160, 56 L. Ed. 237. The course of decisions, mainly in 'the legislatures have attempted to deal In the enactment of statutes which have been held unconstitutional because they interfered with the exclusive power of congress conferred by the commerce clause of the constitution. Among the statutes which have thus fallen umkr the bau of the final authority on the subject is one Imposing a burdensome condition upon a shipmaster as a prerequisite for landing his passengers, with the alternative of the payment of a small sum for each of them; Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259, 23 L. Bd. 543; one regulating the arrival of passengers from a foreign port and authorizing an executive officer to include passengers of certain classes at his discretion; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 r. s. 275, 23 L. Ed. 550; which the court considered as having been enacted mainly to exclude Chinese Immigration, and to go far beyond tbe legitimate state action • eluding pauper or convict immigrants. See also In re Ah Fong, 3 Sawy. 144, Fed. ('as. No. 102. But a statute is not invalid where the detention is for the purpose of disinfection by the order of a state board of health; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 410. -6 L. Ed. 67S;.Minneapolis, St. P. &